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VIII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Claimant! Appellate, Francisco Serrano is a framer who worked the Defendant as an 
employee oth of September 2001 until February 2008. Defendants were subject to 
Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. Claimant was injured in mid January 2004 when he off 
a roof and landed on his right side injuring his right shoulder, back and fracturing his pelvis, 
resulting in a herniated disk as reflected in the St Alphonsus records by Sandra Thompson on the 
28th Claimant aggravated the above 2004 injury on the 28th of January 2008 while 
employed Four Season Framing when he slipped on ice. 
claimed workers compensation benefits for the two industrial accidents 
described above. The Industrial Commission denied both claims on the grounds that the 
Claimants arose from a pre-existing condition and Claimant therefore failed to prove 
his condition was caused by the accidents. The Claimant! Appellant seeks review of the Idaho 
Industrial Commission ("the Commission") orders. The Commission had jurisdiction to hear the 
case pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506. This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the 
Commission's order pursuant to Article V, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution, § 72-724 and § 72-
1368(9), and Idaho Appellate Rules 4 and 14(b). The Claimant! Appellant timely tiled his notice 
of appeal Commission's decisions. See I.A.R 14(b) (The Claimant has an appeal as a 
matter by a notice of appeal with the Commission within 42 days an order of the 
Commission). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 1 
I' 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY APPELLANT 
1. DID THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE 
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS REFUSED A PROTECTIVE 
ORDER UNDER HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AS 
OUTLINED IN HIS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND DENIED SUCH ON THE 
23 RD OF FEBRUARY 2010, THE 24TH OF FEBRUARY 2011 AND ON THE 21 ST OF 
DECEMBER 2011? 
II. DID INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE 
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS ORDERED TO WAIVE HIS 
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT OR BE 
DENIED BENEFITS UNDER IDAHO WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS 
SIGNED ON THE 7TH OF SEPTEMBER 201O? 
III. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE 
DISCRETION WHEN THEY OVERRULED CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S 
OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE TESTIMONY AND DEPOSITION OF DR. 
TIMOTHY DOERR IN THE ORDER DATED THE 5TH AUGUST 2011 AND 
GRANTING THE SECOND EXTENSION ON THE 7TH OF NOVEMBER 2011? 
IV. DID INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
V. 
EVIDENCE AND ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION 
WHEN THEY DETERMINED THE CLAIMANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO THE MEDICAL BENEFITS (PALLIATIVE, CURATIVE, AND 
OTHERWISE), WHETHER INCURRED AND NOT PAID OR WHETHER NOT 
INCURRED AND IMPAIRMENT RATING PURSUANT TO I.e. 72-432(1, ~, 
TEMPORARY DISABILITY AND ATTORNEY FEES AS ORDERED ON THE 20 H 
OF MARCH 2013? 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE 
DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED THE ITEMS REQUESTED IN 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD FILED 
ON THE 18TH OF JUNE 2013? 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED 
DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS REFUSED A PROTECTIVE 
ORDER UNDER HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AS 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 2 
IN HIS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER ON 23 RD OF 
FEBRUARY 2010, THE 24TH OF FEBRUARY 2011 ON THE 21 sT OF 
DECEMBER 2011. 
'~H~UA'.H incorporates and includes herein the arguments, case citations made the 
pleadings and part of the record. 
1. Controlling Authority from the Ninth Circuit Indicates that Immigration Status is 
not a Relevant Issue in a Workers Compensation Claim. 
Central to issues in this case is the Industrial Commissions holding in Diaz v. Franklin 
Building (Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation, 2006-507999) In Diaz, the Commission held that undocumented workers did 
not qualify permanent disability benefits because there exists no legal labor market for them. 
This holding by Commission indicated that immigration status is relevant to determinations 
of permanent and partial disability in workers compensation claims and conflicts with relevant 
case from Ninth Circuit. 
The appellate decision Rivera et ai., v. Nibco, Inc., considered right of an employer to 
discover ________ ''''_ status and held "By revealing their immigration status, any plaintiffs found 
to be undocumented might face criminal prosecution and deportation." 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 
2004) (cert. Denied)(Mar. 7, 2005) The court in Rivera held that immigration status is not 
relevant found protective order granted by the lower court was justified because the 
grave "chilling effect that the disclosure of plaintiffs' immigration status could have on their 
ability to effectuate their rights." Further, "[W]hile documented workers face possibility of 
retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil rights, undocumented workers 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 3 
confront reality that, in addition to possible discharge, employer will likely 
report them to the INS and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal 
prosecution." 1£1 at 1064. The Supreme Court declined to review the decision upholding an 
order iimiting employers' inquiries into plaintiffs' immigration status. Additionally, compelled 
disclosure of immigration status hurts documented workers: 
Even documented workers may be chilled by the type of discovery at issue here. 
workers may fear that their immigration status would be changed, or 
status would reveal the immigration problems their family or friends; 
similarly, new legal residents or citizens may feel intimidated by prospect of 
having their immigration history examined in a public proceeding. Any of these 
individuals, failing to understand the relationship between litigation and 
immigration status, might choose to forego civil rights litigation. 
Rivera v. Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) 
The National Labor Relations Board expressed identical concerns when, in connection 
with unfair labor practices, the employer's counsel inquired into employees' 
length of the United States, places of education, previous employment, and also 
subpoenaed their passports, "green cards," and employment authorization cards. In finding that 
this "intimidation witnesses" constituted an unfair labor practice, Board concluded that: 
The excuse which counsel could proffer [for the subpoenas] was that he 
wanted to test the credibility of all those witnesses by calling into question 
whether they signed their proper names on their pretrial affidavits . . . offered 
no other evidence tending to show that anyone of them, other than Figueroa, was 
working or testifying under an assumed name. His pretext for seeking these 
documents this purpose was a transparent fiction . 
. . . [T]he effect upon the General Counsel's witnesses of this wholly irrelevant 
probe their immigration status which [the administrative judge] observed 
at the hearing ranged from unsettling to devastating and certainly affected their 
ability to testify. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 4 
Boat Works., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 844 (1 , the Board's 
consequent cease and desist order enjoined the employer from "[t]hreatening employees with 
deportation or into question their immigration status in order to discourage them from 
giving testimony under the Act." Id The critical importance of minimizing potential for 
adverse consequences to employees who might invoke their statutory workplace rights is, of 
course, well established: 
Plainiv. effective enforcement [of the FLSA] could thus only be expected if 
employees free to approach officials with their grievances .... [I]t needs no 
argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might operate to induce 
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions. 
Mitchell v. Robert Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,292 (1960). 
the Circuit and the courts of the Eastern District consistently found that 
the entitlement plaintiffs to monetary relief for employment claims is unaffected by their 
immigration or employment authorization status. See, e.g., Local 512, Warehouse & Office 
Workers' v. NLRB (Felbro), 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (granting petition for 
enforcement containing back pay award); Bevies Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 
1391 (9th 1986) (upholding arbitration awards granting to undocumented 
employees); v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th 1989) (following Felbro 
regarding pay availability); EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor. "758 .Supp. 585 (E.D. Cal. 
1991) (scope Title VII not diminished by passage ofIRCA). 
Respondents· inquiries into these areas have no legitimate purpose. Indeed, questions 
implicating of birth may be highly sensitive inasmuch as -- in conjunction with information 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 5 
about birthplace and citizenship status -- they could lead to adverse inferences about an 
individual's immigration status or work authorization. See, e.g., Chau v. LVS, 247 F.3d 026 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage, shifting 
the burden to respondent or deportee to prove citizenship); Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605,608-
09 (9th Cir. 995) (same). 
The courts reasoning in the cases above in the areas of discrimination and unfair labor 
practices are especially applicable to the field of workers compensation. "Proceedings under the 
Workmen's Compensation Law are designed to afford employees a speedy, summary and simple 
remedy for recovery of compensation for injuries sustained industrial accidents ... " 
Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263-64 (1968) see Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho 
579 (1975), also see Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13 984). The humane purposes 
which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 
87,88,910 P.2d 759, 760 996). The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are 
to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 
955,956, (1990). 
undocumented workers know that they cannot receIve workers compensation 
permanent disability benefits, employers are free to sidestep the humane purposes of workers 
compensation law when hiring them. The above issues are reoccurring themes for this office and 
many others the legal community working in the field of workers compensation. Because of 
the expenses of litigation and the current practice of the Industrial Commission to deny the 
possibility of disability benefits to undocumented workers, access to the legal system for non-
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 6 
affluent undocumented Hispanic workers has been severely limited. Many workers 
compensation claims simply are not cost efficient for attorneys to take on the issue of 
permanent ~.~~~"u is automatically removed. 
2. Neither Idaho Law nor Legislative Intent Support the Holding in Diaz which also 
Runs Counter to Established Public Policy. 
Despite the various interpretations of the basis for the arguments or against Diaz, the 
end result is Idaho does not provide for workers compensation disability undocumented 
immigrants. holding is in contract Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609 ( 986). In Sanchez the 
Idaho Supreme Court clarified it would be against public policy to allow the employer to take 
advantage of cheap labor of an illegal alien without assuming the corresponding burden of 
his disability ifhe became injured on the job. 
Diaz also failed to account for the Idaho Legislature that clarified that benefits are available 
even there is not a legal labor market for employees. Such argument that no benefits should be 
paid there is no legal market contradicts the express assertion legislature in Idaho Code 72-
204(2) as is no "labor market" for minors, but benefits are not denied therein. 
Idaho Code 72-204(2) states as follows: 
The following shall constitute employees in private employment and their 
employers subject to the provisions of this law: 
(2) A person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully 
employed, in the service of an employer .... 
Under I.C. § 72-204, undocumented aliens, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, are 
considered employees in private employment and their employers are subject to all provisions of 
the worker's compensation act. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 7 
Legislature's intent not to deny any benefits to illegal immigrants may also be 
inferred from comparing Idaho Code Title 72 Chapter 13 (Employment Security Law) with 
Idaho Code Title 72 Chapters 1 through 8 (Workers Compensation). Idaho's Workers 
Compensation Act defines the term "Alien" within the Workers Compensation Act: 
"Alien" means a person who is not a citizen, a national or a resident of the United 
States or Canada. Any person not a citizen or national of the United States who 
relinquishes or is about to relinquish his residence in the United States shall be 
regarded as an alien. 
Idaho Code §72-102(1). Idaho Code §72-1366 prohibits "aliens" from obtaining unemployment 
benefits. contrast, Idaho Code Title 72 Chapters 1 through 8 dealing with Workers 
Compensation benefits makes no such distinction between those who are eligible for benefits or 
the benefits that may be awarded. Nothing in Idaho Code Title 72 Chapters 1 through 8 suggests 
that "aliens" are entitled to any less benefits than United States citizens legal immigrants. 
Where statutes are ambiguous, Courts employ relevant rules of statutory construction, 
beginning the literal words of statute, giving the language of the statute its plain, obvious, 
and rational meanings. Driver v. S1 Corp. 139 Idaho 423, 429 (2003) " ... [i]t is a fundamental 
law of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed together, to 
the end that the legislative intent will be given effect." [Citations omitted]." Rogers v. Household 
Life Ins. Co. 2011 WL 924034, 2 (Idaho, 2011). Statutes must interpreted according to their 
intent, and intent is not clear it is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and 
necessity law, from the mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be 
taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason and good discretion. Noble v. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 8 
Glenns Bank, Limited 91 Idaho 364, 367, (Idaho 1966). Reading Code Title 72 in 
pari it is evident that it is the intent of the Idaho Legislature to prohibit aliens from 
obtaining unemployment benefits, but not Worker's Compensation benefits. 
Obviously, intent of the legislature in favor not only of coverage but of the right to 
benefits is beyond caviL 
The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and even more upon the 
welfare of its wageworkers .... and sure and certain relief for injured workmen 
and their families and dependents is hereby provided .... 
Idaho Code §§72-20 - Declaration of Police Power. The plain meaning of a statute therefore 
will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to 
absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). St. Luke's 
Regional Center, Ltd v. Board ofCom'rs of Ada County~ 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 
683, 685 (Idaho,2009). There is no ambiguity with respect to the meaning of the pertinent 
statutes Code Title 72 relating to Workers Compensation benefits, because they do not 
make any exceptions to the rights to benefits based upon immigration status. To hold that a 
Claimant cannot obtain disability benefits because he is not a legal resident, but that his last legal 
residence in own country cannot be considered, is simply a back door means of avoiding the 
distinction rlpr<X'P?'n Idaho Code Title 72 Chapter 13 (Employment Security Law) and Idaho 
Code 72 Chapters 1 through 8 (Workers Compensation). 
It would be against public policy to allow Defendants, after an industriai accident has 
occurred, to investigate Claimant's immigration status a second time, especially where they 
cannot demonstrate their reason to now question his immigration status. The Idaho Legislature, 
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In policy behind the Worker's Compensation Act and declaration of police 
power. makes no distinction between employees on the basis of nationality, race or immigration 
status. Code §72-20l, §72 - 102 (12). It is evident the fact that the Workers 
Compensation Act covers "unlawful" employment and the fact it does not an 
employee reference to alienage, that illegal immigrants are subject to entitled to benefits 
under the act -- no doubt because employers desired to have the act's exclusivity provisions 
extend to including the thousands of farm workers exposed to hazardous machinery. 
Furthermore, and most importantly from a public policy perspective, allowing employers 
to evade 
employing 
for disability benefits of illegal aliens further reduces the cost of 
immigrants as against legal immigrants and citizens, one assumes that the 
Workers Compensation sureties account for the anticipated reduced payout in disability benefits. 
In other words, present stance of the Idaho Industrial Commission encourages employers to 
turn a blind eye to immigration status, and then to attack the Claimant's immigration status as a 
defense to Claimant's right to benefits. Presuming, as any reasonable person would, that 
employers have some general knowledge of the prevalence of illegal immigrants in Idaho, and in 
Canyon County in particular, this creates an incentive for employers to exercise minimal 
diligence determining the immigration status of employees. As a practical matter, then, the 
Commission's stance encourages employers to hire Hispanics rather other races, 
sInce probability is higher that Hispanics may be illegal and have to be paid less in 
benefits the case an injury_ 
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hiring the Claimant, the Defendant employer was required to verify the 
Claimant's immigration status by The Immigration Reform and Act 986. The 
Defendant presumably performed this investigation with due diligence and accepted the 
Claimant's immigration status without problems. After the hire, the Defendant received the 
benefits the Claimant's diligent and laborious services. Now, light of the recent Idaho 
Industrial decision in Diaz, Defendants seek to disprove previously 
determined - the legal immigration status of the Claimant. Nothing in record reflects that 
the Defendants have any basis for doing this other than Claimant's race and nationality. 
However, Defendants obviously have concluded that "it is worth a shot" of Diaz. 
whether or not to permit discovery of immigration status in civil and 
administrative proceedings involves important considerations of public policy affecting not only 
illegal immigrants, but legal immigrants, employers and sureties. The facts to be weighed in 
considering whether or not to permit discovery of immigration status are complex. Many of 
those factors are lucidly discussed in the dissent in Diaz. 
3. Compelling Discovery Of Immigration Status Places Employers Danger Of 
......... ,," Prosecution 
Claimant respectfully suggests that the Industrial Commission may want to consider the 
potential criminal liability of employers that may be evidenced by information discovered during 
immigration status "fishing expeditions." In at least some cases, this may a of discovery 
that an employer \vould strongly prefer to avoid. "In light of the IRCA prohibitions and the 1-9 
certification, an employer the person who executed the form) might find it prudent to invoke 
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the UH'V,""HH'~HC privilege against self-incrimination in response to a pointedly framed 
discovery request. court might decide to avoid this controversy entirely simply by barring all 
immigration-related discovery." Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, Trial, 
March 2003, at 54. Most significantly, it is a Federal offense to "shelter" an illegal immigrant as 
discussed below. 
prosecution 
turning their heads while employing illegal immigrants face potential 
violation of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 324(a)(1 )(A)(iii). Employment 
constitutes harboring where employer knew or recklessly disregarded person's illegal status and 
took steps to her remain in employment undetected by INS. US. v. Sanchez, 927 F.2d 376 
(8th Cir. 1 1). Approving a jury charge defining harboring as "any conduct tending to 
substantially 
Gonzalez, 674 
an alien's remaining in the United illegally." us. v. Rubio-
1067, 1073 (Fifth Cir. 1982). The term "harbor" was to encompass 
conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien's "remaining in United States illegally. 
us. Lopez 521 F.2d 437,440 -441 (C.A.N.Y. 1975). 
Aiding and abetting harboring is also a crime that the government may prove by 
establishing (l) the alien entered or remained in the U. S. of law; (2) the 
defendant concealed. harbored or sheltered the alien in the U.S.; (3) the defendant knew or 
recklessly disregarded that the alien entered or remained in the U.S. in violation of law; and (4) 
the defendant's conduct tended to substantially facilitate the alien remaining the Us. v. De 
Jesus-Batre,)', 10 F.3d 154, 60 (FifthCir. 2005). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 12 
Criminal liability for employers also can be based on the simple act of "encouraging" an 
alien to stay the United States, "regardless of whether such has received prior official 
authorization to come to, emer, or reside in the United States and regardless of any future official 
action which may taken with respect to such alien" or simply aiding or abetting anyone else 
who encourages an alien to reside in the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(A). Although 
employment alone may not be sufficient to evidence a criminal violation, the United States 
successfully used defendant's employment of undocumented workers to establish that he 
facilitated their abilitv to remain in U.S. as an element necessarv 
., ., a conviction for harboring, 
concealing or shielding undocumented workers. Us. v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390 (FifthCir. 2007). 
While INS regulatory comments suggest that the criminal provisions of INA 
§274(a)( will not be applied to cases involving only employment, at least one court ignored 
the regulatory comments and found that employment does constitute harboring. Us. v. Kim,. 193 
F.3d 567, 572-74 (2d Cir. 999). Another court found that it was not reversible error for a 
district judge to refuse to give a "mere employment" jury instruction to harboring and smuggling 
charges. Any person is subject to a potential 10-year sentence for knowingly aiding or assisting a 
person to enter the .S., if that person is inadmissible on criminal or security grounds. Knowing 
that the inadmissible person has a prior felony conviction is not an element of the crime that the 
United States must prove. INA §277, 8 U.S.C. §1327. The government need only prove that the 
defendant knew the person was inadmissible. US v. Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
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immigration status carries with it the virtual certainty information 
discovered evidences illegal status must be reported to the INS or Department of Homeland 
Security. "Any person who ... encourages or induces an alien to ... reside ... knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such ... residence is ... in violation of law, shall be punished 
as provided. . for each alien in respect to whom such a violation occurs ... fined under title 18 
... imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." Section 274 felonies under the Federal 
Immigration Nationality Act, INA 27 4A( a) (1 )(A). A person (including a group of persons, 
business, organization, or local government) commits a federal felony when she or he assists an 
alien slhe reasonably know is illegally in the U.S. or who lacks employment 
authorization, by transporting, sheltering, or assisting him or her to obtain employment, or, 
encourages alien to remain in the U.S. by referring him or her to an employer or by acting as 
employer or agent an employer in any way. Arguably once employers, sureties or members 
of the Commission or its staff discover that a Claimant is illegal, they must report that fact to the 
appropriate agency. Permitting discovery of immigration status Claimants creates a 
slippery slope for employers. Obviously, if the employer and surety are entitled to conduct 
discovery regarding the Claimant's immigration status, the Claimant will have same right to 
reqUlre disclosure of similar information from the employer, if only to allow them to create a 
record on they can assert estoppel arguments: 
Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, 39 Trial 46, 54 
(2003) (explaining that if the employer asserted a defense under Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, an employee "would be entitled to engage discovery regarding the 
employer's prior knowledge of his or her immigration status. Proof of an 
employer's general practices and knowledge regarding other immigrant workers 
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relevant evidence." 
Cimini. 61 Stan. Rev. at 415 Emphasis supplied. Given the number of illegal immigrants 
working in Idaho, it is likely, if not certain, that at least some employers will "wink" at hiring 
employees to be illegal immigrants. Many more will likely maintain shoddy practices 
with respect to the hiring of immigrants. The IRCA requires employers to verify that all newly-
hired employees present "facially valid" documentation verifying the employee's identity and his 
or her legal authorization to accept employment in the United States. The employer is faced with 
a Hobson's Choice. The employer must verify that employees present "facially valid" 
documentation prior to hiring, yet an employer who knowingly acceplS fraudulent documentation 
can also be prosecuted under other immigration laws. 
can face stiff penalties for IRCA violations that include substantial 
debarment from government contracts. Penalties can imposed for 
unauthorized workers as well as simply for committing paperwork 
violations even if all workers are authorized to work. Fines for hiring 
workers will amount to anywhere from $250 to $5,500 per worker 
Y'-'f-,"'U"'Uc'A on the prior history of violation. Employers can also be barred from 
competing government contracts for a year if they knowingly hire or continue 
to unauthorized aliens. Paperwork violations can also result in significant 
fines. Each mistake or missing item on a form can result in a $1 penalty up to 
$1 each form. A missing form would automatically be assessed at $1000. 
for example, that had 100 employees and did not complete 1-9 
might face a $100,000 fine. IRCA investigators have considerable 
assessing fines and will look at factors like of the company, 
seriousness of the violations, whether the employer was trying to comply in 
good the pattern of past violations. 
should also be cautioned that knowingly accepting fraudulent 
documents from employees is a different kind of violation that can be criminaliy 
prosecuted under other immigration laws. 
ABCs of Immigration: 1-9 Compliance Avoiding Bombshells 
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http://w-..;vw.visalaw.com/07jan1l2janl07.htm!. 
The burden on the employer has been made clear by the United States Department of Justice: 
INS can impose civil fines on an employer for three types of activity prohibited in 
the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA: 1) knowingly hiring unauthorized 
aliens; 2) knowingly continuing to employ unauthorized aliens; and 3) hiring any 
without verifying identity and authorization to work.3 Verification 
violations occur when an employer's records are filled out incorrectly, do not 
exist, or are not produced for inspection. Civil fines knowingly hiring and 
knowingly continuing to employ range from $250 to $10,000 per alien. Civil fines 
verification violations range from $100 to $1,000 per employee. only 
criminal violation of the employer sanctions provisions is for a pattern or practice 
knowingly hiring or knowingly continuing to employ. This misdemeanor is 
purlishable a criminal fine of $3,000 per alien and imprisonment up to 6 
months for entire pattern or practice. 
United States Department of Justice, Immigration And Naturalization Service Efforts To 
Combat Harboring And Employing Illegal Aliens In Sweatshops, May 1996 Report Number 1-
96-08. Emphasis supplied. "Knowing" means: 
) term knowing includes not only actual knowledge but also knowledge 
which may fairly be inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances 
which wouid lead a person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to k.'10W 
about a certain condition. Constructive knowledge may include, but is not limited 
to, situations where an employer: 
(i) to complete or improperly completes the Employment Eligibility 
Verification Form, 1-9; 
Has information available to it that would indicate that the alien is not 
authorized to work, such as Labor Certification and/or an Application for 
Prospective Employer; or 
Acts with reckless and wanton disregard for the legal consequences of 
permitting another individual to introduce an unauthorized alien into its work 
force or to act on its behalf. 
(2) Knowledge that an employee is unauthorized may not be inferred from an 
employee's foreign appearance or accent. Nothing in this definition should be 
interpreted as permitting an employer to request more or different documents than 
are required under section 274(b) of the Act or to refuse to honor documents 
T"'''',r1'''"r;~r1 that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine and to relate to the 
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PART 274a-CONTROL OF EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS, Subpart A-Employer 
Requirements" § 27 4a.l Detinitions. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security imputes knowledge of immigration status to 
employers based on "constructive knowledge: 
Constructive Knowledge 
Knowingly hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens is a serious 
violation that subjects the employer to civil and, where there is a pattern or 
practice of such violations, criminal penalties. In this context, the term knowing 
includes not only actual knowledge but also knowledge which may fairly be 
inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances which would lead a 
person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know about a certain condition. 
Constructive knowledge may include, but is not limited to, situations where an 
employer: (1) fails to complete or improperly completes the Form I-9; (2) has 
information available to it that would indicate that the alien is not authorized to 
work, such as Labor Certification and/or an Application for Prospective 
Employer; or (3) acts with reckless and wanton disregard for legal 
consequences of permitting another individual to introduce an unauthorized alien 
into its work force or to act on its behalf. 
U.S. Department Of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship And Immigration Services, Employer 
Information Bulletin 103.1-9 Document Review, March 16,2005. 
Employer Sanctions Enforcement 
INS classifies employer sanctions cases into two main categories, lead-driven 
cases General Administrative Plan (GAP) cases. Lead-driven cases are based 
on leads received from calls and letters, or on referrals from other agencies such 
as and state and local officials. INS' lead-driven cases have generated most 
of its employer sanctions fines .... In FY 1995, 86 percent the total 4,760 INS 
employer sanctions cases investigated were lead-driven. INS intends to increase 
percentage of lead-driven cases worked in FY 1996 .... 
Based on its GAP cases, INS estimates an 89 percent compliance rate among all 
U.S. employers.43 It is important to note that this favorable compliance rate 
should not imply a low rate of employment of illegal aliens. The compliance rate 
only indicates that an estimated 89 percent of employers have complied with the 
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rernellltS of the employer sanctions provisions .... 
INS recognizes that there is a prolific trade in fraudulent doclL'11ents. Counterfeit 
employment authorization documents are easily and cheaply obtained. A 
counterfeit "green card" or a social security card can be purchased the Los 
Angeles area for as little as $20. The abundance of fraudulent documents makes it 
difficult for employers to ensure that they employ only citizens and authorized 
aliens .... 
DOL's Wage and Hour Division inspectors conduct inspections of employers for 
compliance with wage and hour laws. During these inspections, they also review 
employers' 1-9 forms. DOL records the results of its employer sanctions 
Hi,:>,'-'''vUVli0 on ESA-91 forms and forwards all of these forms to INS. Since 1988, 
DOL has forwarded 266,000 ESA-91 forms to INS. INS selected 5,024 these 
ESA-9 forms for investigation .... 
Office of the Inspector General, United States Department Justice, Inspections Division, 
Report Of inspection Of The Immigration And Naturalization Service's (EVS) Efforts To Combat 
Harboring and Employing Illegal Aliens In Sweatshops, gov/oig/reports/INS/e9608/i9608pl.htm 
To matters worse for employers, pursuant to the anti-discrimination provisions of 
the IRCA, employers may not request more or different documents are required to verify 
employment eligibility, reject reasonably genuine-looking documents, or specify certain 
documents over others with the purpose or intent of discriminating on the basis of citizenship 
status or national origin. Significantly, in Diaz the employer required one specific document, an 
INS card. "Franklin inspects the prospective employee's original INS card and evaluates 
whether it appears authentic and unaltered. Franklin retains a photocopy of the card. '" Franklin 
does not otherwise conduct any type of investigation, believing to look further into an 
applicant's legal documents when they appear genuine could be deemed discriminatory." Diaz, 
Finding of 3. Obviously, such a verification scheme puts employers at extreme risk for 
being accused discriminatory intent, since it is likely that INS cards are only or principally 
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required of job applicants. Before Idaho's employers sureties break into the 
Hallelujah Chorus over the decision in Diaz, they would be wise to VH.HU'~' its implications. 
Finally, consideration should be given to whether employers or sureties can avail 
themselves of Fifth Amendment protections where they are exchanging information during the 
course of claims handling and litigation and share a common counsel. Whether or not statements 
made to adjusters by employers are covered by the Fifth Amendment when employers are asked 
what statements they have made to a Workers Compensation surety the claims process, 
sureties not be able to invoke the Fifth Amendment on behalf of the employer. Once an 
employer has made a statement relevant to "knowledge" or "constructive knowledge" of 
illegality to an adjuster, the "horse is out of the bam." Similarly, disclosure by an employer to an 
adjuster eligibility verification methods would pose same risk to the employer 
and may create an obligation on the part ofthe surety to report its knowledge to United States 
Department Homeland Security. 
a. The Number Of Employers Affected By Permitting Inquirv Into Immigration Status Is 
Likely To Be Huge. 
One would have to tum a blind eye to deny the fact that much of Idaho's agricultural 
workforce is comprised of illegal immigrants. In the monograph entitled "Illegal Immigration in 
Idaho" author Idaho State Sen. Michael Jorgensen states "According to the Pew Hispanic 
Research Center, Idaho was home to 25,000-45,000 illegal aliens in 2005 .... Over half the 
illegal aliens the state live in this Idaho County." Idaho State Sen. Michael Jorgensen, Illegal 
Immigration Idaho, page 1. Attached hereto as Addendum 1. The report of a study conducted 
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by Center, released in January of 2011, reported the number of illegal 
immigrants labor force was approximately 8 million, representing 5% workers the 
US. Addendum 2. See, also, Estimates o/the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in 
the United Slates: January 2009 published by the United States Department of Homeland 
Security, Addendum 3. 
Approximately 176,000 Hispanics live in Idaho. One would hope that employers would 
conduct their diligence" on the front end. However, it is obviously to their benefit, not to 
conduct true "due diligence" on the front end, but to wait until an injured worker makes a 
Workers Compensation claim and then to run from responsibility attacking an Hispanic's 
immigration status. The idea that employers, such as the one this case, carefully investigate 
the status of employees is absurd, given the number working aliens in 
Idaho. Under Diaz, employers have the best of both worlds - they are able to cheap labor, 
fact that illegal immigrants work for less and bring down cost labor capitalizing on 
overall, and an injury occurs, they get to deny benefits based upon immigration status. 
The conduct of the employers and their sureties is reminiscent of a famous scene from the 
movie Casablanca. The French Police Chief overseeing Morocco under the Vichy government is 
required by Nazis to shut down a casino. The proprietor asks the Police Chief what basis he 
has for shutting down the casino. The Police Chief exclaims, ful1 shocked, shocked and 
dismayed to learn that there is gambling going on here." At that moment the croupier taps the 
Police Chief on [he shoulder and says, "Your winnings sir," which the hypocritical Police Chief 
happily collects. Given the size of the illegal immigrant work force in Idaho's economy, that 
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scene pretty SIzes up where many of Idaho's employers are at respect to the 
employment illegal immigrants. To allow employers to exerCIse diligence" in 
ascertaining immigration status of an injured worker through the discovery process puts the 
state in the position fostering hypocrisy with a vengeance. 
b. The Administrative Resources Required To Be Expended Bv The Commission In 
Having To Determine Immigration Status Can Be Obviated Bv EmQlovers Utilizing New 
Resources For Verifying Status On The Front End 
Obviously. Diaz is going to involve the Commission task of resolving endless 
disputes immigration status -- not only discovery disputes, but hearings on the 
immigration status issue that will embroil it in the consideration of collateral Federal criminal 
and [1p'~r"'1"",n proceedings. This is particularly true since the very documents the Claimant 
offered and 'vvere accepted by the employer to prove citizenship are now under attack. What is 
the Commission to do when a Claimant simply offers those same documents to it as evidence of 
her HHHH,O,U'"""'H status? Is this really a good use of the Commission's scarce resources? 
The good news is, and the news that should cause this Commission to retreat from Diaz, 
IS employers can now avoid hiring illegal immigrants on the front relevant ease. 
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services "E-Verify" program recently been 
instituted to streamline immigration status and reduce the possibility of employing illegal 
immigrants. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services £-Verify Homepage -
http://v.'Vvw.uscis.gov/ponal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dlal?vgnexto 
id=75bce2e26 405 1 OV gn V CM 1000004 718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=7 5bce2e26140511 OV 
gnVCMI000004718 90aRCRD See Addendum 4. 
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is an Internet-based system that compares information from an employee's Form 
1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, to data from U.S Department of Homeland Security 
and Social Security Administration records to confirm employment eligibility. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the E-Verify program is impressive to say the least. E-
Verify works by comparing information entered from an employee's Form I-9 to: 455 million 
Social Security Administration (SSA) records and 80 million U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security records. . S. Department of Homeland Security databases contain records about 
employment based visas, immigration and naturalization status, and U.S. passport issuance, 
which allow employers to E-Verify to compare information against a wide variety of sources. 
• Most employees are automatically confirmed as work authorized. 98.3 
percent of employees are automatically confirmed as authorized to work (" 
work authorized" ) either instantly or within 24 hours, requiring no 
employee or employer action. Emphasis supplied. 
• 1.7% of employees receive initial system mismatches. 
III Of 1.7% of employees who receive initial system mismatches: 
.. 0.3 percent are later confirmed as work authorized after contesting and 
resolving the mismatch. 
1\1 1.43 percent are not found work authorized. 
• Of the 1.43% of employees not found to be work authorized: 
1\1 1.3 percent of employees who receive initial mismatches do not contest 
the mismatch either because they do not choose to or are unaware of the 
opportunity to contest and as a result are not found work authorized. The 
E-Verify program closely monitors uncontested mismatches and actively 
reaches out to employers to ensure that they are aware of their 
responsibiiity to inform employees of the right to contest. 
o O. 4 percent of employees with initial mismatches are unresolved because 
the employer closed the cases as "self-terminated" or as requiring further 
action by either the employer or employee at the end ofFYlO. 
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u.s. Citizen and Immigration Services, Statistics and Reports. Addendum 4. 
Though it is the desire of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services that the 
E-Verify program be made mandatory by states, Idaho has not passed legislation requiring 
compliance with the prograill by employers. Whether participation in the E-Verify program is 
required by Idaho or not, it is obvious that in the future employers are not going to be able to get 
by with turning a blind eye to the legitimacy of migrant workers. Do Idaho's employers really 
want to open up this can worms and subject themselves to having to disclose potential criminal 
activity? And, of course, if Claimants cannot assert the Fifth Amendment with respect to 
immigration status, neither can Employers! 
4. Requiring Disclosure of Evidence of Immigration Status Implicates the 
Underwriting Practices of Sureties and Will Lead to Lawsuits Against It by Policy 
Holders 
Claimants are intended third party beneficiaries of Workers Compensation insurance 
policies. 
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The Workers' Compensation Act sets forth a compensation scheme that is based 
on a three-party agreement entered into by the employer, employee, and the 
compensation carrier. ... As between the compensation carrier and the employee, 
there is a promise for a promise: the carrier agrees to compensate the employee 
for injuries sustained in the course of employment, and the employee agrees to 
relinquish common law rights against his employer. The employee is thus a 
party to contract and therefore entitled to recover in that capacity. Aranda, 
748 S.W.2d at 212 (citations omitted.); Franks v. United States Fidelity and Guar. 
Co., 149 Ariz. 291, 718 P.2d 193, 197 (Ct.App.l985) (" A claim by an injured 
employee against the workers' compensation carrier is a first-party claim." ). See 
also v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai 'i, Ltd., 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12,883 P.2d 
38, 49 n. 2 (recognizing non-contracting parties' rights as third party 
beneficiaries of an insurance contract), reconsideration denied, 77 Hawai'i 489, 
889 P.2d 66 (1994); Hunt v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai 'i, Ltd., 82 Hawai'i 363, 367, 
922 P.2d 976,980 (App.1996) (same), cert. dismissed, 83 Hawai'i 204, 925 P.2d 
374 (1996). 
Hough v. Pac?fic Ins. Co., Ltd. 83 Hawai'i 457, 468-469, 927 P.2d 858, 869 - 870 
(Hawai'i,1996). 
is no evidence that immigration status was a factor in the determination of the rates 
charged to the employer and the premiums collected by the surety in this case, or for that matter 
any other "Forker's Compensation surety of which Claimant's counsel is aware. As 
demonstrated is well documented that Idaho employs large numbers (in the thousands) of 
illegal immigrants. Idaho's Workers Compensation sureties are well aware of this, and are 
charged knowledge of this fact because the statistics are a matter of public record. 
Absent evidence that Workers Compensation sureties underwriting practices take into 
account the fact that illegal immigrants are not entitled to recover disability benefits beyond 
impairment setting premium rates, they should be estopped from asserting immigration status 
as a defense. Otherwise, the sureties will be rewarded for setting premiums based on the 
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assumption that workers in a business are entitled to disability when injured, 
knowing well that they intend to assert immigration status as a defense to the payment of 
those benefits. At a minimum, this exposes Idaho's Workers Compensation sureties to potential 
class action suits based upon the equitable theory of unjust enrichment. 
5. The Conclusion that there is no Labor Market in Idaho for Undocumented 
Employees is Simply Incorrect. 
The idea that undocumented employees are prohibited from receiving workers 
compensation disability benefits because they will never be able to work again the geographic 
labor is simply fantasy. Senator Craig has specifically reported that to 85% of farm 
labor workers in Idaho are undocumented in 2006. See http://craig.senate.gov/i agjobs.cfm 
(December 2 ,2006) Prominent and regular news reports, including the PewResearchCenter, 
report that unauthorized immigrants living in the United States grew during the last decade from 
8.4 million 2000 to 11.1 million in 2011. http://www.pewhispanic.org/201 1I29/a-nation-
of-immigrants/ (July 30, 2013). 
Diaz was decided incorrectly as there is a significant labor market undocumented 
workers in Idaho. hold otherwise is to ignore the facts and as the Commission did in Diaz, to 
allocate vital legal rights based on what must be recognized as a fantasy. For the Diaz majority, 
since there should their view be no labor market for illegal workers, there is no such market. 
This is flawed and circular reasoning at its most blatfu'1t and such precludes the Claimant herein 
from providing evidence to the contrary. For the Diaz majority, lack of a legal labor market 
equates directly to lack of an actual labor market. The following are examples of evidence that 
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the Commission, as well as vocational experts, can consider regarding the labor market for 
undocumented immi grants: 
1. Immigrants made up 7.2 percent of Idaho's workforce 2008, and of that 3.1 
percent were illegal immigrants. Idaho Business Review, 31, No. 41 
(August 2,2010). 
2. undocumented immigrants were removed from Idaho, the State would lose 
nearly $430 million in economic activity. Id. 
3. The Pew Hispanic Center, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the United States 
Census Bureau all track and maintain demographics on foreign-born, 
unauthorized works in the United States Labor Force. See, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2010, March 19), Foreign-born Workers: Labor Force 
Characteristics; Passel, J (2006), Size & Characteristics of the Unauthorized 
AJigrant Population in the Us., Pew Hispanic Center; The Labor Force Status of 
Short-Term Unauthorized Workers, Id.; U.S. Census Bureau (2009, December 
97). United States Foreign-Born Population. 
4. Pew Hispanic Center and U.S. Census Bureau estimate 
of the workforce is comprised of undocumented workers. Pew Hispanic 
estimates that undocumented works make up 9 percent of the service 
industry. 
5. The Census Bureau estimates that the unauthorized migrant population in 
Idaho is between 25,000 and 45,000 individuals. Id. 
6. The number and percentage of migrant workers in Idaho is increasing at a high 
rate. Federation for Immigration Reform, (2010, June 1), 6fD4. 
That much of Idaho's agricultural workforce is comprised of illegal immigrants IS 
virtually undisputable. Claimant, whether he is documented or not, still has access under the law 
as an independent contractor, which does not require a social security number, and such was not 
accounted for in the Diaz. Finally, termination of employment the Defendant does not 
preclude benefits under the eggshell skull theory and Nelson v. Pan/mess-Warren Jdgas Enterprises, 
26 Idaho 129 (1994) and or I.C. 72-406 as the accident and loss of employment aggravated a pre 
existing condition. 
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6. Claimant's Immigration Status is not only Irrelevant a Workers 
Compensation Proceeding, but Requiring a Claimant to Testify as to his 
Immigration Status Violates his Fifth Amendment Against Self-
Incrimination. 
A s testimony regarding immigration status in States is protected by 
the privilege self-incrimination. No person shall be held to answer a capital, or 
otherw~ise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases ansmg the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to twice put in jeopardy 
of or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness himself, nor be 
deprived of libe11y, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken public use. without just compensation. United States Constitution, Amendment 5. 
basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do 
not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the 
of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted 
prosecution 'shoulder the entire load.' "The privilege afforded not only 
to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise 
embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
prosecute .... [1]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove 
hazard ... he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the 
is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only evident 
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a 
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered 
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. 
HofJinan v. States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 -87 (1951). See also Emspak v. United States, 349 
U.S. 90 ( 955); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 
(1951 
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The States Supreme Court ruled in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 
(1976), that compelling the plaintiff to answer questions or provide documents about 
immigration status would require the Plaintiff to make an incriminating statement about him or 
herself, violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment Privilege is available to 
everyone, regardless of immigration status. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 .S. 67, 77 (1976). The 
United States Supreme Court has spoken clearly on the exercise of privilege against self-
incrimination rising under the Fifth Amendment. 
Kasligar United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), we recently reaffinned the 
principle that the privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted 'in any 
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory.' Id., at 444, 92 S.Ct. at 1656; Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 
94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 
U.S. 52, 94. 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1611, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) (White, J., concurring); 
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17, 69 L.Ed. 158 924); 
United States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100, 7 L.Ed. 69 (1828); cf. Gardner v. 
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 19l3, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968). 
Maness v. 419 U.S. 449, 464-65, 95 S. Ct. 584, 594, 42 2d 574 (1975). Emphasis 
supplied. 
The Idaho Appellate Court in 1987 held that Idaho also recognizes the United States 
Supreme Court's position that the Claimant's Fifth Amendment rights and protections also 
extend to cases; McPherson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402 987). Citing Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); and Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
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case before the Court the Industrial Commission held the Claimant could not 
invoke of the Fifth Amendment for the reason that there is no real possibility of 
criminal prosecution: 
We the hazard of self-incrimination is not real and appreciable, and that 
the Claimant does not have cause to fear criminal prosecution from a direct 
answer to the questions posed to him by Defendants in their discovery request. It 
strikes Commission that the principal risk Claimant faces ifhe is indeed in this 
country illegally, is deportation which, as we have noted, is a civil, not a criminal, 
proceeding. 
(R Vol. 1. p. 39 L 6-10) In support of this finding the Commission cites language from Idaho 
State Tax Com'n v. Peterson 107 Idaho 260, 261 (1984). Respectfully, the Commission has read 
Peterson far too broadly. 
Missing the Commission's decision is that which was implicit in Peterson. 
Peterson's citation w Neffimplicitly incorporates the United States Supreme Court's recognition 
of the narrowness of the exception to the limitation of the state's power to override the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination: 
Moreover, he must have "reasonable cause to apprehend (such) danger from a 
direct answer" to questions posed to him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 
486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). The inlormation that would be 
revealed by direct answer need not be such as would itself support a criminal 
conviction, however, but must simply "furnish a link the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime." Id. See also Hashagen v. 
States, 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960). Indeed, it is enough if the 
responses would merely "provide a lead or clue" to evidence having a 
tendency to incriminate. Id. at 348. [emphasis added] 
us. v. Neff615 1235,1239 (C.A.Cal., 1980). In fact, the basis of the holding in Neffis that 
tax returns, unlike questions about immigration status, are neutral on face: 
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Questions on income tax returns, in contrast, are "neutral on their and 
directed at the public at large .... " rd. See also California v. Byers,402 .S.424, 
429, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 1538, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971); Marchetti v. United States, 390 
.S. 39, 57, 88 S.Ct. 697,707, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (l9681-Grosso v. United States, 
390 U.S. 62, 64, 88 S.Ct. 709, 711, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968). 
u.s. v. 6 5 F.2d 1235, 1239 (C.A.Cal., 1980) Emphasis supplied. Neff recognized that 
when an inquiry is not neutral on its face, it does not lend itself to so facile an analysis. Neff 
accurately characterizes the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by citation to Hashagen v. u.s. 283 F.2d 
345 (C.A.9 1960): 
The 'guarantee against testimonial compulsion embodied in the Fifth i\rnendment 
to the United States Constitution must be liberally construed and broadly applied 
in order to sustain fully the basic right it was designed to protect. It is not merely 
an admission of guilt of a federal crime, or of a probative fact which, with others, 
may aid in establishing guilt, that may be withheld; the privilege to remain silent 
may also be validly asserted where the answer to a question would be likely to 
provide a lead or clue to a source of evidence of such crime, and thus furnish 
a means of securing one or some of the 'links in the chain of evidence' 
required for federal prosecution of the witness. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 
1892,142 U.S. 547,12 S.Ct. 195,35 L.Ed. 1110; Alexander v. United States, 9 
Cir., 1950, 81 F.2d 480. The emulous conflict between government's right to 
information, including the consequent duty of the citizen to testify, and the 
witness' right not to incriminate himself must be balanced favor of the 
constitutional privilege. If at times this results in closing and locking the doors of 
discovery to the government, that is but a calculated and foreseen consequence of 
recognizing this basic right in a free society. 
Emphasis supplied. A more accurate summation of Fifth Amendment case law than the 
Commissions summary is: 
Generally the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be 
invoked "whenever information sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be 
discoverable provides even a clue that might point a hypothetical government 
investigator toward evidence of criminal conduct. 
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Robert Heidt The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE 
LJ. 1062, 1065 (1982) Emphasis supplied. 
Appellant provided law to demonstrate that answering the discovery, undocumented, 
would lead to Appellant providing testimony and evidence against himself that can lead to 
numerous CRIMINAL charges in his filings, including: 
... Federal 1-9 form reflecting that the 1-9 must be signed by the employee under 
penalty of perjury; also, the I-9 gives the notice to employees which is placed 
immediately above where the employee is required to sign the 1-9: 
I am aware that federal law provides for imprisonment and/or fines 
for false statements or use of false documents in connection with 
the completion of this form. 
Any admission by Claimant that he is not a United States Citizen, that he is not 
present lawfully in the United States of America, that he did or does not have 
ability to work in the United States of America, would give rise to the 
immediate conclusion that Claimant committed Perjury, that committed 
document fraud, that he committed Social Security Fraud, identity fraud, identity 
theft, being deported and either not leaving or returning unlawfully etc, would 
provide direct evidence that would lead to numerous CRIMINAL charges, 
including, but not limited to the list below: 
a. 48 USC 408. Federal criminal penalties for fines and 
incarceration for up to 5 years for false use of a Social Security 
Number. 
b. Us.c. § 1621: Federal criminal penalties fines and 
incarceration for perjury by knowingly making a false statement 
taking an oath to tell the truth during a proceeding or on 
any document signed under penalty ofpeIjury. 
c. 18 USC 1546. Federal criminal penalties for fines and 
incarceration for up to 25 years for document fraud relating to 
gaining employment or border crossing. 
d. USC 1028. Federal criminal penalties for fines and 
incarceration for up to 15 years for identity fraud. 
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e. 18 U.S.C. § lOOI(a): Federal criminal penalties and 
incarceration for make any false statement or make or use any 
false document. 
f. Us. C. 911. Federal criminal penalties for false 
representation of self as a U.S. citizen. 
g. 8 USC 1253. Federal criminal penalties for failure to depart the 
U.S. within 90 days of an order of deportation. 
h. 8 USC 1325. Federal criminal penalties for fines and 
incarceration for illegal or attempted illegal entry into US. 
1. 8 USC 1326. Federal criminal penalties for fines and 
incarceration for illegal re-entry after being deported or denied 
admission. 
J. Ie 18-3007. State criminal penalties for false impersonation for 
fines and incarceration up to 2 years. 
Claimant does not bear the burden to show that he be charged if the 
information is provide, he only needs to show that information requested 
" ... could furnish a link in a chain of evidence leading to prosecution." 
~McPhcrson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402, 404; Maness v. A1eyers, 419 US 449 
(1975). 
(R VoL X. X.L X) Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Order Dated 
Sept 7, 2009, filed July 20lO; Claimant's citation of Additional Authority, filed December of 
2009. 
See also the following list of items that would be protected under the Fifth Amendment in 
the Stanford Review Article by Christine N. Cimini (see also the federal statutes attached to 
the footnotes below and in Addendum 1): 
Undocumented workers can be criminally liable for a number of different 
actions which, for ease of analysis, can be grouped into two broad categories: 
those related to entry and continued presence in the United States; and those 
related to obtaining and maintaining employment. In terms of those criminal 
activities related to entry and presence in the country, while mere presence in the 
States is not currently a crime,31 entry and presence in United States 
after a deportation order has been entered is a criminal offense. 32 Additionally, 
entering the country without inspection or entering by use false or misleading 
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representations33 and willful failure to register as an alien 
crimes.34 Further, it is a crime to knowingly forge, alter, possess, or 
accept immigration documents for entry into or as evidence a lawful stay 
or employment in the United States.35 In terms of criminal or fraudulent activity 
related to work, using a false Social Security number for the purpose of obtaining 
any or any other benefit is a felony.36 It is not currently a crime to work 
without any legal documents, but it is grounds for remova1.3 7 
Of those acts that constitute a criminal offense, are any of them considered 
"continuing crimes"? If so, the ongoing nature of the offense might impact the 
analysis of whether or not a lawyer's work on employment-related civil litigation 
could construed as "assisting" the client in a crime or fraud. Courts have found 
entering without inspection or entering with false documents and using a false 
Social number to obtain a benefit are not "continuing " 38 The 
crime entering by eluding examination or immigration officers has been held to 
be "consummated at the time an alien gains entry through an unlawful point and 
does not submit to these examinations."39 Based upon this analysis, once an 
reaches a place of repose within the country, misdemeanor of 
improper entry is concluded. Similarly, using a false Social Security number in 
order to obtain a benefit has been held to be completed when the false 
representation is made and is not considered a continuing crimeAO However, 
there could be numerous separate crimes if an individual were to make numerous 
representations utilizing a false Social Security number. 
contrast, willful failure to register as an alien after thirty days and entry 
p<~'0~'"<V~ in the United States after a deportation order have been found to be 
crimesA Additionally, while there is no specific case analyzing 
all, or part, of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 amounts to a "continuing crime," related 
case law supports an interpretation that at least some acts under § 1546 could be 
construed as continuing crimes. Section 1546 makes it a crime to knowingly 
forge, counterfeit, alter or falsely make immigration documents for entry or as 
evidence of authorized stay or employment in the U.S. and to use, attempt to 
use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive such immigration documents for entry or 
as evidence authorized stay or employment in the United StatesA2 Employing 
analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Toussie v. United States, the 
doctrine continuing offenses should be applied In only limited 
circumstancesA3 Toussie requires that, in order to constitute a continuing offense, 
the explicit language of the substantive criminal statutes must compel such a 
conclusion or the nature of the crime must be such that Congress intended that it 
be treated as a continuing crimeA4 Of all of the acts prohibited by this statute, 
possession is the only one that implies an ongoing activity. other actions such 
as uttering, obtaining, using or accepting appear more likely to be construed as 
completed upon the act constituting the crime. There are many cases involving 
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"possession" offenses and no matter the divergent circumstances, each court 
found that possession is a "continuing offense."45 Thus, addition to willful 
failure to register after thirty days and entry and presence after a deportation 
order, it also appears that possession of immigration documents for the purposes 
in the statute might be construed as a continuing crime . 
Ask. Don't . Ethical Issues Surrounding Undocumented Workers' Status in Employment 
Litigation, Christine N. Cimini, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 355,415 (2008). Attached as Addendum 5. 
Thus, a judge who would deny a claim of the privilege must be "'perfectly clear, from a 
careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that 
the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate." Hoffman v. United States, 
341 U.S. 479, 488 (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)). While the 
Commission correctly asserts that deportation proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is not 
the only consequence a claimant may face. It cannot be said that requiring the Claimant the 
instant case to answer questions under oath regarding his immigration status "cannot possibly 
have such tendency to incriminate" Id. 
Because the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion by declaring 
immigration status relevant to claims of permanent impairment and failed to recognize the real 
danger of criminal consequences inherent in forcing claimants employers to testify under 
oath regarding immigration status, Claimant asks this Court to reverse the holding of the 
Commission denying his Motion for Protective Order and the Order for Reconsideration. 
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED 
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS ORDERED TO WAIVE HIS 
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT OR BE 
DENIED BENEFITS UNDER IDAHO WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS 
SIGNED ON THE 7TH OF SEPTEMBER 2010. 
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its Order dated September 7th, 2010 the Industrial Commission, after examining at length 
how Constitutional Fifth Amendment protections apply (or rather do not apply) to workers 
compensation proceedings, the Commission "ordered that the Claimant's claim for PPD benefits 
shall be omitted as an issue on the claim currently before the Commission." (Order p. 9). 
1. Dismissal Claimant's Disability Claim is a Costly and Unlawful Penalty in 
Violation of his Fifth Amendment Constitutional Rights to Remain SHent. 
The Fifth Amendment protection is against "compulsory" incrimination. The compUlsion 
need not be imprisonment; it can as well be termination of public employment, Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 493 (1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation 
Men Ass'n v. Commissioner a/Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968). See also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 
U.S. 70 ( 973), (holding unconstitutional state statutes requiring the disqualification for five 
years of contractors doing business with the State if at any time they refused to waive immunity 
and answer questions respecting their transactions with the State.) See also Lefkowitz v. 
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 977). (The State can require employees or contractors to respond to 
mqmnes, only it offers them immunity sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-
incrimination). The State is unable to disbar a lawyer as a legal consequence of a refusal to 
make incriminating admissions. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 967). Also, penalties of 
contempt for advising a client to refuse to produce material in discovery on the good faith belief 
the material may tend to incriminate his client was a Fifth Amendment violation. Maness v. 
Meyers, 419 U.S. (1975). 
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the Court has treated within the clause only those compulsions, which arise 
from legally enforceable obligations, culminating in imprisonment for refusal to testify or to 
produce documents. E.g., lvfarchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (criminal penalties 
attached to failure to register and make incriminating admissions); lvialloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964) (contempt citation on refusal to testify). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 
(1983) compulsion in introducing evidence of suspect's refusal to submit to blood alcohol 
test, since state could have forced suspect to take test and need not have offered him a choice); 
SeieClive Service System v. l\1innesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (no 
coercIOn requirement that applicants for federal financial assistance for higher education 
reveal whether they have registered for draft). 
extending the concept of coercion, however, the Court has not developed a clear 
doctrinal explanation to identify the differences between permissible and impermissible 
coercion. As a general rule, it may be said that all of these cases involve the ordering of some 
feature of a trial in such a way that a defendant must choose between or among rights, with one 
choice being to or to submit to self-incriminating disclosures his actions as the 
Defendants are requesting in this case. The Idaho Appellate Court, while referring to Citing 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Maness v. l\1eyers, 419 .S. 449 (1975); and Garrity 
v. 385 U.S. 493 (1967), held that not only is the Fifth Amendment protection 
applicable in the civil cases, but that "The individual may remain silent without suffering a 
sanction or penalty that would make assertion of the privilege "costly."" McPherson v. 
McPherson, 112 Idaho 402, 404 (1987). 
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was costly 
to find that 
Commission's sanction against Claimant for asserting Amendment privilege 
it severely reduced the value of the underlying claim. Claimant asks this Court 
Commission's sanction constituted a violation of the Claimant's rights against 
self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and to either reverse Commission's holding or 
remand case back to the Commission for reconsideration. 
The Industrial Commission failed to address the case law the letter provided to 
the Commission on the 19th of August 2010 for the proper remedy in light of a party invoking his 
Constitutional Fifth Amendment Rights to remain silent. While "costly" penalties are not 
permitted, Supreme Court has held that an adverse inference can be dra~n from the silence 
of an individual pleading the Fifth Amendment. see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 .S. 308 (1976) 
(emphasis added); see also Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 32 P.3d 1261 (Idaho App. 
2006). adverse inference allows a fact-finder to draw a presumption that response to a 
refused question would have been adverse to the individual's position in litigation and allows 
a fact-finder to draw a presumption that the response to a refused question would have been 
adverse to the individual's position in the litigation. Id; 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses 121 (1992); 
see also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) ('Failure to contest an assertion .. .is 
considered evidence of acquiescence .. .if it would have been natural under circumstances to 
object to assertion in question.") 
Also, Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) the Supreme Court held that an individual 
asserting their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination could not be penalized. See also 
Garrity v. Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) and McPherson v. l\lfcPherson, 112 Idaho 402, 
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(Idaho 987). The Spevack Court went on to clarify that any practice is unconstitutional 
that makes the exercise of the privilege "costly" or that have sanctions with substantial economic 
consequences, such as the loss of employment or state contracts. A state statute that forces an 
officer of a political party to waive his Fifth Amendment right or forfeit his office is 
unconstitutional. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-09 (1977). The 9th Circuit 
recently stated Jane Doe v. Glazer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000) the following: 
However. Supreme Court has made it clear that certain sanctions stemming 
from a party's refusal to answer a question on Fifth Amendment grounds are too 
costly. For example, a state statute that forces an officer of a political party to 
waive Fifth Amendment right or forfeit his office is unconstitutional. See 
Lefkowitz v. Cunnigham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-09 (1977). Similarly, individuals 
cannot be forced to waive their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination 
by threats that their employment will be terminated. See Turley, 414 U.S. at 83-
85. Moreover, the Rules of Civil Procedure recognize an appropriate role for the 
exercise of this privilege, and a refusal to respond to discovery such 
invocation cannot justify the imposition of penalties. See Fed. R. Crim. 
26(b)(5); Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 (FifthCir. 
1979). 
As discussed previously Claimant's PPD claim is the predominate issue and value of 
Claimant's claim and a preclusion of Claimant's right to claim his PPD benefits could remove 
any and all net benefits of the litigation due to costs, fees, expert fees, etc. Also, the solution 
proposed by the Claimant the letter was appropriate as the Claimant may relocate prior to 
hearing and has retained experts to establish that even if the Claimant were undocumented, there 
still remains a labor market for him. The law is clear that the waiving of the PPD claim due to 
Claimant's exercise of his Constitutional Rights is unconstitutional and inequitable in light of the 
solution was created by the Supreme Court. 
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2. Worker's Compensation Should be Interpreted to 
Code 72-708 states that the "Process and procedure 
not Punish Claimants. 
this shall be as 
summary simple a reasonably may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of 
equity." Commission proceedings have been informal and designed for simplicity; 
further, the purpose of these proceedings being the attainment of justice in each 
individual case. Hagler v. lvlicron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596 990). "Proceedings under 
the Compensation Law are designed to afford employees a speedy, summary and 
simple remedy for recovery of compensation for injuries sustained in industrial accidents ... " 
Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263-64 (1968) see Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho 
579 ( see Hogaboom Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13 (1984). 
to Worker's Compensation laws, Claimant forfeited any personal injury or civil 
rights against employer exchanged for a simpler and efficient procedure under Idaho Code 
72. the benefits under Worker's Compensation statue provides for benefits and 
financial remunerations, namely, a claimant is only eligible for 500 weeks of future wage loss, 
no claim for and suffering, ect. Therefore, the benefits and provisions of the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. 
American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave 
no room narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88 (1996). 
Claimant is unable to locate any similar civil or personal injury decision in Idaho that 
limits the of a Plaintiff to receive Disability, or future wage loss, a Defendant even if 
the Plaintiff was undocumented. Therefore, the above cases and statutes should imply that the 
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Worker's Compensation benefits of Disability, or future wage loss, should be construed in favor 
of the employee. 
IlL THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED 
DISCRETION WHEN THEY OVERRULED CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S 
OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE TESTIMONY AND DEPOSITION OF DR. 
TIMOTHY DOERR IN THE ORDER DATED THE 1 AUGUST 2011 AND 
GRANTING THE SECOND EXTENSION ON THE 7TH OF NOVEMBER 2011. 
1. Defendants' Discovery was Deficient, not Supplemented and Contradicted the 
Deposition of Dr. Doerr Causing Prejudice to the Claimant. 
Though the Industrial Commission has adopted its own Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure workers compensation proceedings, it has adopted by reference the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure relating to discovery through JRP 7C. Of particular importance in the instant 
case is Rule Civil Procedure 26. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) allows opposing counsel to obtain 
through interrogatory, 
"A complete statement of aU opinions to be expressed and the basis and 
reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by the witness in 
forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the 
opinions; any qualifications of the witness, including a list of publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be 
paid for testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years." 
(Emphasis added) 
IRCP 26( e) creates a duty to seasonably update interrogatory answers. Clark v. 
Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 346 (Ct. App. 2002) Failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 typically 
results the exclusion the proffered evidence. White v. Mock, ] 40 Idaho 882, 888, (2004). 
The exclusion of evidence is specifically authorized as a sanction for failing to seasonably 
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supplement a expert witness disclosures. Radmer v. Ford Co., 20 Idaho 86, 91 
(1991). rule requiring supplementation of disclosures applies 'particularly [to] the 
substance of an expert's testimony." Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 158 (2002) (discussing 
Hopkins v. Duo-Fat Corp., 23 Idaho 205 (1993)). 
In Radmer, the plaintiffs expert witness devised a new theory and a supporting opinion 
shortly before trial one that had not been disclosed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)( 4) or seasonably supplemented by plaintiff s counsel. Id. at 88. The court declined to grant 
the defendant's motion in limine and the plaintiffs expert was permitted to offer a new opinion, 
the substance of which had not been seasonably disclosed to the defendant. Id. On appeal, the 
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the 
plaintiffs expert to offer his unseasonably disclosed opinion, and the matter was remanded for a 
new trial. at 91. Idaho Supreme Court wrote that: 
cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation 
Similarly, effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony 
of other side.... Before an attorney can even hope to deal on cross -
examination with an unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the 
bases opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is required to await 
examination at trial to get this information, he often will have too little time to 
recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the testimony. 
Id. at 89 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 26, Fed. R. of Civ. . Friedenthal, 
Discovery and Use of an Averse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan. Rev- 455, 485 (1962)). 
v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 158, (2002), the plaintiffs estate brought a medical 
malpractice action alleging that a treating physician negligently failed to detect treat internal 
injuries the plaintiff suffered in an accident. Specifically, it was alleged that the defendant failed 
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to a small tear in the plaintiffs intestine which later led to infection and death. See td. at 
156. disclosed a medical expert, indicating that the expert would testify as to 
anatomy causation. at 158. At trial, however, the defendant's medical expert was 
permitted, over plaintiffs objection, to testify that in his opinion the plaintiffs intestine was not 
torn after he was discharged from the defendant's care. ld. at 158-59. This was a new 
theory, and the substance the expert's opinion on that question not been disclosed nor 
seasonably supplemented. ld. Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court that permitting the 
medical expert to offer opinions the substance of which went beyond that disclosed or 
seasonably supplemented was reversible error, and the matter was reversed and remanded for 
anew trial. ld, at 159. 
in Clark v. Klein was the Idaho Supreme Court's determination that the right 
of party opposing the entry of undisclosed expert opinions to have such testimony excluded 
is in no way compromised by any failure to depose the challenged expert or failure to bring a 
motion to ld. at 58 The trial court in Clark excused the party seeking to offer 
undisclosed expert opinions from full compliance with LR.C.P. 26(b)(4) on basis that the 
other party have deposed the expert or made a motion to compel, but declined to do so. ld. 
In reversing the decision below, the Idaho Supreme Court held that: 
Considering the financial and time burdens of depositions, however, it is not 
reasonable to expect parties to depose every expert witness listed. As Appellants 
point out, if a motion to compel is required to force compliance v\lith the rules of 
discovery, it puts the burden of compliance on the wrong (innocent) party, and the 
district court abused its discretion in indicating that a motion to compel is 
required by the party seeking exclusion of an expert witness for noncompliance 
with Rule 26. 
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Clark v. Klein, footnote 1. It is the responsibility of the party seeking to present expert 
testimony to disclose the substance of the opinions to which the expert will offer testimony. 
That responsibility cannot be cast off on the other party to sniff out undisclosed opinions during 
discovery or to file motions to compel a more complete disclosure. The failure to disclose the 
opinion of an expert should lead to it being excluded and not admissible. 
the matter currently before the Court Defendants admitted their answer dated 
January 22nd 2009 Vol. 1 p. 4) and in their answer dated the 27th of July 2011 (R Vol. 2 p. 
284) s condition for which benefits are claimed was partly caused by an accident 
arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment and failed to allege that any pre-
existing condition might be the cause of Claimant's medical condition. 
Defendants also failed to respond fully to or supplement numerous interrogatories. 
Defendants' response to Claimant's Interrogatory No.2, requested clarification if Defendants' 
claimed suffered any pre-existing condition. Defendants' answer stated: "Defendants 
are not aware of pre-existing conditions ... " (R VoL 2 p. 207 L 5-6) and no supplement was 
made. 
Claimant's Interrogatory No.4 stated 
"If contend that the Claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition which is 
the basis of, or contributes to the Claimant's present or future symptoms, 
complaints, condition, impairment, or disability, please state: the approximate 
date that the condition arose; the manner in which the condition arose; the source, 
cause or etiology of the condition; the name of the physicians who have 
diagnosed condition; the dates on which the condition was diagnosed by each 
physician; the treatment rendered with regard to the condition, and the dates of 
such treatment by each physician or other health care provider; the extend you 
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that the alleged pre-exlstmg condition contributes to Claimant's 
present or symptoms, complaints, condition, impairment, or disability; the 
manner you contend that the alleged pre-existing condition contributes to the 
Claimant's present or future symptoms, complaints, condition, impairment, or 
disability; and identify with specificity the medical or other documents which you 
contend evidences the factual basis of your contention that the alleged pre-
existing condition contributes to the Claimant's present or future symptoms, 
complaints, condition, impairment or disability_ By this Interrogatory, Claimant 
seeks to know all facts which you will attempt to introduce into evidence 
concerning any allegation of pre-existing condition at the hearing in this case, and 
Claimant will move to strike all evidence not revealed in your answer to this 
Interrogatory_ 
Defendants answered: "Defendants are aware that Claimant had prior injuries, however, do not 
believe they any relationship to the current conditions that Claimant complains of." ((R 
Vol. 2 p. 208 L 13- 4) 
Interrogatory No. 8 found in the Agency Record Volume 2 page 211 
requested the expen disclosures allowed under Rule 26 and DefendaIlts failed to answer or 
supplement discovery with the IRCP required disclosures regarding Dr. Doerr. While Dr. 
Doerr's previous medical report contained a brief reference to degenerative disk disease; 
Claimant did not prepare for, anticipate, or hire experts to address said medical report as the pre-
existing condition defense had not being raised. In discovery and throughout the litigation 
process the Defendants alleged that either Claimant's condition was caused by a post accident 
injury on or about 6th of October 2008 when the Claimant "got up from the couch and felt a 
pop in his back, and fell to the floor." Or that he was not injured at all. See Exhibit 206-
207. IRCP 26( e) case law cited above required Defendants to seasonably supplement their 
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answer to Interrogatory No.8 and provide the necessary expert witness disclosures, which they 
failed to do. 
Defendants did list Dr. Doerr as a lay witness and disclosed he "May be called to testify 
to any matters at issue, including, but not limited to Claimant's alleged medical condition, 
diagnosis, prognosis, and opinions." (R Vol. 2 p. 209) That an expert may testify to "any matters 
at issue" is too vague without the proper supplementation to satisfy 26' s requirements 
for expert witness disclosures. Further, Claimant notified Defendants Claimant's 
Interrogatory 1 (R Vol. 2 p. 206) that Claimant would motion to strike any ~l1d all facts or 
defenses nm revealed in the answer. 
Even at hearing, in response to Claimant's counsels concerns that Doerr might 
potentially raise defense for the first time, counsel for the Defendants stated that, "The issue 
about the pre-existing impairment, whether or not Mr. Serrano had one -- in short, I think that's a 
red herring. don't think that really has any impact on this case." (Transcript of Hearing July 
28th 2011 before the Industrial Commission of the State ofIdaho, 19-22 p.96) 
Claimant's objections, the Commission herein on the 5Ih of August 2011 Denied 
Claimant's request to limit the scope of the Deposition of Dr. Doerr to testimony and opinion not 
previously disclosed and not contradictory to the previous discovery answers. The Commission 
allowed Dr. Doerr to testify as an expert and contrary to the admission made in Defendants' 
Answer to Complaint that Claimant's condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly 
by accident arising out and in the course of Claimant's employment. Dr. Doerr introduced 
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a defense to the issue of causation that was not only a surprise to Claimant, 
Defendants repeatedly asserted was not a factor in the case. 
was an Issue 
The Commission also based their choice to include Defendants' new theory of pre-
existing condition on Defendants interest in judicial economy when it allowed Claimant to 
include the 2008 injury for consideration at hearing. However, unlike the Defendants claim to 
pre-existing condition, Claimant had included the claim in discovery and the claim was 
referenced in numerous communications. The Claimant's sole error was including both 
accidents on one complaint. While Defendants were accommodating allowing Claimant to 
create a second complaint out of he 2008 accident and then to merge both complaints and 
continue, Dr. Doerr's post hearing deposition, this did not create a situation where a party 
was prejudiced or blindsided by any new claims. 
Defendants stated correctly in their Response to Objection to Defendants' Amended 
Notice Taking Post-Hearing Depositions that the Commission has specifically reserved the 
right to determine sanctions for violations of its procedures (JRP 7C). However, using their 
reserved power over sanctions to thwart their own adopted rule constitutes abuse of discretion. 
Claimant was severely prejudiced by the Commissions ruling in that it was impractical for him, 
from both a time and cost perspective, to secure his own expert testimony to combat an 
affirmative defense that, until after the hearing on the matter was concluded, was considered by 
the Defendants to be a "red herring." 
Commission either erred as a matter of law when it determined that simply 
listing a witness is sufficient to satisfy [RCP 26's requirements for disclosures 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 46 
concernmg witness testimony, or abused its discretion by exercIsmg power over 
sanctions to thwart the rule it adopted, Claimant asks this Court to reverse COIll..lllissions 
Order Regarding Objection to Deposition and remand the case back to the Commission for a 
decision consistent with the ruling herein. 
2. The Defendants' Second Extension of Deposition of Dr. Doer was not Timely Filed 
and Motion was not Based upon Fact. 
JRP 1 0(E)(3) gives defendants twenty-eight (28) days after the conclusion of the hearing 
to conduct post-hearing depositions. The Commission gave Defendants in this case a Second 
Extension so Defendants could conduct a deposition more than months after the hearing 
was held. Commission issued the Order, granting Defendants more time without allowing 
Claimant to be and without a stipulation. The second extension was also untimely under 
JRP 1 as it was not made before the original date for the deposition had passed. Further, 
Counsel for Claimant was not requested to agree to, did not agree to, did not sign any 
stipulation, and the record is vacant of any agreement to such stipulation to the extension. 
Further, order was granted in express opposition to the letter sent to counsel for the 
Defendants on 24th of October 2011 as reflected in Exhibit A. Defendants to honor the 
agreement to supplement the Order with a Second Affidavit and Motion as reflected in Exhibit B 
submitted on the 9th of November 2011. The Defendants and the Commission failed to allow 
Claimant to respond or represent correctly the failure of agreement between the parties. 
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED 
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DETERMINED THE CLAIMANT-APPELLANT 
W AS NOT ENTITLED TO THE MEDICAL BENEFITS CURATIVE, 
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AND OTHERWISE), WHETHER INCURRED AND NOT OR WHETHER NOT 
INCURRED AND IMPAIRMENT RATING PURSUANT TO I.C 72-432(1, 7), 
TEMPORARY DISABILITY AND ATTORNEY FEES AS ORDERED ON THE 20TH 
OF MARCH 2013. 
While the Commission has discretion as to the weight it gives to the evidence before it, 
the Commission abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law it considered evidence 
that should not have been included in the record. As outlined above, the expert opinion of Dr. 
Doerr regarding the Claimant's alleged pre-existing condition should not have been admitted. 
Even so, the Commission correctly points out that a Claimant in a workers compensation matter 
has the burden of proof to establish causation on a more likely than not standard. As the record 
indicates, the post hearing deposition that Claimant was unable to respond to, Claimant 
met that burden of proof. 
The Commission points out other evidence, including a statement made by Dr. 
Thompson, which indicates that the industrial accident was the cause of Claimant's medical 
problems. Commissions Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order) In reference to 
Dr. Thompson's suggestion that the industrial accident was the cause of Claimant's condition. 
The Commission states "but an inferred opinion is not enough to prove causation where there is 
conflicting evidence in the record." (Commissions Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order. p. 29) But for the post-hearing deposition of Dr. Doerr, the only evidence in conflict 
with the Claimants claim of causation, the evidence in the record would have been sufficient to 
establish causation. 
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the absence of Dr. Doerr's unfairly solicited opinion Claimant's medical 
condition was the result of a pre-existing condition, Claimant provided more than sufficient 
evidence as to causation. Therefore, Claimant asks for this Court to reverse the order of the 
Commission regarding Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits or remand claim back to 
the Commission for reconsideration. 
V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED 
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED THE REQUESTED IN 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD FILED 
ON 18 OF JlJNE 2013. 
Claimant submitted an Objection and Motion to Augment the Record on the 18th of June 
2013. The Motion asked for numerous additional entries, but most importantly the transcripts, 
notes, records and audio of the July 28t\ 2011. The Commission responded by augmenting the 
record to ·a,-,.,~~,-, the majority of the Claimant's requests, excluding transcripts and audio of the 
telephonic hearings stating they were not in their possession. However, the Commissions Order 
Regarding Claimants Request to Augment the Agency Record makes no mention of the July 28th 
hearing request for audio, etc. 
The Supreme Court in Small v. Jacklin Seed Company, 1 Idaho 541, 544 (1985) 
remfu'1ded a prior case and recommended a new hearing when the Industrial Commission's 
Agency record was not complete and stated as follows: 
... it is the conclusion of this Court that the apparent omission by the Industrial 
Commission to consider Exhibits 8 and 9 requires this Court to remand the case to 
the Industrial Commission for reconsideration. The commission may well want to 
consider a new hearing to obtain an accurate record from which to evaluate 
appellant's case, considering the apparent inadequacies of the telephone 
conference record presently before the Court. 
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~<~H'H~UH therefore asks this Court to remand the case back to ~H'-'~'''U''. Commission 
for reconsideration due to the inadequacies of the record. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a matter of right under worker's 
compensation law, but may only be affirmatively awarded under the circumstances set forth in 
I.e. § 72-804. Idaho Code § 72-804 provides: 
Attorney's fees-Punitive costs in certain cases.-If the commission or any 
court before whom any proceedings are brought under this law determines that the 
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured 
employee or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground, or 
that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a reasonable time after 
receipt a written claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee or his 
dependents the compensation provided by law, or without reasonable grounds 
discontinued payment of compensation as provided by this law. In all such cases 
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or their dependents shall be 
fixed the commission. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
Claimant is entitled to attorney fees because the Defendants' denial of his claim was 
unreasonable. Defendants originally denied the claim on the grounds that the Claimant was at 
full MMI condition was the result of a non-work related accident. When both of these 
grounds proved unfruitful Defendant introduced new grounds for a post-hearing 
deposition conducted five months after the hearing alleging that claimant suffered from a pre-
existing condition. Interestingly, the same doctor who found Claimant to be asymptomatic of his 
back problems prior to Claimant's first visit (Doerr Deposition, 36:2 -25; 37:14-18) and later 
declared him at maximum medical improvement, intimated that Claimant was feigning 
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Deposition 35:8-17) while simultaneously asserting that 
that his back condition was caused by pre-existing degenerative 
Dr. Doerr 18:14-23) Even if the Court finds that the Defendants' grounds for 
benefits are reasonable, Claimant should be entitled to those attorneys fees 
necessary to pursue his claim for Permanent Disability as such was denied based solely on 
alleged immigration status. 
CONCLUSION 
Commission erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it sanctioned 
not providing discovery answers to an irrelevant issue and in his 
Commission also erred as a matter of law and abused 
to introduce expert testimony a new defense five months on 
concluded. Claimant Mr. Serrano respectfully requests that this Court either 
order the Commission and grant him medical benefits and permanent partial 
or his case to the Commission with instructions to to 
consistent "viih Claimant's arguments in this brief. Claimant 
s fees and costs under I.e. § 72-804, fAR 11.2 and IRCP 1) 
unreasonable denial and delay and contrary position to 
day of October. 
Respectfullv submitt~\ 
" j / 
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A,,\'YWHERE FROM 12 TO 20 MILLION FOREIGN NATIONAlS ARE LIVING IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNLAWFULLY, INVIOIATION OF FEDERAL 
IMMIGRATION L<\.w. 
THE AMERICA.N PEOPLE ARE GUARANTEED PROTECTION AGAINST INVASION UNDER THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 4, SECTION 4: 
'WHEN 'liVE ARE CONSIDERING THE ADVANTAGES THAT MAY RESULT FROM AN EASY MODE OF 
NATURALIZ4TlON, 'WE OUGHT ALSO TO CONSIDER THE CAUTIONS NECESSARY TO GUARD ~4GAINST 
ABUSES ••• ALIENS MIGHT ACQUIRE THE RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP, AND RETURN TO THE COlIfliTRY 
FROM WHICH THEY CAME, AND EVADE THE LAWS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE THE COMMERCE AND 
INDUSTRY OF THE REAL CITIZENS AND INHABITANTS OF AMERICA, ENJOYING AT THE SAME TIME 
ALL THE ADVANTAGES OF CITIZENS ••• " 
Founding Father James Madison, known as the "Father of the Constitution" 
AMERICA'S LESS LESS SKILLED, YOUNG AND MINORITY WORKERS A.ND THE 
AMERICA."'l MIDDLE CLASS ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF JOB DISPLACEMEl\J~f Al"'lD THE HEAVY 
BURDEN OF TAXATION INCURRED BY THE PRESENCE OF LOW-SKILLED ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT 
LABOR. 
MfERICAN WORKERS ARE BEING REPLACED BY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT LABOR, ESPECIALLY THE 
WORKING POOR. REPLACEMENT BY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT LABOR HAS LED TO WAGE 
SUPPRESSION AND WAGE STAGNATION FOR DECADES, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMERICAN 
FAMILIES TO HAVE A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING. 
THE MIDDLE CLASS IS BEARING THE BURDEN OF THE TAXES NECESSARY TO PAY FOR THE 
SOCIAL COSTS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS. STATE AND FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICITS ARE CAUSING 
INFLATION, l\IAKING THE COST OF LIVING RISE. 
THE STATES CAN AND MUST ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAw TO PROTECT THEIR 
CITIZENS BECAUSE THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT REFUSES TO Do So. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"You and 1 have a rendezvous with destiny. We will preservefor our children the 
last best on earth, or we will sentence them to take the first step a thousand 
Ifwefail, at least let our children and our children's children say of us, we 
our brief moment here. We did all that could be done." 
'" President Ronald Wilson nO;:'dJ';"U 
IS HA"lffiORING THOUSA.l~DS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
Pew Hispanic Research Center, Idaho was home to 25,000-45,000 illegal aliens in 2005. 1 
Fast forvvard to 2010 ... 
How many aliens now live in Idaho? 
aliens are either taking jobs away from the state's high percentage of unemployed workers and/or 
enjoying unlawful access to Idaho taxpayer benefits and welfare. Either way they are the legal residents 
of Idaho millions of dollars every year. 
In unemployment for November, 2009 was 12%.2 Over half of the illegal aliens in the state live 
this Idaho county. 
When enforcement legislation is passed in Idaho in the 2010 Idaho '''.~~''''"U, session, employers 
will be forced to check the immigration status of new hires or face penalties. 
This to be introduced by Idaho State Senator Mike Jorgenson, will secure Idaho jobs for citizens 
and protect Idaho taA--payers. 
CHOICE BmWER'J DEPORTATION MIt'll AMNESTY IS A FALSE CHOICE 
Attrition, or the reduction in the number of illegal aliens through enforcement of immigration law, works every 
time it is tried. RemO\ing the magnet of jobs and taxpayer funded services will force illegal aliens to le2.ve 
Idaho for greener pastures. 4 
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1 
: March 15, 2011 
'" n IS 
... 
a I S .. 
Jeffrey S. Passel, 
D'Vera Cohn, 
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DVera 
The number of Hispanics counted in the 2010 Census was nearly 1 million more than expected, 
based on the most recent Census Bureau population estimates, according to an analysis by the 
PCv\' Hispanic Center, a project ofthe Pew Research Center. 
2010 Census count of Hispanics was 50,478,000 I, compared v,ith 49,522,000 Hispanics 
bureau's own estimates. The count was 1.9% higher (955,000 people) than the estimated 
population. In 32 states, the 2010 Census count of Hispanics was at least 2% higher than the 
estimates; in nine states, it was at least 2% lower than the estimates. In the nine remaining 
states and the District of Columbia, the difference was less than 2% in either direction. 
comparison, for the total U.S. population, the 2010 Census count of 308.7 million was 
barely lower (about 232,000 people) than the bureau's population estimate for April 1, 2010. 
Compared with results a decade ago, the national Hispanic count in the 2010 Census was 
closer to the bureau's population estimates than it had been in 2000. The 2000 Census count 
included 10% more Hispanics than the population estimates, and state-level discrepancies also 
were larger than in 2010. 
Unlike the decennial Census, designed to be a 100% count of the u.s. population, the Census 
Bureau's population estimates are annual based 
largely on birth certificates, death certificates, immigration data and other government 
The most recent published state population estimates for Hispanics were as of .July 1, 
2009. For this analysis, the Hispanic estimates were updated to Census Day, April 1, 2010, by 
extrapolating the 2009 estimates based on each state's Hispanic population grO\\th rate from 
2008 to 2009. This report replaces an analysis published March 15, 2011, which examined 
Census 2010 data and population estimates from 33 states. 
1 ~jumbers throughout this report are rounded to the nearest thousand. 
2 The Census Bureau also analyzes a sample of federal tax returns for people who moved from one state to another (linked to 
other data on age, sex, race and ethnicity of the tax filers) to calculate the number and characteristics of in-migrants and out-
migrants for each state. For group quarters such as prisons and college dormitories, the bureau mainly relies on counts supplied 
by states and localities. 
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Pew Hispanic Center analysis 
indicates that states with large 
percentage differences between their 
Hispanic census counts and census 
estimates also were likely to have large 
differences between census 
counts and census estimates for their 
total populations. This reflects the large 
that Hispanics play in overall 
population grO\'vth-nationally, 
accounted for 56% of the U.S. 
increase. Hispanics have accounted for 
most of the discrepancy between 2010 
Census counts and census estimates of 
total populations. 
In addition, according to the Pew 
U.~lYUUH.· Center analysis, states that 
Hispanic populations under a 
million people (including many where 
counts grew sharply) 
collecth'ely had a larger percentage gap 
behveen their census counts and census 
estimates than did the nine states ""ith 
larger, long-duration Hispanic 
communities. 
nine traditional Hispanic states 
include Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Illinois, New ,J ersey, New 
Mexico, New York, and Texas. Each has 
more than a million Hispanic residents 
New Mexico, with 953,000). 
Collectively, 28% of their population is 
As a group, those states are 
home to 38.6 million Hispanics, 
according to the 2010 Census, and their 
aggregate census count was about 
:)62,000 (or .9%) larger than their 
(%) 
Census higher than estimate 
Alabama 
Louisiana 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Delaware 
Kentucky 
Wyoming 
Wisconsin 
South Carolina 
Iowa 
9,7 
9,1 
9,0 
8,5 
Census !ower than estimate 
District of Columbia 
Colorado 
Vermont 
New Hampshire 
-6,1 __ West Virginia 
-8,6 .... Montana 
-8,7 Arizona 
-10,1:: 
-10,2 
South Dakota 
Maine 
-12.9'-:: 
-14,3 _ 
North Dakota 
Alaska 
PEW HISPANIC CENT.:=E~R _____ _ 
15.9% 
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census estimate. 
In 41 states and District of Columbia, Hispanics make up 7% of the total population. 
states as a group are home to 11.9 million Hispanics, and their combined 2010 Census 
count was 593,000 people (or 5.3%) higher than their combined census estimate. Among them 
Alabama, where the Hispanic census count of 186,000 people was 16% higher than its 
census estimate, the largest gap among states. At the other extreme, the census count of 
:)9,000 Hispanics in Alaska was 14% below the most recent census estimate. (Smaller 
PUPUluLIUll;:' by nature tend to be more volatile than large ones, so even a small numerical 
could result in a large percentage change.) 
In the nine states with large Hispanic populations, five had gaps of more than two percentage 
in either direction between census estimates and census counts. In four, the count was 
than the estimate. In New Jersey, the census count of 1.555 million ,vas 4.6% higher 
the census estimate for Hispanics. In Florida, the census count of 4.224 million was 3.7% 
than the estimate. In New York, the census count of 3-417 million Hispanics was 2.9% 
than the census estimate. In New Mexico, the census count of 953,000 ,vas 2.6% higher 
the estimate of Hispanics. 
In the fifth, Arizona, the census count of 1.895 million Hispanics was 8.7% lower than the 
estimate; it also was lower than the Census Bureau's estimates for 2008 and 2009. The gap in 
Arizona 'was almost entirely due to a lower-than-expected Census count in Maricopa County, 
which includes Phoenix. The numerical gap of 180,000 between Arizona's 2010 Census count 
and census estimate of Hispanics was the largest among states. 
accompanying table shows, there were differences between census counts and census 
estimates for Hispanics in most parts of the country. 
accuracy of these census population estimates is important not only because they are the 
I11L\jor source of basic demographic data in the years behveen census counts, but also because 
are the basis for distributing billions of dollars in federal funds during those years. They 
on for sample design and weighting in widely used federal surveys, including the 
own American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey from which 
unemploYlnent and poverty rates are calculated. The estimates also are used to 
calculate birth and death rates for the total population and for sub-populations such as race 
and ethnic groups. 
The Census Bureau has invested study and effort over the past decade to improve its 
population estimates after the publication of 2000 Census counts pointed to a shortfall in 
census estimates published in the 1990S. 
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2000, the population estimate for April I, 2000 of 274.5 million was about 7 
of the census count for that day of 281.4 million people, or 2.5%. Later analysis 
attributed much of the gap to a low census estimate of Hispanics, the nation's largest minority 
group. The 2000 Census count of Hispanics of 35.3 million was nearly 10% larger than the 
estimate for April 1, 2000 of 32.2 million. 
Much of the problem, the bureau concluded, was that the estimates failed to account for 
growth in the number of unauthorized immigrants. Analysts also concluded the 1990 Census 
count had been too low, so the estimates began from a base that was too small. 
At the state leyel, the gap between 2000 Census counts and census estimates of Hispanics was 
(for this analysis the 1999 estimates were extrapolated to Census Day 2000). In 
states, the count was 50% or more above the estimate, higber than any variation found in 
2010 state census counts. In only three states was the census count within 2% of the census 
estimate. 
The bureau made several changes to its population estimates methodology oyer the past 
Most notably, it began including state-level data obtained from the 
Community Survey, which collects information on characteristics ofthe U.S. population, 
immigrants. The bureau also devoted additional effort to outreach in the 2010 
'./~.".nh' to groups that haye been hard to count in the past, such as immigrants. 
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(thousands) 
HISPANIC POPULATION CENSUS COUNT DIFFERENCE FROM CENSUS ESTIMATE 
~.-,----------"-- ----- -- ---- ~----
Official Census Arnount Count 
U.S. total 50,478 49,522 +955 +1.9% 
186 160 +25 +15,9% 
Alaska 39 46 -7 -14,3% 
Anzona 1,895 2,076 -180 -8.7 % 
p.,rkansas 186 180 +6 +3,4% 
California 14,014 13,916 +97 +0,7% 
1,039 1,043 A -0,4% 
479 446 +33 +7,5% 
73 66 +7 +10,4% 
D:sthct or· Columbia 55 55 
° 
-0,3% 
4,224 4,071 +152 +3,7% 
854 848 +6 +0,7% 
121 118 +3 +2,6% 
Idaho 176 170 +6 +3,3% 
flhnols 2,028 2,006 +22 +-1.1% 
390 361 +29 +8,0% 
152 140 +12 +8,5% 
300 271 +29 +10,8% 
K~;ntu(k\j 133 121 +12 +9,8% 
LOU1SkJtla 193 170 +22 +13,2% 
17 19 -2 -10,2% 
471 425 +46 +10,7% 
628 599 +28 +4,7% 
436 427 +9 +2,2% 
250 233 +18 +7,5% 
81 78 +4 +4,8% 
212 211 +2 +0.7 % 
29 31 -8,6% 
Nebraska 167 156 +11 +7,0% 
Nevada 717 717 
° 
0,0% 
Hampshire 37 38 -1 -3,3% 
New 1,555 1,487 +68 +4,6% 
f\1ex!I:::o 953 929 +24 +2,6% 
York 3,417 3,320 +97 +2,9% 
Carohpd 800 746 +54 +7,2% 
North Dakotz:'i 13 15 -12,9% 
355 336 +19 +5.5~jo 
332 315 +17 +5,5% 
450 441 +9 +2,2% 
720 669 +50 + 7.Sq'b 
131 131 
° 
-0,2% 
236 216 +19 +9,0% 
22 25 -2 -10,1% 
290 274 +16 +6,0% 
9,461 9,375 +86 +0,9% 
358 355 +4 +1.0% 
9 10 
° 
-3.3% 
632 592 +40 +6,7% 
756 712 +43 +6,1% 
22 24 -1 -6,1% 
336 308 +28 +9,1% 
'tVv<')rninq 50 46 +4 +9,7% 
PEW HISPANIC CENTER 
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Estimates of the Unauthorized 
Immigrant Population Residing in 
the United States: January 2009 
MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA. AND BRYAN C. BAKER 
This report provides estimates of the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United 
States as of January 2009 by period of entry, region and country of origin, state of residence, age, 
and gender. The estimates were obtained using the "residual" methodology employed for estimates 
of the unauthorized population in 2008 (see Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker, 2009). The unauthorized 
resident population is the remainder or "residual" after estimates of the legally resident foreign-
born population - legal permanent residents (LPRs), asylees, refugees, and non immigrants - are 
subtracted from estimates of the total foreign-born population. Data to estimate the legally resident 
population were obtained primarily from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) while the 
American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau was the source for estimates of the 
total foreign-born population. 
In summar y, DHS es tim ates that the unau tho ri zed 
immigrant populatio n li ving in the United State s 
decreased to 1 O.S million in January 200 9 from 1 l .6 
million in January 20 0S . Betw'een 20 00 and 200 9, the 
unauthorized population grew by 2 7 percent. Of all 
unauthor ized immigrants living in the United States in 
2009, 63 percent entered before 2000 , and 62 percent 
were from Mexico. 
DEFINITIONS 
Legal Residents 
The legally resident immigrant population as defined 
for these es timates include s all persons w h o were 
granted lawful permanent residence ; granted asylee sta-
tus; admitted as refugees ; or admitted as nonimmigrants 
fo r a tempo rar y stay in th e United States an d no t 
reqUired to leave by January l , 200 9. Non immigran t 
residents refer to certain aliens vyho were legally admit-
ted temporarily to the United States for specified time 
periods such as students and temporary workers. 
Unauthorized Residents 
The un autho rize d residen t im migrant popu lat ion is 
defined as all foreign-born non-citi ze ns who are no t 
legal residents. Most u nauthorized residents either 
entered the United States w ithou t inspection or were 
admitted temporarily and stayed past the date they were 
Homeland 
Security 
I 
reqUired to leave. Unau thorized immigrants applying 
for adjustm en t to lawful permanent resident status 
under the Immig rati o n and Na tionality Act ( INA) 
Section 24S(i) are unauthorized until they have been 
granted LPR sta tus , even though they may have been 
authorized to work. Persons who are beneficiaries of 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) - an es timated several 
hundred thousand- are n ot technically nnauthorized 
but were excluded from the legally resident immigrant 
population because data are unavailable in suffiCient 
detail to estimate this population. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Two populations are es timated in order to der ive the 
unauthorized population estimates : I) the total foreign-
born population liying in the United States on January 
I , 2009 , and 2) the legally resident population on the 
same date. The unauthorized population is equal to I ) 
minus 2) . It was assum ed that foreign -born residents 
who had entered the United States prior to 19S0 were 
legally resident since m ost were eligible for legal per-
manent resident status. I Therefore, the starting point for 
: The Registry ProviSion of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows persons 
who have been in the United States si nce January 1. 1972 to apply fo r LPR status. 
Additionally. persons who had lived in the United Sta tes before 1982 as unauthor-
ized res idents were eligible to adjust to LPR status under the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA") of 1986. 
Office of Immigration Statistics 
POLlCY DIRECTORATE 
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the estimates was January 1, 1980. The steps involved in es timating 
the components of each population are shown in Appendix 1. Data 
on the foreign -born population that entered during 1980-2 00 8 by 
country of birth, state of residence, year of entry, age, and gender 
were obtained from the 2008 ACS. The ACS is a nationwide sample 
survey that collects information from u.s. h ouseholds on social, 
demographiC, and economic characteristics, including country of 
birth and year of entry of the fore ign-born population. The ACS 
consists of non-overlapping samples from which information is 
collected monthly over the course of a year. The ACS was selected 
for the estimates because of its large sample size , about 3 million 
households in 2008 compared to 100,000 for the March 2009 
Current Population Survey, th e primary alternative so urc e o f 
national data on the foreign-born population. 
Data on persons who obtained LPR status by country of bir th, state 
of residence, age, gender, category of admission, and year of entry 
were obtained from DHS administrative records maintained in an 
application case tracking system of US. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USerS). Data on refugees arriving in the United States by 
country of origin were obtained from the Department of State. Data 
on persons granted asylum by country of origin were obtained from 
users for those granted asylum affirmatively and from the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review of the Departm ent of Justice for those 
granted asylum defenSively through removal proceedings. Data on 
nonimmigrant admissions by country of citizenship, state of resi-
dence, age, gender, and class of admission were obtained from 1-94 
arrival-departure records in the TECS system of the US. Custom s and 
Border Protection. Estimates of the unauthorized population were 
generated for the ten leading countries of birth and states of resi-
dence, age, and gender. The Cuban-born population living in the 
United States was excluded from the estimates since, according to 
immigration law, Cubans living in the United States more than a 
year are eligible to apply to adjust to LPR starns. 
Caution is recommended in interpreting changes in the size of the 
unauthorized population presented in this report. Annual estimates 
of the unauthorized immigrant population are subject to sampling 
error in the ACS and considera ble nonsampling error because of 
uncertainty in some of the assumptions required for estimation (see 
Limitations below). In addition, changes in the ACS, including revi-
sions in the wording of the question on Hispanic origin in the 2008 
ACS and m easurem ent of net international migration (see U.S . 
Census Bureau, 2009) may have affected the size of the foreign born 
population and thus estimates of the unauthorized population. This 
report does not discuss changes in the unauthorized population 
between 2008 and 2009 by countries of origin or states of residence 
because of greater uncertainty in those es timates. For reference, 
Appendix 2 provides DHS estimates by leading countries of birth 
and states of residence for 2000 and 2005-2009. 
Limitations 
Assumptions about undercounl of the foreign-born population in the ACS and rates of 
emigration. The estimates are sensitive to the assumptions that are 
m ade about these components (see RESULTS). 
Accuracy of year of entry reporting. Concerns exist among immigration 
analysts regarding the validity and reliability of Census survey data 
on the year of entry question, "When did this person come to live 
in the Uni ted States)" Errors also occur in converting DHS adminis-
trative dates for legally resident immigrants to year of entry dates. 
Assumptions about the nonimmigrant population es timate. The estimates are 
based on admission dates and length of visit by class of admission 
and not actual population counts. Length of visit, which is calcu-
lated by matching arrival and departure records, is subject to more 
error than admissions data. 
Sampling error in the ACS. The 2008 ACS data are based on a san1ple of 
the US. population. Thus the estimates of the total foreign-born 
population that moved to the United States in the 1980-2008 
period are subject to sampling variability The estimated margin of 
error for the estimate of the foreign-born population in the 2008 
ACS at the 90 percent confidence level is plus or minus approxi-
mately 154,000. 
Accuracy of state of residence for the legally resident population. State of residence 
for legally resident 1980-2008 entrants is assumed to be the state 
of residence on the date the most recent status (e.g., refugee, LPR, 
or naturalized Citizen) was obtained; however, the accuracy of the 
estimates may be affected by state-to-state migration that occurred 
between the date of the status change and January 1, 2009. 
RESULTS 
Overall Trend 
Between January 2008 and January 20 09, the num ber of unau-
thorized immigrants living in the United States decreased seven 
percent from 1 1.6 million to 10.8 million (see Figure 1). Between 
2000 and 2007 , th e unauthorized population grew by 3.3 million 
from 8. 5 m illion to 11. 8 m illion . The number of unauthorized 
residents declined by 1.0 million between 2007 and 2009, coinci-
dent with the U S. economic downturn. The overall annual average 
increase in the unauthorized population during the 2000-2009 
period was 250,000. 
14.0 
12.0 
10.0 
6.0 
6 .0 
4.0 
2.0 
Figure 1. 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population: 2000-2009 
Millions 
8.5 
DHS estimates not produced 
for 2001-2004 
11.8 11.6 11.3 
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Source: U. S. Department of Homeland Security. 
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Tabie :1. 
Period of Entry of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: 
January 2009 
Period of entry 
All years. 
2005·2008. 
2000·2004. 
1995·1999. 
1990·1994. 
1985·1989 ... 
_1~80·1~~4_c __ ~~~_ .. _ 
Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
Source: 1..;5. Department of Homeland Security. 
Estimated population 
January 2009 
Number! Percent 
-~~~'--~~~ 
10.750.000 100 
910.000 8 
3.040.000 28 
3.080.000 29 
1.670.000 16 
1.190.000 11 
860.000_ 8 
.- .. -.. ~.- .. -.-
The decrease in the size of the unauthorized population betvveen 
2008 and 2009 is not likely due to sampling error in the estimates 
of the foreign-born population in the 2007 or 2008 ACS. The mar-
gin of error at the 90 percent confidence level was 151,000 for 
the 2007 ACS and 154,000, as noted above, for the 2008 ACS.' 
Changes in the ACS, e.g., revisions in the question on Hispanic ori-
gin in 2008 and measurement of net international migration, may 
have had an impact on the 2009 estimate and therefore the magni-
tude of change between 2008 and 2009. Trends in the unauthor-
ized population reported by DHS are consistent with the most 
recent estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center showing 1 1.9 million 
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in March 
2008, 12.4 million in March 2007, 11.5 million in March 2006, 
and 11.1 million in March 2005 (Passel and Cohn, 2008). 
L The additional samplmg error introduced by shifting the reference date of the foreign born popula-
tion to January liS not large enough for sampling error to account for the 2008-2009 change In 
the unauthorized populat:on. 
The sensitivity of the estimates to assumptions about under count 
of the foreign-born population and emigration is illustrated with 
several examples. Doubling the unauthorized immigrant under-
count rate from 10 percent to 20 percent increases the estimated 
unauthorized population from 10.8 million to 12.1 million. By 
lowering or raising emigration rates 20 percent and holding all 
other assumptions constant, the estimated unauthorized immi-
grant population would range from 10.0 million to 1 1. 5 million. 
Doubling the unauthorized immigrant undercount rate and low-
ering or raising emigration rates by 20 percent would expand the 
range of the estimated unauthorized immigrant population to 
11.3-13.0 million. 
Period of 
Of the 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants in 2009, 4.0 mil-
lion (37 percent) had entered the United States on January 1, 
2000 or later (see Table 1). An estimated 0.9 million (8 percent) 
came to the United States between 2005 and 2008 while 3.0 mil-
lion (28 percent) came during 2000 to 2004. Forty-four percent 
came to live in the United States during the I 990s, and 19 percent 
entered during the 1980s. 
in 2009 
The size of each component of the unauthorized immigrant popu-
lation estimates for 2009 is displayed in Table 2. See Appendix I for 
a detailed explanation of each entry in Table 2. For the foreign-born 
population, the starting point ,vas the estimated 29.0 million for-
eign-born residents in the 2008 ACS that entered the United States 
during 1980-2008. This population was increased by 2.2 million, 
or 8 percent, by adjustments for the shift in the reference date from 
mid-year 2008 to January I, 2009 and the addition of undercounts 
for the populations of non immigrants, other legally resident immi-
grants, and unauthorized immigrants. The estimated undercount of 
Components of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009 
a. Foreign·born population. entered 198()'2008, 2008 ACS. 
b. Adjustment for shift in reference date from July 1. 2008 to January 1. 2009 . 
c. Undercount of nonimmigrants in ACS 
d. Undercount of other legally resident immigrants (LPRs. recent refugeejasylee arrivals) in ACS 
e. Undercount of unauthorized immigrant population in ACS . 
29.010,000 
490,000 ! 
190,000 ' 
470,000 
1.080,000 
g. LPR, refugee, and asylee flow January 1. 1980-December 31. 2008 ................................................... . 23.540.000 
1,520.000 . 
3.420,000 
18,610,000 
1.860,000 
20.470,000 
h. Mortality 1980·2008 .. 
I. Emigration 1980·2008. 
j. LPR, refugee. and asylee resident population. January 1. 2009 (g.·h. i.) . 
k. Nonimmigrant population on January 1. 2009 . 
Estimated legally resident population. January 1, 2009 U.+k.). 
, 3) Unauthorized immigrant population 
........ _ .. _ .... -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m. Estimated resident unauthorized immigrant population. January 1. 2009 (f.·I.) . 
Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
10,750,000 
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Figure 2. 
Region of Birth of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: 
Mexico continued to be the leading source of unauthorized immi-
gration to the United States (see Table 3 and Appendix 2). There 
were 6.7 million unauthorized immigrants from Mexico in 2009, 
representing 62 percent of the unauthorized population . The next 
leading source countries for unauthorized immigrants in 2009 
were El Salvador (530,0 00 ), Guatemala (48 0,00 0), Honduras 
(320,000), and the Philippines (270,000). The ten leading coun-
tries of origin represented 85 percent of the unauthorized immi-
grant population in 2009. 
January 2009 and 2000 
Mill ions 
10.0 
8. 5 
8.0 
6.0 
4.0 
2.0 
o 
North America Asia South America 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
the unauthorized immigrant population 
in the ACS was nearly I . 1 million and 
represents 49 percent of all adjustm ents 
to the foreign-born population. 
For the legally resident population, the 
starring point was the flow of23 .5 mil-
lion LPRs, refugees, and asylees during 
1980-2008. By January 200 9, the 23.5 
million had been reduced by 4. 9 mil-
lion to 18.6 million due to mortality 
and emigration. Emigration accollnted 
for 3.4 million , or 69 percent, of the 
4.9 million. The addition of the nonim-
migrant population, es timated at 1.9 
million, resu lted in a total estimate d 
legally resident immigrant population 
o f 20.5 mi lli on on January I , 2009 . 
Subtracting the 20.5 million legally resi-
d ent immigrants from the to tal 3 1 .2 
million for eign-born population on 
January I , 2009 that entered the United 
States during 1980-2008 yields the final 
estimated unauthorized population of 
10.8 million. 
Estimates by Region and Country 
of Birth 
An es timated 8 5 m ill ion of the to tal 
10.8 million unauthorized immigrants 
living in the United States in 2009 were 
from the North America region, includ-
ing Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and 
Central America (see Figure 2). The next 
l eading regions of origin were Asia 
(980,000) and South Am e rica 
0.3 0.3 
Europe 
Table 3 . 
0.2 0.2 
Other 
Between 2000 and 2009, the Mexican-born unauthorized immi-
grant population increased 2.0 million or 4 2 percent. The greatest 
percentage increases occurred among unauthorized immigrants 
from Honduras (9 5 percent), Guatemala (65 percent), and India 
(64 percent). 
Estimates by State of Residence 
California remained the leading state of residence of the unau-
thorized immigrant population in 2009 , w ith 2.6 million (see 
Table 4 and AppendiX 2). The next leading state, Texas , had 1.7 
million unauthorized residents, followed by Florida with 720,000, 
Country of Birth of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009 and 2000 
- . Estimated POPUlatio~--- Percent 
in January I Percent of total change 
, Country of birth 2009 1 
All countries . 10.750,000 
Mexico 6,650.000 
EI Salvador 530,000 
Guatemala .. 480.000 
Honduras, 320,000 
Phi lippines. 270.000 , 
India. 200.000 ' 
Korea .... .. .. . . . . . 200.000 . 
Ecuador. 170,000 
Brazil . 150.000 
China 120.000 
Other countries . 1.650,000 
- Represents less than 5,000. 
Detail may not sum to tota ls because of rounding. 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Table 4 . 
2000 i 2009 : 2000 i 2000 to 2009 
---~. ----'----- . 
8.460,000 100 100 27 
4.680,000 62 55 42 
430.000 5 5 25 : 
290.000 4 3 65 
160,000 3 ' 2 95 
200.000 2 2 33 
120.000 2 1 64 
180,000 . 2 : 2 14 . 
110,000 2 . 1 55 ! ; 
100.000 1 1 49 : 
190.000 1 2 ·37 ' 
2.000.000 15 24 · ·17 : 
Average annual 
change 
2000 to 2009 
250,000 
220,000 
10.000 
20,000 
20,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
(10,000) 1 
(40,000) 
State of Residence of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009 and 2000 
........ - -----~-.----.--.-----, 
I I 
Percent of total ! 
Percent Average annual 
change change 
: State of residence 2000 i 
---'-"-'-'~'-
2000 to 2009 
_ 2000 to 2009 J 
----- -
All states. 10.750,000 8 .460.000 100 100 27 250,000 j 
Ca lifornia. 2,600.000 2.510,000 24 30 3 10,000 ! 
Texas .. . . . .. . - 1 ,680.000 1 ,090.000 16 13 54 : 70,000 ; 
Florida. 720.000 800,000 7 9 
New York . 550.000 540.000 5 6 
·10 : (10 ,000) i 
1 -I I 
Illinois .. . . . . . . . . . 540 .000 440.000 5 5 . 
Georgia. 480.000 220.000 4 3 ' 
24 10.000 I 
115 i 30,000 
Arizona. 460,000 330,000 4 4 
North Carolina . . 370.000 260.000 3 3 ' 
42 20,000 I 
43 10,000 I 
New Jersey. 360.000 350,000 3 4 
Nevada . .... .. . . . . . 260,000 170.000 2 2 
3 
-I 
55 10,000 ! 
Other states 2.730,000 1 ,760.000 25 . 21 ; 55 i 1 110,000 i 
(740,000). - Represents 'ess than 5.000. 
Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
Source: U. S. Department of Homeland Security. 
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3 .0 
2 .5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0 .5 
0 
Figure 3 . 
Age and Gender of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009 
Millions 
2.3 
Under 18 to 25 to 
18 years 24 years 34 years 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
35 to 
44 years 
45 to 
54 years 
Tab!e S. 
Age and Gender of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009 
Total Male 
0.2 0.2 
55 years 
and over 
Female 
i Age Number I percent ! Number_l_ !~rce~.:.L_Number_L __ .~ce~~.J 
Al l ages. 
Under 18 years . 
18 to 24 years . 
25 to 34 years . 
, 35 to 44 years . 
; 45 to 54 years. 
._~~.X~~r::;_,!':l~Cl'/e.! . ..:.. 
10,750.000 
1 ,320,000 
1.410.000 
3,650,000 . 
2 ,930,000 
1 ,040,000 
.. ___ . 39.9~.2()() ___ .... 
Detair may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
Source: U. S. Department of Homeiand Security. 
100 
12 
13 
34 
27 
10 
4 
6 .190.000 100 4 ,570,000 100 
710,000 11 620.000 13 
890,000 14 520,000 11 
2 ,270.000 37 1.380,000 30 
1.630,000 26 1 .300 ,000 29 
530,000 8 510,000 11 
._._._16()!000 . _ 3 .:130,000 5 
New York w ith 550,000, and Illino is 
with 540,000. California's share of the 
n ational total \vas 24 percent in 2009 
compared to 30 percent in 2000. The 
greatest percentage increases in the 
unauthorized population between 2000 
and 2009 o ccurred in Georgia (115 
percent), Nevada (55 percent), and 
Texas (54 percent). 
Estimates by Age and Gender 
In 2009, 61 percent of unauthorized 
immigrants were ages 25 to 44 years, 
and 58 percent were male (see Figure 3 
and Table 5). Males accounted for 62 
percent of the unauthorized population 
in the 18 to 34 age group in 200 9 while 
females accounted for 52 percent of the 
45 and older age groups. 
NEXT STEPS 
The estimates presented here w ill be 
updated periodically based on annual 
data of the foreign-born population col-
lected in the Am eri can Community 
Sur vey and on the estima ted lawfully 
re s id ent for eign - b o rn populati o n 
derived from various administrative 
data sources. 
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APPENDIX 1 
the Unauttmrlzed Resident 
The material below describes how each component was estimated. 
Note that the labels for each component correspond with the 
entries in Table 2. 
1) Foreign-born population 
a. Foreign-born population, entered 1980-2008 
The estimated total foreign-born population that entered 
between 1980-2008 was obtained from the ACS's 
FactFinder. FactFinder is the Census-maintained online data 
portal for obtaining ACS estimates from the full sample for 
a particular year. Data on the distribution of the foreign 
born by country of origin, state of residence, year of entry, 
age, and gender were obtained from the 2008 Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS). The overall FactFinder estimate 
for the total foreign-born population entering in the post-
1979 period \vas reduced to remove PUMS estimates of the 
post-19 7 9 Cuban-born population. Further, a three-year 
moving average was applied to PUMS data for year of entry 
to reduce heaping effects. 
b. Shift in reference date to January 1, 2009 
The reference date for the 2008 ACS, the most recently a\'ai!-
able ACS data, was shifted from mid-year 2008 to January 1, 
2009 by multiplying the population of 2008 entrants by 
1.72, which is the average of three ratios: the ratio of the 
estimated population in the 2008 ACS that entered the 
United States during 2007 compared to the population in 
the 2007 ACS that entered in 2007 and the comparable 
ratios for the 2006 entrants in the 2006 and 2007 ACS sur-
veys and the 2005 entrants in the 2005 and 2006 ACS sur-
veys. Previous DHS estimates used an average of five ratios; 
however, the average of three ratios better reflects recent 
population growth in the second half of the year. 
e. Undercount of non immigrants in the ACS 
Undercount refers to the number of persons who should 
have been counted in a surveyor census, but were not. A rate 
of 10 percent was used to estimate the nonimmigrant under-
count. This rate was used in previous DHS unauthorized 
population estimates for 2000 and 2005-2008 (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2003; Hoefer et a!., 2006, 2007, 
2008,2009). 
d. Undercount ofLPRs, refugees, and asylees in the ACS 
The undercount rate for LPRs, refugees, and asylees in the 
ACS was assumed to be 2.5 percent. This was the same rate 
used in DHS estimates for 2000 and 2005-2008 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2003; Hoefer et a!., 
2006,2007, 2008, 2009). 
e. Undercount of unauthorized immigrants in the ACS 
The under count rate for unauthorized immigrants in the 
ACS \vas assumed to be 10 percent. This was the same rate 
used in previous DHS estimates for 2000 and 2005-
2008 (Department of Homeland Security, 2003; Hoefer 
et a!., 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
f. Estimated foreign-born population, January 1,2009 
The sum of 1 a. through 1 e. (above) is the estimated for-
eign-born population on January 1, 2009 that entered the 
United States during the 1980-2008 period. 
2) Legally resident population 
g. Legal permanent resident (LPR), refugee, and asylee 
flow, entered 1980-2008 
The 1980-2008 flow was calculated separately for LPRs, 
refugees, and asylees. LPRs consist of two groups: new 
arrivals and those who have adjusted status. New arrivals 
include all persons with immigrant visas issued by the State 
Department who were admitted at a U.S. port of entry. For 
new arrinl LPRs, the date of entry into the United States is 
the same as the date of approval for LPR status. For LPRs 
adjusting status, year of entry was assumed to be the year 
of last entry between 1980 and 2008 prior to adjustment. 
Year of entry was imputed when last entry date was miss-
ing (affecting approXimately 40 percent of adjustment of 
status records during 1998-2005) using category of admis-
sion, year of LPR adjustment, and known last entry date. 
Refugees and asylees included in the legally resident flow 
had not adjusted to LPR status as of January 1, 2009. The 
refugee and asylee flmv was estimated based on the aver-
age time spent in the status before adjustment to LPR sta-
tus~3.0 years for refugees and 5.3 years for asylees 
adjusting in 2008. The refugee and asylee portion of the 
legally resident flow therefore included refugees who 
arrived in the United States during the 3.0 years prior to 
2009 and persons granted asylum during the 5.3 years 
preceding 2009. 
h. Mortality oflegally resident flow 1980-2008 
Data are not collected on the mortality of legally resident 
immigrants. LPRs were survived to 2009 by gender and age 
(taking into account subsequent naturalization) using mor-
tality rates by age and sex from 1989-1991 life tables 
(National Center for Health Statistics, 1997). 
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i. Emigration oflegally resident flow 1980-2008 
Emigration is a major component of immigrant population 
change. In the absence of data that directly measure emigra-
tion from the United States, researchers have developed indi-
rect estimates based largely on Census data. For this report, 
annual emigration rates by year of entry (year of naturaliza-
tion if the immigrant subsequently became a US. citizen) 
were calculated from estimates of emigration of the foreign-
born population based on 1980 and 1990 Census data 
(Ahmed and Robinson, 1994). In addition, refugees and 
asylees, with little likelihood of returning to their country of 
origin, were assumed not to emigrate. The overall effective 
rate of emigration for legally resident immigrants in 2009 
was about 22 percent after twenty years. 
j. LPR, refugee, and asylee population on January 1,2009 
Subtracting mortality (2h.) and emigration (2i.) from the 
LPR, refugee, and asylee flow during 1980-2008 (2g.) results 
in the estimated LPR, refugee, and asylee resident population 
onJanuary 1,2009. 
k. Nonimmigrant population on January 1,2009 
The number of nonimmigrants living in the United States on 
January I, 2009 was estimated by counting days of presence 
between July I, 2008 and June 30, 2009 and dividing the 
APPENDIX 2 
Country of birth 
All countries. 
Mexico 
EI Salvador . 
Guatemala. 
Honduras .. 
Philippines. 
India. 
Korea. 
Ecuador. 
Brazil. 
China 
Other countries . 
8.460,000 
4,680,000 
430.000 
290,000 
160,000 
200.000 
120,000 
180,000 
110,000 
100,000 
190,000 
2~000,000 
2005 
10.490,000 
5,970,000 
470,000 
370,000 
180,000 
210,000 
280,000 
210,000 
120,000 
170,000 
230,000 
.. ~,:2i30,00Q.~ .. 
result by 366. The estimate was restricted to classes of admis-
sion such as students, temporary workers, and exchange visi-
tors where the length of stay typically exceeds two months. 
The estimate does not include border crossers or visitors for 
business or pleasure. Year of entry for the 2009 nonimmi-
grant population was based on the distribution of year of 
entry for nonimmigrants used in previous DHS unauthorized 
immigrant population estimates (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2003; Hoefer et al., 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
1. Estimated legally resident immigrant population on 
January 1,2009 
Adding the population of LPRs, refugees, and asylees on 
January 1, 2009 (2j.) to the nonimmigrant population on 
the same date (2k.) results in the total estimated legally res-
ident immigrant population in the United States on January 
1,2009. 
3) Unauthorized immigrant population 
m. Estimated unauthorized immigrant population on 
January 1,2009 
Subtracting the estimated legally resident immigrant popu-
lation (2L) from the total foreign-born population on 
January 1,2009 (If) yields the estimate of the unauthor-
ized immigrant population. 
2000 and 2005-2009 
Estimated population in January 
2006* 2007 2008 2009 
11,310,000 11,780,000 11,600,000 10,750,000 
6,570,000 6,980,000 7,030,000 6,650,000 
510,000 540,000 570,000 530,000 
430,000 500.000 430,000 480,000 
280,000 280,000 300,000 320,000 
280,000 290.000 300,000 270,000 i 
210,000 220,000 160,000 200,000 
230,000 230,000 240,000 200,000 
150,000 160,000 170,000 170,000 
210,000 190,000 180,000 150,000 . 
170,000 290,000 220,000 120,000 
2,290.000_~ .. 2,100,000 
" "-----.. 
:2,OOO,OOO_~ __ ~_l~"O,OOO 
.. ~-~-~,,---~ 
Estimated population in January 
State of residence 2000 2005 
All states. 8,460,000 10.490,000 
California. . 2,510,000 2,890,000 
Texas 1,090,000 1,670,000 
Florida. 800,000 970,000 
New York. 540,000 560,000 
Illinois. , . 440,000 550,000 
Georgia. 220,000 490,000 
Arizona. 330,000 510,000 
North Carolina. . 260,000 370,000 
New Jersey. 350,000 440,000 
Nevada. 170,000 230,000 
...Qtherstates_ .. _ .. _._ . .......!..!60,00g 1,800,000 _ 
Detati may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
""Rev<scd as noted in the 1/1/2007 unauthorized estirrates report published In September 2008 
Source: u.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
2006* 
11,310,000 
2.790,000 
1,620,000 
960,000 
510,000 
530,000 
490,000 
490,000 
360,000 
420,000 
230,000 
__ E()O-,OOO .. 
2007 2008 2009 
11,780,000 11,600,000 10,750,000 
2,840,000 2,850,000 2,600,000 
1,710,000 1,680,000 1,680,000 
960,000 840,000 ' 720,000 
640,000 640,000 ~ 550,000 
560,000 550,000 540,000 
490,000 460,000 480,000 
530,000 560,000 I 460,000 
380,000 380,000 370,000 
470,000 400,000 360,000 
260,000 280,000 260,000 
. .. 2,950,O~ ____ :2,,,50,000 _ ... ____ 2_.7}0,000. 
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USClS - What is E-V eri1)r? Page 1 of2 
u.s. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
What is E-Verify? 
E-Veri1)r is an Internet-based system that compares 
information from an employee's Form 1-9, Employment 
Eligibility Verification, to data from U.S Department of 
Homeland Security and Social Security Administration 
records to confirm employment eligibi lity. 
Why E-Verify? 
Why do people come to the United States illegally? They come here to work. The public can, 
and should. choose to reward companies that follow the law and employ a legal workforce. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is working to stop unauthorized employment. By 
using E-Veri1)r to determine the employment eligibility of their employees, companies become 
Paft of the solution in addressing this problem. 
Employment eligibil ity verification is good business and it's the law. 
Who UsesE-Verify? 
More than 225,000 employers, large and small, across the United States use E-Verify to check 
the employment eligibil ity oftheir employees, with about 1,000 new businesses signing up 
each week. 
While participation in E-Veri1)r is yoluntary for most businesses, some companies may be 
required by state law or federal regulation to use E-Verify. For example, most employers in 
Arizona and Mississippi are required to use E-Veri1)r. E-Verify is also mandatory for 
employers with federal contracts or subcontracts that contain the Federal Acquisition 
Regulat ion E-Verify clause. 
This page provides general information about E- VerifY and is meant to provide an overview of 
the program. For instructions and policy guidance, visit the For Employers and For 
Employees sections of the website. 
Last updated: 09/30/2010 
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U. S. Citizenship 
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Services 
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These stati stics are based on E-Verify cases in Fiscal Year 2010 (October 2009 through September 
20 I 0). Statistics may not appear to sum to 100 percent (or to the subtotals listed below) due to 
rounding. 
Most employees are automatically confirmed as work authorized. 
• 98.3 percent of employees are automatically confirmed as authorized to work ("work 
authorized") either instantly or within 24 hours, requiring no employee or employer action. 
• 1.7 percent of employees receive initial system mismatches. 
Of the 1.7% of employees who receive initial system mismatches: 
• 0.3 percent are later confirmed as work authorized after contesting and resolving the 
mismatch. 
• 1.43 percent are not found work authorized. 
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employees not found to be work authorized: 
• 1.3 percent of employees who receive initial mismatches do not contest the mismatch either 
because they do not choose to or are unaware of the opportunity to contest and as a result are 
not found work authorized. The E-Verify program closely monitors uncontested mismatches 
and actively reaches out to employers to ensure that they are aware responsibility to 
employees of the right to contest. 
• 0.01 percent of employees who receive initial mismatches contest the mismatch and are not 
work authorized. 
• 0.14 percent of employees with initial mismatches are unresolved because the employer 
closed the cases as "self-terminated" or as requiring further action either the employer or 
employee at the end ofFYlO. 
Note: The statistics reported above differ from the 96 percent "accuracy rate" as reponed by the 
Westat in " because Westat used E-
Verify transaction data from April-June 2008 in a model to estimate accuracy rates. 
E-Verify is updated and enhanced to improve its accuracy and usability. 
For a description orE-Verify program improvements, please see the :c:--'-='-'-'-'---'-"=~-== 
~=~""" webpage. 
Reports 
In order to continue to improve E-Verify operations and efficiency, several government and 
independent reports are conducted to provide information to guide the direction ofthe program. 
Last updated: 02/04/201 
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USGS - Veri fication Work Authorization 
Search 
Services Entire Site JuSt thiS sectlO:l 
01 1'IR! 
> E-Ver:fy> VVhat IS E-Vetlfy? > Instant Verification of Work tij.Printer Friendly 
f...Ulncnzation 
Verification of Work Authorization 
E.-Verify's most impressive features are its speed and accuracy. E~Verify is the only 
service that verifies employees' data against millions of government records and provides 
results within seconds, There's no other program that provides the same peace of mind in 
such little time 
i::.-Verify compares the information an employee prOVides on Form 1-9, Employment 
e:lgibillty VerifiCG!.lon, against millions of government records and generally provides 
results in three to five seconds. !f the Information matches, that employee is eligible to 
WO;1( in the States, If there's a mismatch, E-Verify wi!! alert the employer and the 
be allowed to WOrK while he or she resolves the problem. 
E-Verify works by comparing Information entered from an employee's Form 1-9 to: 
455 million Sccial Security Administration (SSA) records 
80 million U.S Department of Homeland Security records 
U.S Department of Homeland Security databases contain records aoout employment-
based Visas, immigration and naturalization status, and U.S. passport issuance, which 
allow E-Verify to compare mformation against a wide vanety of sources. 
TI;ls page provides general informatIOn about E-Verify and is meant to provide an 
overview of the program. For Instructions and policy gUidance, visit the For Employers 
and For Employees sections of the website 
Fmmiy 
Workmg u.s. 
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uselS - Business-Friendly Features 
Au,nonzallon 
Home! espana!] 8!og : i Index 
Search 
Entire Site J<JS~ thiS section 
> E-Ver:f; > I/<Jhat IS E-Verify? > Business"Friend!Y Features mPrinter Friendly 
E-Venfy gives compames peace ofmmd In ensunng that employees are legal U<S, workers, E-
Venfy ehmlOates tne guesswork of determmmg employment eligibility when a new employee IS 
hIred and !s a powerful too! in protecting businesses against those who try 10 cheat the system 
So what's the eaten? There isn't one. Companies are already required by law to complete Form 1-9 
for each newly nired employee, and E.verify works seamlessly with the Form !~9 process to 
cC:1firm employment eligibility 
EwVerify features: 
secure 24~hour access - Access E~Verify anytime, anywhere with no special software 
reqUired. Ail tr,at is needed is a Web browser and Internet access. 
instant results - Employment eliglb!lity results for most employees are displayed in three to 
five secondS. 
Error checking - E-Verify can alert employees to mIsmatches and possible errors in their 
governmem records. Clearing up errors sooner ratner than later saves employees time ar.d 
frustration down the road. 
Photo matching - E~Verify features a photo matching tool to combat document fraud and 
ensure the documents that employees present are genume. 
Compliance peace of mind - Compames that properly use E~Verify get a ~rebuttab!e 
presumpMn" tnat they are In compliance with Form !~9 and employment eligibility laws. 
User access flexibility - With two different user roles to choose from, companies can select 
what their USers can see and do in E-Verify 
Usage reports - E-Verify offers companies the ability to monitor usage to assist with their 
comphance efforts 
Implementation flexibility - With E-Verify, companies can decide thelrpartidpation on a 
location-by-iocation basis (state laws and federal regulations may limit use of this feature) 
Support for large companies - E-Verify offers features through its corporate administrator 
access methoG that allow companies to link and manage their locations that use E-Verify. 
interactive training - E-Verify offers a comprehensive online tutorial as weI! as qUick 
reference gUideS, user manuals and other publications to assist users. 
Customer service - You're never on your own with E-Verify. E-Verify customer support is 
available to provide you WIth technical and program assistance. 
This page provides general informat!on about E-Verify and IS meant to provide an overview of the 
program. For instr..:ctions and policy gUIdance, VIsit the For Employers and For Employees 
sechons of the weoslte. 
famdy 
i,"\ior}·dr,g 
Adoption 
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USClS - Milestones 
Home I Espana! i 81¢9 I AtctHve I Index 
Search 
Entire Site q- Just thiS section 
ou'rRi 
> E-Venf'j' > About the Program> History and .Miiestones sPrinter Friendly 
and MHestones 
ThiS !s a chrono:ogical summary of the milestones of the E-Verify Program (the 
electronic employ:nent eligibility verification program formerly known as the Basic Pilot 
Program) 
y';;--o-es;;,i-pt-io-n-o-f-E-.V-erify His-to-ry-a-n-d-----N-u-m-be-r ~-::--7NC""u-m-:be-' O"'C1;--'1 
Milestone Participating E·Verify 
Employers cases (per I 
1986 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA) Enacted 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(lRCA) of 1986 required employers to 
examine documentation from each newly 
hired employee to prove his or her identity and 
to work In the United States, This act 
Form 1·9, Employment Eligibility 
Verification, requiring employees to attest to 
t~eir work eligibility, and employers to certify 
that the documents presented reasonably 
appear (on their face) to be genuir,e and to 
relate to the individual 
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) Enacted 
The Illega! Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 required 
the then Immigration and Naturalization 
SerJice ONS)--which became part of the U.S, 
Depanment of Homeland Security In 2003--to 
condL<ct three distinct pilot programs: Basic 
Pilot, the Citizen Attestation Pilot, and the 
Machine-Readable Document Pilot These 
pilots were used to determine the best method 
of verifYIng an employee's 
employment verification, 
1997 Basic Pilot Program Launched 
The INS, in conjunction with the Socia! 
SecLlnty Administration (SSA), implemented 
the Basis: PHot Program in California, Florida, 
liunois, Nebraska, New York and Texas. The 
Basic Pilot Program was voluntary and 
allowed employers to confirm the work 
elig:OI:!ty of their newly hired employees, The 
Basic P!!ot Program used informat:on from the 
employee's Form 1-9 and compared it to the 
information in INS and SSA records. To verify 
information with SSA. employers were 
required to call SSA Once the SSA 
information was confirmed by phone, the 
employer entered 1-9 data into a computer 
program which transmitted the data to INS via 
a modem connection 
1998 Basic Pilot Program Integrates SSA 
Verification 
Employers were able to complete both the 
SSA and INS portion of the verification case 
by entering 1-9 data Into a computer program 
which transmitted the data to INS and SSA via 
modem 
1999 Designated Agent Basic Pilot Launched 
INS, in conjunction with the Socia! Security 
Administration (SSA), implemented the 
DeSignated Agent BasiC Pilot Program. The 
DeSignated Agent Basic PHot Program was 
vOluntary and allowed empioyers to use a third 
-party agent to confirm the work eligibility of 
their newly hired employees 
(cumulative) Fiscal I 
Year) I 
Enrol! n 
:...og In te 
Contact 
Useful Links 
R'SS Feed 
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USClS - Milestones Page 2 of 4 
2001 Basic Pilot Program Reauthorized 1,064 559,815 
Congress reauthorized and extended the Employers Cases 
Basic ?l!ot program until 2003 enrolled in E-
Verify 
2002 Basic Pliot Program Continued to Grow 1,704 660,885 
Thougr: no major upgrades were made to the Employers Cases 
program Of its systems, the Basic Pilot enrolled in E· 
Prograrr, continued to grow within the pilot Verify 
states 
2003 Basic Pilot Program Extension and 2,144 588,479 
Expansion Act of 2003 Enacted 
Employers Cases 
Cor.gress enacted the Basic Pilot Program enrolled in E-
Exten5ion and Expansion Act of 2003. Th!s Verify 
extended the Basic Pilot Program to 
November 2008, The new law also required 
the expansion of the BasiC Pilot Program to all 
50 states no later than December 1, 2004. 
2004 Basic Pilot Program Access Expanded to 3,478 757,342 
World Wide Web 
Employers Cases 
The BaSIC Pilot Program lmtJlemented a new enrolled In E· 
Web-based access method to confirm Verify 
employment eligibility The new Web-based 
access method allowed users to access Basic 
Pilot through any Internet-capable computer 
Other features of the jnternet version Include 
online enrollment, reporting capability for 
users, and availablhty of the web interface 23 
hours a day. 
2005 Additional Access Methods Added to the 5,899 980,991 
Basic Pilot 
Employers Cases 
The Corporate Administrator access method enrolled In E-
was created to ailow companies to enrol!, Verify 
maintain, and oversee compames under the 
Junsdict;on of their corporate offices. The 
Corporate Administrator does not create 
employment eligibility verification cases 
2006 BaSic Pilot Program Added Web Services 11,474 1,743,654 
Web Se;vices allows DeSignated Agents or Employers Cases 
employers to develop software that intertaces enrolled In E-
between their own systems and E-Verify Verify 
2007 BaSic Pilot Improved and Renamed E· 24,463 3,271,871 
Verily 
Employers Cases 
The Basic Pilot Program was renamed E- enrolled in E-
Venfy Along With the new name, the program Verify 
added more features inCluding an automatic 
flagging system that prompts employers to 
douole~check the data entered into the web 
interfaCe for those cases that are about to 
result In a mismatch, ThiS change reduced 
data entry errors and initial mismatches by 
approxi;nately 30 percent. 
The launch of E-Venfy also marKed the 
addition of photo matching, Photo matching !s 
the first step in incorporating biometric data 
Into the web interface_ Photo matching was 
developed for employees presenting a 
Permar.ent Resident Card or Emp!oyment 
Authorization Document, and allows the 
emplOyer to match the photo on an 
employee's document with the photo in USCIS 
records 
State workforce agencies were encouraged to 
use E~Veri'fy to confirm the employment 
eligibility of any worker referred to an 
employer in response to an H-2A job order 
Public Education Program Launched 
U.S_ Cit!zenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) launChed a public education branch 
to educate employers, employees and other 
stakehofders about E-Verify and the Form 1-9 
Addendum 4 pg 7 
http://www.uscis.gov/porta\/site/uscis/menuitem.eb 1 d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d 1 a/?vg, .. 4/9/2011 
USCIS - Milestones 
Addltior.ally, Informative materials were 
created and distributed. Brochures mdude 
"You Should Know Your Riahts and 
Respor.sibilities," "You Have Rights" and 
"How Do I Use E-Venfy?" 
2008 E-Verify Web Interface Further Enhanced 
New upgrades to E-Verify now allow the 
progra;r, to automatically check U.S, 
CitizenShip and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
naturalization data, This reauced citizenship 
status mismatches by approximately 39 
percent The Integrated Border Inspection 
Systerr, real time arrival and departure 
mformatlon for non-citizens IS also added to 
the records E-Venfy record checks 
2009 
2010 
ICE Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
u.s Citizenship and immigration Services 
(USCIS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) signed a MOA for the 
sharing of informatton between the two 
agencies. This agreement formalized the 
coordi:iation and management of referralS 
oetweef'l USCIS Verification Division and ICE 
regard,ng the misuse, abuse or fraudulent use 
of E-Venly. 
Compliance Tracking and Management 
System (CTMS) Launched 
USCIS ::.egan momtoring of employers based 
on Cinalysis of their system usage and 
Idemif:cation of specific noncompliant 
benavlors. Potential Incidents of 
noncompliance are tracked In CTMS, aiang 
with the compliance actions that have been 
taken ~o address them. 
Congress authorizes a three year 
extension of E~Verify untii the end of 
September 2012. 
Federal Contractor Regulation Goes into 
Effect 
On Sepember 8. 2009, the 'Federal 
Contractor Regulation" went Into effect. The 
new rule implements Executive Order 12989, 
as amended on June 6, 2008. Executive 
Order 12989 directs federal agencies to 
require many federal contractors entering into 
ne"" CO:ltracts to use E-Verify on aU new 
and on existing employees 
on covered federal contracts. 
E-Verily Web Interface Redesigned 
The E-Verify Web Intertace :-edesign, released 
in June. changed more than 200 indiVIdual 
screens. The redesigned interface creates 
greater efficiency and ease-of-use through 
Improved navigational tools such as 
Drcp down boxes to minimize input errors 
*" Icor.s to aid understanding 
C;ear and simple language 
A new home page 
A new 'case alerts' feature 
improved case management 
Streamlined tutOrials 
Employee Hotline Launched 
U.S. CI:lzenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) launched the E-Verify Employee 
Hotline 888-897-7781 The hotline connects 
employees to customer service 
representatives who answer questions about 
E-VeJify. Fonm 1-9. and employment eligibility 
verification in general, in English and Spanish 
Department of Justice Memorandum of 
Agreement Signed 
U.S Cillzenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) and Department of Justice (DOJ), 
Civil RIghts Division, Office of Special Counsel 
88,116 
Employers 
enrolled In E-
Verily 
156,659 
Employers 
enrolled in E-
Verily 
216,721 
Employers 
enrolled in E-
Verify 
Page 3 of 4 
6,648,845 
Cases 
8,171,711 
Cases 
13,411,411 
Cases 
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USCIS - History Milestones 
(ose) s:gned a Memorandum of Agreement 
for shanng information between the two 
agencies. This agreement formahzed 
Information sharing between USC!S 
Verification Division and (OSe) regarding 
discriminatory use of E-Verify. 
Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Videos Released 
DHS Otice for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Cieated two new, educational training videos 
exp:air:,ng E-Venfy procedures and policies, 
employee rights and employer responsibilities, 
The videos are viewable 
Page 4 of 4 
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USC IS - Companion to Form 1-9 
u.s. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Home I Espana! i BlDg i Archive I Index 
Wt)at is E-Ve!lf{' 
inStant Veflflcation or Work 
AuthOriZation 
Companion to Farm i~9 
Busine5S~F(lendtl Fe2:tt..res 
View a verno 
Attend Elr', Infonrtat,o:"l Session 
Getting S!arted 
Abc~i1. the Prcgf.<.'l1'!"1 
Cu~tOr'l1ef Support 
For Employer,,; 
Fur Emp'cycf;s 
For Fecer3f Contractors 
Publications 
Search 
Entire Site ~ Just !hls section 
RES()(,RCE.S LAWS 
Heme > E~Venfy > \.'\J11al is E-Ve,jfy? :> Companion to Form 1-9 {8Printer Friendly 
Companion to Form 1-9 
E-Veri ty IS closely iinked to Form 1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification . and exists to strengthen 
!he Form 1-9 employment eligibility verification process that aU employers, by law, must follow . 
vVhi!e participation ir, E-Verity is voluntary for most employers, completion of Form 1-9 is required of 
aU employers . 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 prohibits employers from knowingly hiring 
1Hegal woric::ers. To comply with this law , employers must collect information regarding an 
employee's identtty and employment eligibility and document that information on Form '-9. An 
employee must provide certain information on the form, such as name and date of birth, as weI! as 
present supporting documents 
WhIle Form f-9 requires employers to collect information, there was no way for employers to ve rify 
that the information employees provide is valid or that the documents presented are genuine-that 
;s, :.;nlil E-Vecify. E-Verify offers employers a powerful tool in protecting themselves against those 
who try to cheat the system. 
By adding E-Ve,ify to the existing Form 1-9 employment eligibility verification process, a company 
can benefit from the peace of mind of knowing that it maintains a legal workforce. 
How it Works 
----- -r(fCfl\'i ~( , ,", 
Before a company can use E-Verify to verify the employment eligibility of its employees, the 
company and employee must first complete Form 1-9. All of the Form 1-9 ru les that companies 
roliowed before signing up for E-Verify stilt apply with two exceptions . 
.... Employees must provide their Social Security numbers on Form 1-9. (Providing a Social 
Security number on Form 1-9 is voluntary unless the employer participates in E-Verifj.) 
.. Any list B dOCLzment that employees present must contain a photo. (Some List B documents 
without photos are acceptable unless the employer participates in E-Verify.) 
Once Form '-9 is completed , the company enters the information from Form 1-9 into E Verity. 
Depending on the documents an employee provides, the employer may have to compare a photo 
displayed on a computer screen to the photo on the employee's document. The photos should 
match, which ensures the document photo is genuine and hasn't been altered. 
Once the information has been entered and submitted, E~Verify wilt compa;-e it against millions of 
govemment records. If the information entered matches, E-Verify will return an 'Employment 
Authorized' result This confirms the employee is authorized to work in the United States. After 
priming the results page and attaching it to the employee's Form 1-9 (or recording the employee's E 
-Venty case verifJCa!ion number on the form itself), the employer simply closes the case to 
complete the E-Venfy process. 
if there's a mismatch, E-Verify will return a 'Tentative Nonconfirmation (TNC)' result If this 
happens. 1t1e employer needs to print and review a notice with the employee that explains the 
cause of the mismatch and what it means for the employee, 
!f the employee decides to contest the mismatch, the employer will refer the case in E~Verify to the 
appropriate agency (either the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or Social Security 
Administration) and print a letter that it must give to the employee. The letter contains important 
instructions and contact information that the employee will need to resolve the mismatch. The 
employee then has eight federal government work days from the date the case was referred in E-
Verify to resolve the problem. 
E-Verity will alen the employer of an update in the employee's case . If the employee successfully 
resolves the mismatch, E-Verify wiH return a result of employment authorized. If the employee 
doesn 't resolve the mismatch , E-Verify w it! return a final nonconfirmation resun . Only after an 
employee receives a final nonconfirmation may an employer terminate an employee based on E· 
Ve~lfy 
in rare cases, the U,S. Department of Homeland Security or the Social Security Administration 
might need more time to verify the employee's employment eligibility. 
When this happens, E-Verity wi!! return a case in continuance result. When an employee's case is 
In continuance the employer must allow the employee to continue to work until E-Verify gives a 
final result of 'Empioyment Authorized' or a 'Final Nonconfirmation.' 
Start He,.., 
"" Enroll In !::,. V.::rify 
;.. Log in to E.·Verify 
-.. Cor;tac~ E·Venfy 
Re!ated Links 
..... 1-9.Employmem Eiigil:l:ilty 
Verification 
iJseful Links 
.,. immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1936 ([RCA) 
.. - M-274. ~andbook for 
Employ ••• (3907KB PDF) 
Ace Our RSS Feed 
Page 1 of2 
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USCIS - to Fonn 1-9 
page provides general mformation about ENerify and is meant to provide an overview of the 
program For Instr:..;ctions and policy guiaance, visit the For Employers ano For Employees 
sections of the webSite 
Last updated: 04/12/2010 
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USGS -
Home- ! EspanOi! 8!("g i Archive I Index 
Search 
Entire Site 'it JUSt ~hls section 
::> E.venfy > For Employers> Photo Matching 
Matching 
E-Vcrify's photc marching is an important part of 
the employmem eligibility verification process. It 
~eqUires the employer to verify that the photo 
dlspiayed In ENenfy is identical to the photo on 
the document that the employee presented for 
section 2 of Form 1-9. 
PhotO matching is act!vated automatically ;f an 
employee has presented with his or her Form 1-9 
1·551, (Permanent Resident Card) 
Form 1-766, (Employment Authorization Document), or 
- U.S. passport cr passport card 
OUTRi 
BPrinter Friendly 
if no photo is avail8;:)le, the case will either automatically skIp photo matchl:lg or ~No Photo on this 
Dccument" may display in place of a photo 
Other documents with photos (such as a driver's license) will not activate pnoto matching. 
Reminder. A photo displayed In ENenfy should be compared wrth the photo In the document that 
the employee has p~esented and not with the face of the employee, 
Photo Matching Requirements 
if an empioyee presents a Permanent Resident Card, Employment Authorization Document or U.S. 
passport or passport card as the verification document, the employer must make a copy of that 
document and keep it on file with Form 1-9. 
if tna photo dlspiayed on the E-Verify screen does not match the photo on the employee's 
document, the employee will receive a "DHS Tentative Nonconfirmation" (TNC) and must be given 
the opportunity to correct the problem. If the employee chooses to contest the TNC, the employer 
must either attach and submit electronically a copy of the employee's photo document or mail a 
copy of the employee's document to DHS via express mail at the employer's expense. 
Avoiding Discrimination 
Employees have th.a right to present any acceptable aocumentatlon to complete Form 1~9, 
Employers may nO! require an employee to present a speCIfiC document. Employers must accept 
the documents the new employee chooses to present as long as they appear to be genuine and 
relate to the person presenting them. Otherwise, employers may violate feceral law prohibiting 
dlscnmlnatlon In the verificatIon process 
Last updated: 10/04/2010 
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INTRODUCTION 
The presence of an estimated 11.5 million undocumented immigrants in the 
United States, I of which an estimated 7.2 million are working, 2 has become a 
flash point in the emerging national debate about immigration. Despite the fact 
that immigrants often accept jobs and working conditions that no citizens seem 
willing to undertake,3 this country has responded with hostile state initiatives4 
and federal legislative efforts that not only fail to recognize their contributions, 
but also penalize many aspects of their daily existence. 5 
l. JEFFREY S. PASSEL PEW HISPANIC CTR .. THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY I (2006). http://www.pewhispanic.org/tiles/reports/6l.pdf 
(explaining that as of March 2005 there were Il.l million unauthorized immigrants in the 
United States). 
2. Id. at ii (explaining that approximately 7.2 million unauthorized migrants were 
employed as of March 2005. which accounts for approximately 4.9% of the civilian labor 
force). 
3. See Haya EI Nasser. Family. Better Jobs Pull :'vlexicans to CSA. USA TODAY. Dec. 
7. 2005. at A3; S. Mitra Kalita & Krissah Williams. Help Wanted as Immigration Faces 
Overhaul: Congress Considers :Yew Rules. and Businesses Worry About Finding Workers. 
WAS!-!. POST. Mar. 27. 2006. at A I ("Businesses say it is hard to persuade Americans to 
perform the unski1led jobs that immigrants easily fill."): Dave Montgomery. Bush Presses 
Immigration Proposal: Illegal Aliens to Get Chance to Work Here 6 Years Before Return. 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE. Oct. 19. 2005. at All ("[F]oreign workers are needed to fill 
jobs that U.S. citizens often bypass. including unskilled labor and seasonal agricultural 
work."): Mary Lou Pickd & Matt Kempner. Reliance on Illegals Props up Economy: Law 
Would Hit Industry. Consumers. ATLANTA J. & CONST .. Mar. 23.2006. at Al ("[Tjhe hotel 
industry in Georgia has become a magnet for workers from other eountries who are willing 
to take tough. low-paying jobs. such as housekeeping .... "). 
4. See Nicholas Riccardi. States Take On Border Issues. L.A. TIMES. Jan. 16. 2006. at 
A I ("In New Hampshire . . . two sheriffs last year began arresting illegal immigrants. 
reasoning that their presence violated state laws against criminal trespass."): John Turner 
Gilliland. Ari:::ona Prosecutor Has :Yew Twist on Prosecuting Illegal Aliens. CNSNEWS.COM. 
Mar. 15. 2006. http://www.cnsnews.comlNationlArchive/200603INAT20060315b.html 
(describing Arizona Maricopa County Attorney's tiling of felony conspiracy charges against 
illegal immigrants under Arizona's antihuman smuggling law). 
5. REAL ID Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-13. Div. B. 119 Stat. 231. 302-23 
(preventing states from issuing standard federally recognized driver's licenses to 
undocumented immigrants: creating additional proof requirements in asylum claims: 
eliminating habeas corpus review of removal orders and expanding the grounds of 
inadmissibility). 
On December 16. 2005. the United States House of Representatives passed the Border 
Protection. Antiterrorism. and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. sponsored by James 
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When an employer, wittingly or unwittingly, hires an undocumented 
worker, a question arises regarding the extent to which labor and employment 
statutory protections extend to undocumented workers. In analyzing this 
question, courts are forced to address the interplay between immigration and 
employment statutes and their respective underlying policy rationales. Prior to 
2002, courts confronting these issues developed a body of law that harmonized 
these two distinct areas of jurisprudence, finding, in many contexts, that 
undocumented workers were entitled to statutory protections in the 
workplace. 6 This body of law shifted in 2002 when the United States Supreme 
Court decided Hoffinan Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB and found that back-
pay for undocumented workers under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) was foreclosed by federal immigration policy.7 Since the Hoffman 
decision, lower courts have struggled to define the parameters of the case, and, 
while the jurisprudence is still evolving, many courts have limited Hoffman's 
reach and found workers entitled to seek legal remedies for workplace 
violations under a variety of statutes. 8 
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Peter King (R-NY). H.R. 4437. 109th Congo (2005). The bill 
includes a provision that makes "unlawful presence" in the United States a federal crime. Id. 
§§ 201, 203. For a description of additional measures set forth in H.R. 4437, see NAT'L 
IMMIGRATION FORUM. THE SENSENBRENNER-KING BILL'S "GREATEST MISSES" (2006). 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/documents/policyWire/legislation/SenseKingGlance.pdf 
(summarizing some of the provisions of the bill including: a provision that makes any 
relative. employer. coworker. clergyman. or friend of an undocumented immigrant into an 
"alien smuggler" and a criminal: a provision that makes it harder for legal permanent 
residents to become citizens: a provision that requires employers to verify workers' legal 
status: a provision that denies admission to nationals of certain countries: a provision that 
authorizes state and local police to enforce federal immigration laws: and various provisions 
that erode due process. including a provision that reverses the burden of proof). 
6. Sure-Tan. Inc. V. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 884 (1984) (holding that undocumented 
workers were considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act): Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n V. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504.1517 (9th Cif. 1989) 
(finding that the district court did not err in awarding undocumented workers back-pay under 
Title VII): Rios V. Enter. Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union 638. 860 F.2d 1168. 1172 (2d Cif. 
1988) (permitting undocumented workers remedies under Title VII prior to passage of the 
IRCA): In re Reyes. 814 F.2d 168. 170 (5th Cif. 1987) {finding that both undocumented and 
documented workers are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA»: Local 512. 
Warehouse & Oftlce Workers' Union V. NLRB. 795 F.2d 705. 716 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding 
that undocumented workers are entitled to the protections afforded under the NLRA): Bevies 
CO. V. Teamsters Local 986. 791 F.2d 1391. 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding an 
arbitrator's award of back-pay and reinstatement to undocumented workers prior to passage 
of IRCA): Donovan V. Burgett Greenhouses. Inc .. 759 F.2d 1483. 1485 (lOth Cir. 1985) 
(allowing for the enforcement of the FLSA on behalf of undocumented workers): NLRB v. 
Apollo Tire Co .. 604 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cif. 1979) (finding that undocumented workers 
qualify as employees under the NLRA and are entitlcd to seek relief under the act). But see 
Del Rey Tortilleria. Inc. V. NLRB. 976 F.2d 1115. 1121 (7th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Sure-
Tan as disallowing undocumented workers back-pay under the NLRA). 
7. 535 U.S. 137. 151-52 (2002). 
8. Workers who are not paid can seek recovery of wages. See, e.g.. Galaviz-Zamora V. 
Brady Farms. Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. 501-02 (W.D. Mich. 2005): Trejo V. Broadway Plaza 
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Undocumented workers who pursue enforcement of their legal rights have 
heightened concerns about the disclosure of their status in the context of civil 
litigation. Because of the precarious situation that undocumented workers 
inhabit in the workplace,9 the potential for mistreatment is great. 10 Further, 
Hotel. No. 04 Civ. 4005. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17133. at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16.2005): 
Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping. No. 00 C 6320. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831. *2-3 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 30. 2002): Flores v. Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d 462. 463-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2002): Singh 
v. Jutla. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056. 1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2002): Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Inn 
Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
Those who are discriminated against can seek relief under anti-discrimination statutes. 
Rivera v. Nibco. Inc., 364 F.3d 1057. 1066-69 (9th Cir. 2004). cert. denied. 125 S. Ct. 1603 
(2005) (holding that Ho.ffman does not apply to Title VII claims): Escobar v. Spartan 
Security Service, 281 F. Supp. 2d 895. 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that Ho.ffman did not 
preclude all remedies for undocumented workers under the NLRA or other comparable 
federal labor statutes): De La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237. 238-39 
(C.D. Ill. 2002) (reasoning. in dicta. that given the differences between the authority of 
federal courts and the NLRB. as well as Title VII precedent favoring back-pay. Ho.ffman was 
not dispositive of issues raised by the defendant): Lopez v. Supertlex. Ltd .. No. 0 I Civ. 
10010. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15538. at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21. 2002) (rejecting 
employer's argument that in order to state a claim of disability discrimination. the plaintiff 
was required to plead that he was a documented alien). 
Those injured on the job can pursue personal injury remedies or workers' 
compensation. See, e.g.. Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers' Compo Appeals Bd .. 35 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 23. 27-30 (Ct. App. 2005): Safeharbor Employer Serviees L Inc. V. Velazquez. 860 
So. 2d 984.985-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003): Earth First Grading V. Gutierrez. 606 S.E.2d 
332.334-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004): ConrI PET Techs .. Inc. V. Palacias. 604 S.E.2d 627. 630-
31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004): Wet Walls. Inc. v. Lcdezma. 598 S.E.2d 60. 63-64 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2004): Design Kitchen & Baths V. Lagos. 882 A.2d 817. 829-30 (Md. 2005): Correa V. 
Waymouth Farms, Inc .. 664 N. W.2d 324.329-31 (Minn. 2003): Rosa V. Partners in Progress. 
Inc .. 868 A.2d 994.997. 1001 (N.H. 2005): Cherokee Indus. V. Alvarez. 84 P.3d 798. 799. 
801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003): Tyson Foods. Inc. V. Guzman. 116 S.W.3d 233. 244. 247 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
9. Rebecca Smith. Immigrants' Right to. Wo.rkers· Co.mpensatio.n. 40 TRIAL 48. 49 
(Apr. 2004) ("'Latino immigrants are now far more likely to be killed on the job than their 
counterpart, of European ancestry. From 1992 to 2000. fatalities among Latino immigrants 
rose by 67 percent-at a time when the number of fatal occupational injuries to all workers 
declined by 5 percent.") (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. CENSUS OF FATAL 
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES. FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES TO FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS BY 
SELECTED WORKER CHARACTERISTICS (2002): CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION. 
PROTECTING THE SAFETY AND HEALTH OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS (2002). 
http://www.cdc.gov/programs/workforc22.htm: AFL-CIO. DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF 
NEGLECT 9-10 (12th ed. 2003). http://www.atlcio.org/issues/safety/memoriallupload/ 
death_2003jntro.pdf): Rebecca Smith. Amy Sugimori & Luna Yasui, Lo.w Pay, High Risk: 
State .'vfo.dels fo.r Advancing Immigrant Wo.rkers· Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
597. 598-600 (2003-2004) (detailing the statistics showing that immigrant workers are at 
greater risk of work-related injuries and death than their counterparts). 
10. See Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds. Inc. V. NLRB: Strategies fo.r Pro.tecting Undo.cumented Wo.rkers in the Title VJJ 
Co.ntext and Beyo.nd. 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473. 477 & n.12 (2005) (stating that "the 
conditions under which these persons work are--owing to their precarious circumstances-
typically substandard. rife with exploitation by avaricious employers and. sometimes. 
astoundingly appalling in the extent and depth of their cruelty" and providing examples of 
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once their status is disclosed, the ramifications for undocumented immigrants 
are uncertain at best; they could be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (BICE) and deported, charged criminally and/or barred 
f' . h 11 rom reentering t e country. 
Lawyers litigating employment-related claims involving undocumented 
workers are likely to confront a host of complex ethical issues. The ethical 
quandaries have grown increasingly more difficult in light of ongoing debates 
about comprehensive immigration reform. Recent legislative proposals contain 
stepped-up employer verification provisions,12 make mere presence in the 
United States a federal crime, 13 and make those who help undocumented 
immigrants susceptible to liability as "alien smugglers." 14 These looming 
developments increase the potential risks and consequences to undocumented 
immigrants, their employers, and, potentially, to the lawyers who are involved 
in the litigation. The following case is illustrative of the complex interplay of 
ethical issues that can arise. 
A group of workers sued their employer, a landscape company, for 
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). As the case proceeded, 
defense counsel repeatedly questioned the immigration status of some of the 
workers and suggested that plaintiffs' counsel was somehow aiding and 
abetting illegal conduct by failing to report the plaintiffs' whereabouts to 
immigration officials. In an attempt to protect the clients, plaintiffs' counsel 
obtained a written agreement from the defendant that it would not raise the 
issue of plaintiffs' immigration status at depositions. This agreement was 
promptly violated at the first plaintiffs deposition and, in response, plaintiff 
asserted his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Then, during a break, defense 
such exploitation). 
11. 8 U.s.c. § 1227(a)(I)(B) (Supp. V 2006) (making individuals who are present in 
the United States without lawful status deportable): see Rivera. 364 F.3d at 1064 ("While 
documented workers face the possibility of retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their 
labor and civil rights. undocumented workers confront the harsher reality that. in addition to 
possible discharge. their employer will likely report them to the INS and they will be 
subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution."). 
12. Stepped-up verification has been included in many of the proposed bills designed 
to address immigration reform. See, e.g.. The Secure America Through Verification and 
Enforcement ("SAVE") Act of 2007. H.R. 4088. S. 2368. I 10th Congo (2007) (expanding 
the already existing Basic Pilot/E-Verify employment eligibility verification program to 
require participation by all employers and all workers in the country): The Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Act of 2006. S. 2611. 109th Congo (2006) (creating a new Electronic 
Employment Verification System (EEVS) for checking the employment eligibility of every 
newly hired worker in the United States). 
13. Border Protection, Antiterrorism. and Illegal Immigration Control Act. H.R. 4437. 
109th Congo §§ 20 I. 203 (2002). 
14. ld. § 202 (expanding the definition of "smuggling" to include a person who 
knowingly "assists" an undocumented immigrant to "reside or remain" in the United States. 
even if that person does not encourage or induce the immigrant to come to or reside in the 
United States unlawfully). 
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counsel called the local police who, upon their arrival, called the local 
immigration enforcement office to report plaintiff as an illegal alien based only 
upon the assertion of plaintiffs Fifth Amendment rights. IS 
This Article explores the increasingly complex ethical obligations with 
regard to a client's immigration status in the context of employment-related 
civil litigation. 16 The inquiry begins with the initial question of whether or not 
a lawyer can represent an undocumented worker in such litigation. In light of 
prohibitions on lawyers assisting in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent, the 
answer to the question is not necessarily evident. 17 Undocumented workers 
currently can be criminally liable for various actions related to the manner in 
which they entered the country and the method by which they obtained 
employment. Thus, even though undocumented workers may have a legal right 
to certain employment-related remedies, lawyers need to determine whether the 
rules of professional conduct bar such representation. Ultimately, this Article 
concludes that, in most every instance, lawyers are not prohibited from 
representing undocumented workers in employment-related civil litigation, 
even if actions related to their manner of entry or method of obtaining 
employment are criminal or fraudulent. 18 
After determining that a lawyer can represent an undocumented worker in 
employment-related civil litigation, the Article explores additional complexities 
that arise in the course of the representation when lawyers have to decide 
whether to protect or disclose a client's immigration status. The lawyer's 
decision to protect or disclose the information is, in the first instance, 
dependent upon whether or not immigration status is relevant to the underlying 
lawsuit. In the wake of Hoffman, employers have attempted to broaden the 
Court's holding by arguing that immigration status is relevant to a whole range 
of employment-related civil litigation. If immigration status is determined 
relevant to the litigation, the lawyer's ethical obligations to protect the 
information involve inquiries into the rules of confidentiality, the client's Fifth 
15. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW erR., LITlG. GUIDE FOR IMMIGRANT WORKER 
ADVOCATES § 1Il(B)(2) (2007). 
16. Throughout this Article. I refer to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct in analyzing the ethical questions raised herein. While the 
ABA Model Rules themselves are not binding on anyone state. the large majority of states 
have adopted them. See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules. 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr!mrpc!alpha_states.html(last visited Dcc. 24. 2007). To the extent 
a state has adopted professional responsibility rules that differ from the Model Rules. the 
analysis might differ as well. 
17. A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage. or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of 
any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counselor assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007). 
18. See inFa Part II. 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,19 and the applicability and 
scope of the attorney-client privilege. 
If, on the other hand, immigration status is determined not relevant, the 
client's immigration status would constitute confidential information and 
lawyers would be obligated to protect this information unless they were 
pennitted or mandated to disclose it. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
contain a strong obligation to keep client information confidential as well as 
rules designed to prohibit lawyers from counseling or assisting a client in 
fraudulent or criminal activities. Proposed and existing legislation that 
characterizes an undocumented worker's presence or work in this country as 
criminal or fraudulent, thus, creates a tension between the lawyer's 
confidentiality obligations and the potential for permissive 20 or mandatory 
disclosure. 21 Among the applicable provisions are Rule 3.3(b)--which requires 
lawyers representing clients they know intend to engage or are engaging in 
criminal or fraudulent conduct to take reasonable remedial measures, including 
disclosure of such information to the tribunal 22 -and Rule 4.1 (b )--which 
requires lawyers to disclose material facts in order to avoid assisting a criminal 
or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.23 
In trying to address the tension between confidentiality and disclosure 
obligations, lawyers should bear in mind that there are two important 
limitations on the crime and fraud rules embodied in the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. First the rules apply only if there is a sufficient nexus 
between the alleged crime or fraud and the pending action.24 Second, the rules 
19. Generally the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked 
"whenever information sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be discoverable provides 
even a clue that might point a hypothetical government investigator toward evidence of 
criminal conduct:' Robert Heidt. The Conjurer 's Circle-~The Fifth Amendment Privilege in 
Civil Cases. 91 YALE L.J. 1062. 1065 (1982). 
20. Model Rule 1.6 contains several exceptions that are arguably relevant to this 
context. First. Rule 1.6(b)(2) is designed to prevent future client misconduct and allows 
attorneys to disclose if failure to do so will result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007). 
Second. Rule 1.6(b)(3) is designed to permit disclosure to mitigate or rectiry the type of 
harm described in Rule 1.6(b)(2). Jd. R. 1.6(b)(3). Finally. Rule 1.6(b)(6) addresses a 
lawyer's disclosure obligation pursuant to a court order. Additionally. Rule 4.1(b) scts forth 
a lawyer's obligation to disclose to third parties. Jd. R. 4.I(b). Since Rule 4.I(b) has many 
conditions that must be met before disclosure, I include this in the category of permissive or. 
more accurately, conditional disclosure. 
21. My use of the term "mandatory disclosure provisions" includes a lawyer's 
obligation to disclose to the tribunal under Model Rule 3.3(b). Jd. R. 3.3(b). 
22. Jd. 
23. Jd. R. 4.I(b). 
24. HAZARD & HODES. THE LAW OF LAWYERING 37-6 to 37-8 (3d ed. Supp. 2008) 
(stating that rule 4.I(a) "still prohibits only statements that are materially false"). Model 
Rule 3.3(b) requires only that information "related to the proceedings" be disclosed to the 
tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007). 
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apply only if there is a sufficiently close relationship between the lawyer's 
actions and the client's alleged crime or fraud. 25 Essentially, disclosure is only 
required if the lawyer is directly counseling or assisting in the crime or fraud or 
if there is a close causal connection between the client's crime or fraud and the 
underlying litigation. Thus, despite the statutory provisions criminalizing 
certain acts, the constellation of ethical rules relating to client crime or fraud 
may not actually require a lawyer to disclose a client's immigration status, but, 
instead, may obligate the lawyer to protect this otherwise confidential 
information. 
Lawyers representing employers will also be affected by the immigration 
status of opposing parties. 26 If immigration status is not relevant to the pending 
litigation, lawyers representing employers mi9ht consider whether it is 
appropriate to seek access to this information. 2 Further, the way in which 
these disclosure issues are decided will have larger implications for the justice 
system. If the risks and costs of disclosure are too high, undocumented workers 
will be deterred from seeking enforcement of their rights or forced to drop 
litigation once started. This chilling effect might also undermine the policies of 
employment laws that may, as a result, go under enforced. Additionally, 
lawyers might be forced to alter their client relationships so as to avoid learning 
information they might later have to disclose. 
Despite this Article's conclusion that the ethical rules do not mandate 
disclosure of a client's immigration status, the rules might permit the disclosure 
and some lawyer may want to exercise this discretion to reveal. For example, 
an attorney might believe that disclosure would make her client more credible 
or preempt certain strategic benefits gained by the opposing party. In order to 
assist lawyers in addressing these decisions, this Article will briefly explore 
whether the decision to disclose belongs to the lawyer or the client and the 
extent of the lawyer's obligation to counsel the client and to obtain informed 
consent prior to disclosure. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the initial ethical question whether 
undocumented workers seeking employment-related civil remedies will be able 
to avail themselves of legal representation, or whether the limitation on 
25. MODEL RULES Of PROf"L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (stating that a lawyer cannot 
counselor assist a client in perpetrating a crime or fraud); id. R. 4.1 (b) (stating that a lawyer 
shall disclose only "hen necessary to avoid assisting with a client's crime or fraud); HAZARD 
& HODES. supra note 24. at 5-6 to 5-7 ("'Rules 3.3(a)(3) and 4.I(b) are of like effect. for 
together they provide that a lmvyer must disclose material facts to a tribunal or to a third 
party. even if the information would otherwise be confidentiaL when such action is 
necessary to avoid either participating in or passively assisting a clienfs fraud through 
silence."). 
26. While this Article raises some ethical issues that lawyers for employers might face. 
the main focus is on the ethical issues involved in representing undocumented employees. 
27. For a discussion of ethical limitations on the employer. see infra notes 230-44 and 
accompanying text. 
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assisting clients in the commission of a crime or fraud will bar representation. 
After concluding that there is likely no bar to representation in this context, the 
Article then examines how undocumented status affects decisions made during 
the course of the representation. Part II explores the development of the law 
regarding relevancy of immigration status in the context of civil litigation. In 
particular, this Part focuses on a comparison of the law before and after the 
Supreme Court decision in HofJman and then examines the development of law 
by lower courts post-Hoffinan. Part 1lI then explores lawyers' obligations to 
protect or disclose immigration status and contrasts lawyers' ethical obligations 
if immigration status is determined to be relevant to the proceedings with 
instances in which immigration status is not relevant to the proceedings. 
Finally, Part V examines the ethical obligations of lawyers who determine that 
it would be strategically beneficial to the case to disclose a client's immigration 
status. 
In the current climate of hostility toward immigrants, and undocumented 
immigrants in particular, lawyers representing undocumented clients need to be 
mindful of the implications of disclosure. An improperly made disclosure could 
have catastrophic consequences for a client, including deportation, criminal 
charges, and the inability to reenter the country legally. Given these potential 
harmful consequences, lawyers should be cognizant of their ethical obligations 
at all stages of legal proceedings, and should keep clients informed about and 
prepared to address immigration status issues. 
I. IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED STATUS ON ATTORNEy-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
Under current jurisprudence, undocumented workers are entitled to some 
legal remedies for workplace violations. For lawyers seeking to represent 
undocumented workers in this context, an initial ethical question is whether the 
rules of professional responsibility limit such representation. Specifically, the 
inquiry of this Part is whether Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits an attorney from 
assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, categorically bars an 
attorney from counseling or representing an undocumented worker in 
employment-related civil litigation. This Part proceeds by first examining the 
meaning of 1.2(d) and then analyzing its application to typical scenarios in 
which undocumented workers seek the assistance or representation of a lawyer. 
This Part will then move to an analysis of the broader policy implications of 
various interpretations of 1.2(d) and conclude that, in most instances, 1.2(d) 
does not prohibit undocumented workers from seeking the advice, counsel, and 
representation of an attorney in employment-related civil litigation. 
Rule 1.2( d) states: 
[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct 
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the 
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may 
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counselor assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 
. I" f h I 28 scope, meanmg or app lcatlOn 0 t e aw. 
By its plain language, the rule distinguishes between directing, suggesting or 
assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct and providin? the client with 
information about the law and predicted legal consequences.2 
On its face, the application of this rule seems quite simple. Ifthe conduct in 
question is the filing of a lawsuit to enforce existing employment rights, this 
conduct, in and of itself, is not criminal or fraudulent. However, the more 
complex issue is whether the representation indirectly amounts to counseling or 
assisting a client to engage in a crime or fraud. In analyzing this question it is 
necessary to initially explore what, if any, crime or fraud is at issue and 
whether or not any of the crimes could be construed as "continuing offenses.,,30 
Once these parameters are defined, the Article then examines whether or not 
representation in employment-related civil matters amounts to "assisting" and 
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007). Prior 10 adoption of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
stated that "a la\\yer shall not counselor assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to 
be illegal or fraudulent." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY at DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981). 
This rule was much broader in its application as "illegal" could be construed as a larger 
category of actions than merely criminal. 
29. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-37 to 5-38: 
[Ilt is frequently the case that educating the client about the law may function as the 
equivalent of suggesting or assisting in its violation. It is therefore important to note that the 
explicit phrasing of the rule appears to deal with this overlap directly 
and clearly by indicating that communicating ·the law' is always acceptable. and by itself 
is not to be considered suggestion or assistance. 
Stephen L Pepper. Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence 
and Ethics of Lawyering. 104 YALE L.J. 1545. 1588 (1995): see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (2007) (noting that even if the client uses the advice of the 
lawyer in the course of criminal or fraudulent actions it does not by itself make the lawyer "a 
party to the eourse of action"). 
30. By "continuing offense" I mean to refer to that group of offenses that criminal law 
defines as ongoing. See United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co .. 306 U.S. 161. 166 
(1939) ('"[A continuing offense is a] continuous. unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by 
a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force. however long a time it may 
occupy. Where such an act or series of acts runs through several jurisdictions. the offense is 
committed and cognizable in each."): State v. MaidwelL 50 P.3d 439. 441 (Idaho 2002) 
(defining a continuing offense as "a continuous. unlawful act or series of acts set in motion 
by a single impulse and operated by unintermittent force") (citing State v. Barlow's. Inc .. 
729 P.2d 433.436 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986»: State v. Ramirez. 633 N.W.2d 656. 660 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2001) (defining a continuing offense as '''one which consists of a course of conduct 
enduring over an extended period of time'" (quoting John v. State. 291 N.W.2d 502 (Wis. 
1980»: see also.l. Michael Callan & Harris David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty 
of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client :Hisconduct in an Adversary System. 29 RUTGERS L 
REV. 332. 363 (1976) (detining a continuing crime as one "which. though committed in the 
past. has ramifications or effects which continue into the present or future"). But see Nancy 
E. Stuart. Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidentiality. I GEO. 1. 
LEGAL ETHICS 243. 253 (1987) (arguing that the definition articulated by Callan & David is 
too narrow and should instead include continuing acts that are crimes in the future). 
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is thus prohibited under Rule 1.2( d). 
Undocumented workers can be criminally liable for a number of different 
actions which, for ease of analysis, can be grouped into two broad categories: 
those related to entry and continued presence in the United States; and those 
related to obtaining and maintaining employment. In terms of those criminal 
activities related to entry and presence in the country, while mere presence in 
the United States is not currently a crime,31 entry and presence in the United 
States after a deportation order has been entered is a criminal offense. 32 
Additionally, entering the country without inspection or entering by use of false 
or misleading representations33 and willful failure to register as an alien after 
thirty days are crimes. 34 Further, it is a crime to knowingly forge, alter, make, 
obtain, possess, or accept false immigration documents for entry into or as 
evidence of a lawful stay or employment in the United States. 35 In terms of 
criminal or fraudulent activity related to work, using a false Social Security 
number for the purpose of obtaining any payment or any other benefit is a 
felony.36 It is not currently a crime to work without any legal documents, but it 
is grounds for removal. 37 
Of those acts that constitute a criminal offense, are any of them considered 
"continuing crimes"? If so, the ongoing nature of the offense might impact the 
analysis of whether or not a lawyer'S work on employment-related civil 
litigation could be construed as "assisting" the client in a crime or fraud. Courts 
have found that entering without inspection or entering with false documents 
and using a false Social Security number to obtain a benefit are not "continuing 
crimes.,d8 The crime of entering by eluding examination or immigration 
31. Unlawful presence in the United States, in and of itself. is not currently a crime. 
but it is a deportable offense. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2007): see also Gates v. L.A. Superior Court. 
238 Cal. Rptr. 592.603 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that aliens' being in the United States in 
violation of thc immigration laws is a civil offense and exclusively within the federal 
domain). 
32. 8 U.s.c. § 1326(a) (2000). A person found to have committed an offense under 
this statute shall be imprisoned for a period often years. Id. § 1326(b)(3}. 
33. Id. §§ 1325(a)(2)-(3} (defining as criminal the entry into the country by eluding 
examination as well as entry by use of false or misleading representation). A person found to 
have committed an offense under this statute can be fined or imprisoned not more than two 
years. or both. Id. § 1325(a)(3). 
34. Id. §§ 1302. 1306 (stating that any alien who willfully fails to register after thirty 
days can be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined up to $\000 or imprisoned up to six months 
or both). 
35. 18 U.s.c. § 1546(a) (2000). A person found to have committed an offense under 
this statute shall be fined or imprisoned not more than ten years for the first offense. Id. 
36. 42 U.s.c. §§ 408(a)(7)-(8) (2000). A person can be fined or imprisoned for not 
more than five years. or both. for such an offense. Id. 
37. 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(l)(8) (SUpp. V 2006). 
38. United States v. Payne. 978 F.2d 1177. 1180( 10th Cir. 1992} (finding that falsely 
representing a social security number is not a continuing offense): United States v. Rincon-
Jimenez. 595 F.2d 1192. 1194 (9th Cir. 1979) (l1nding that entering by eluding examination 
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officers has been held to be "consummated at the time an alien gains entry 
through an unlawful point and does not submit to these examinations ... 39 Based 
upon this analysis, once an immigrant reaches a place of repose within the 
country, the misdemeanor of improper entry is concluded. Similarly, using a 
false Social Security number in order to obtain a benefit has been held to be 
completed when the false representation is made and is not considered a 
continuing crime. 40 However, there could be numerous separate crimes if an 
individual were to make numerous representations utilizing a false Social 
Security number. 
In contrast, willful failure to register as an alien after thirty days and entry 
and presence in the United States after a deportation order have been found to 
be continuing crimes.4 ! Additionally, while there is no specific case analyzing 
whether all, or part, of 18 U.S.c. § 1546 amounts to a "continuing crime," 
related case law supports an interpretation that at least some acts under § 1546 
could be construed as continuing crimes. Section 1546 makes it a crime to 
knowingly forge, counterfeit, alter or falsely make immigration documents for 
entry or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the U.S. and to utter, 
use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive such immigration 
documents for entry or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the 
United States. 42 Employing the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Toussie v. United States, the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied 
in only limited circumstances. 43 Toussie requires that, in order to constitute a 
continuing offense. the explicit language of the substantive criminal statutes 
must compel such a conclusion or the nature of the crime must be such that 
or inspection was not a continuing crime, but instead one that was completed at the time an 
unauthorized alien gains entry without inspection): United States v. Joseph. 765 F. Supp. 
326. 330 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding that the crime of using a false social security number with 
the intent to deceive is completed when the talse representation is made). 
39. Rincon-Jimenez. 595 F.2d at 1193-94: see a/so United States v. Pruitt. 719 F.2d 
975.978 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A violation of 8 U.s.c. § 1325 occurs only at the time of entry 
and does not continue thereafter."): Gates v. L.A. Superior Court. 283 Cal. Rptr. 592. 602-03 
(Ct. App. 1987) (citing Rincon-Jimenez for the proposition that a violation of 8 U.S.c. § 
1325(a)(2) has been held to be "consummated at the time an alien gains entry through an 
unlawful point and does not submit to these examinations"). 
40. Payne. 978 F.2d at 1180-81 (finding that using a false social security number for 
tax-evasion purposes, with intent to deceive, was not a continuing otfense): Joseph. 765 F. 
Supp. at 330 (finding that use of a talse social security number on a credit application for a 
bank loan. with intent to deceive. was not a continuing offense). 
41. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1032. 1047 n.3 (1984) (finding that willful 
failure to register after thirty days constitutes a continuing crime): United States v. Ruelas-
Arreguin. 219 F.3d 1056. 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a violation of § 1326 constitutes 
a "continuing offense"). 
42. 18 U.s.c. § 1546 (2000). 
43. 397 U.S. 112. 115 (1970) (analyzing the doctrine of continuing otfense in the 
context of statute of limitations issues and explaining that the doctrine should apply only in 
limited circumstances because of the tension that exists between the statute of limitations 
and the continuing-offense doctrine). 
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Congress intended that it be treated as a continuing crime.44 Of all of the acts 
prohibited by this statute, possession is the only one that implies an ongoing 
activity. The other actions such as uttering, obtaining, using or accepting appear 
more likely to be construed as completed upon the act constituting the crime. 
There are many cases involving "possession" offenses and no matter the 
divergent circumstances, each court found that possession is a "continuing 
offense.,,45 Thus, in addition to willful failure to register after thirty days and 
entry and presence after a deportation order, it also appears that possession of 
immigration documents for the purposes identified in the statute might be 
construed as a continuing crime. 
Further, because the ethical rules address fraudulent, as well as criminal, 
actions of the client, the lawyer should explore what, if any, actions of a client 
could be considered fraudulent. The rules define fraudulent as "conduct that is 
fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction 
and has a purpose to deceive." 46 Fraud typically consists of a false 
representation, whether oral, written or based in conduct that creates an untrue 
or misleading impression in the mind of another with the intent that the person 
would rely upon the false representation. 47 Certainly, entering without 
44. fd at 115-16 (construing a statute and regulation that required male citizens 
between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the draft). 
45. See United States v. Winnie. 97 F.3d 975. 976 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding unlawful 
possession of a cheetah traded in violation of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora was a continuing ot1'ense): United States v. 
Blizzard. 27 F.3d 100. 101 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the crime of receiving and 
concealing stolen government property was a continuing offense): United States v. Jones. 
533 F.2d 1387. 1391 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding that possession of a firearm constituted a 
continuing offense): United States v. Cunningham. 902 F. Supp. 166. 168 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(finding that possession of stolen mail was a continuing offense). 
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(d) (2007). 
47. 9 STUART M. SPEISER ET At., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:4. at 212-13 
(1992) ("[11n very general terms [fraud J can be said to comprise anything calculated to 
deceive. including all acts. omissions. and concealments involving a breach of legal or 
equitable duty. trust, or confidence justly reposed. reSUlting in damage to another or by 
which an undue and unconscionable advantage is taken of another."). For examples of how 
some states define fraud. see Weinstein v. Weinstein. 882 A.2d 53. 62-63 (Conn. 2005): 
"Fraud consists in deception practiced in order to induce another to part with property or 
surrender some legal right. and which accomplishes the end designed .... The elements of a 
fraud action are: (I) a false representation was made as a statement of fact: (2) the statement 
was untrue and known to be so by its maker: (3) the statement was made with the intent of 
inducing rei iance thereon: and (4) the other party rei ied on the statement to his 
detriment.. .. 
ld (quoting Mattson v. Mattson, 811 A.2d 256. 259 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002»: see also Vigil 
v. Fogerson, 126 P.3d 1186. 1197 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) r-[F]raud is defined as 'a false 
representation. knowingly or recklessly made. with the intent to deceive. on which the other 
party acted to his [or her] detriment. "'(quoting Robertson v. Carmel Builders Real Estate. 92 
P.3d 653.662 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004»): McCarthy v. Wani Venture. 251 S.W. 3d 573. 585 
(Tex. Ct. App., 2007) (,,[A]ctual fraud can be the concealment of material facts or the failure 
to disclose a material fact."). 
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inspection, with false papers or obtaining employment with false documents 
might be construed as fraudulent activity. 
Based upon the fact that some of the actions of the undocumented worker 
might constitute either a crime or a fraud, the issue is whether or not legal 
representation of an undocumented worker in an employment-related civil case 
would amount to "assisting" in any of these criminal or fraudulent acts. In 
analyzing this question, it is helpful to think about a continuum at one end of 
which are those instances where there exists an obvious connection between the 
client's crime or fraud and the lawyer's actions or inactions. The most extreme 
examples are those in which the lawyer directly participates in the client's 
crime 48 or directly advises a client to commit a crime or fraud. 49 In these 
instances, Rule 1.2( d) would bar representation. On the other end of the 
spectrum would be an example in which the client commits a crime or fraud 
that is so wholly unrelated to the representation that it is obvious Rule 1.2( d) 
would not prohibit the attorney's representation. For example, assume a client 
who is undocumented seeks compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
and the state counterpart, for wages owed for completed work. In the course of 
representation, the client discloses to his attorney that he previously has been 
violent toward his wife. Even assuming that his actions would constitute an 
48. S'ee. e.g. Townsend v. State Bar of Cal.. 197 P.2d 326. 327-29 (Cal. 1948) (lawyer 
was suspended for three years for advising his client to make a fraudulent conveyance to 
frustrate a judgment and prepared the deed knowing it was to be used in a fraudulent fashion 
and backdated it to facilitate the fraud); People v. Theodore. 926 P.2d 1237. 1242 (Colo. 
1996) (lawyer drove client to family home in violation of restraining order issued against 
client): Fla. Bar v. Brown. 790 So. 2d 1081. 1083. 1089 (Fla. 2001) (lawyer who. at client's 
request. solicited campaign-contribution checks from subordinate la\\yers and delivered 
them to a corporate client and premium billed the client as reimbursement suspended for 
ninety days): Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sheinbein. 812 A,2d 981. 989. 1001 (Md. 
2002) (lawyer who assisted his son/client in fleeing to Israel after committing a murder 
disbarred): In re Berglas, 790 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 2005) (lawyer who submitted false 
filing to INS in order to give the New York City office jurisdiction over the matter 
suspended for one year): Disciplinary Counsel v. Cirincione. 807 N.E.2d 320, 323. 326 
(Ohio 2004) (lm\yer who helped client obtain rental housing in violation of court ordered 
conditions for client's release from jail suspended for six months). 
49. Regardless of whether actual assistance is rendered. a lawyer may never advise a 
client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct. See, e.g.. Peoplc v. Gifford. 76 P.3d 519, 
520, 522 (Colo. App. 2003) (la\\yer who advised client to pay wife to recant testimony in 
criminal case disbarred): Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Somers. No. CV 980585853S. 1999 
WL 732978 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (lawyer who counseled witnesses to tcstify falsely 
disbarred): Fla. Bar v. Boland. 702 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1998) (lawyer who told client not to 
comply with a court-ordered child-visitation schedule suspended for two years): In re 
Holden. 982 P.2d 399 (Kan. 1999) (lawyer who advised client to remove child from 
jurisdiction in violation of court order indefinitely suspended): State ex reI. Counsel for 
Discipline v. J-Jorncber, 708 N.W.2d 620. 622 (Neb. 2006) (lawyer who counseled client to 
violate a court order to convey title to property as part of marriage dissolution suspended for 
two years): In re Edson. 530 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1987) (lmvyer disbarred for advising clients to 
invent evidence in defense of drunk driving case). 
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assault, nothing prohibits his representation in the claim for unpaid wages50 
because Rule 1.2(d) recognizes a distinction between assisting the client in the 
commission of a crime or fraud and merely being aware that the client has or is 
committing a crime or fraud. 51 
A gray area exists in between these extremes-inst_ances in which a 
lawyer's actions can be construed as "passively assisting,,)2 the client in the 
commission of a crime or fraud. 53 Consider the following factual scenarios and 
how they implicate the underlying policies of Rule 1.2( d). 54 
50. In this context. the lawyer should still consider her obligations under Rule 1.6 to 
keep this confidential. in the absence of an exception. This ultimately may cause a conflict of 
interest, but the fact that the client has committed a crime in and of itself does not mean that 
the lawyer is barred from representing that client in a wholly unrelated case. 
5!. In analyzing the application of Model Rule 1.2( d). courts and regulatory bodies 
have found no violation for counseling a client where the lawyer provides the client broad 
advice or provides advice for a client who has committed some prior bad act. See, e.g.. State 
Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof! Conduct, Op. 2000-04 (2000) (opining that a 
Imvyer may ethically advise a client to tape record a telephone conversation in which one 
party has not given consent to the recording as long as the lawyer concludes that such taping 
is not prohibited by state or federal law). 
Also. courts have found no violation for assistance where the lawyer recognizes the 
crime or fraud and takes steps to correct or remedy it. or vvhere the lawyer relied upon the 
opinion of other counselor conducted his own research into the facts and law and could 
argue that he did not have knowledge. See. e.g.. In re Tocco. 984 P.2d 539. 543 (Ariz. 1999) 
(lawyer who did not deliberately omit assets from bankruptcy schedules not subject to 
discipline); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. ofProfi Ethics v. Jones. 606 N.W.2d 5.8 (Iowa 2000) 
(lawyer who had no evidence a current client's transaction with former client was fraudulent 
other than that the current client's story sounded "incredible" did not knowingly assist the 
current client's fraud, but lawyer misstatements and omissions in persuading former client to 
loan money to current client did constitute misrepresentation, which resulted in suspension 
of the lawyer's license): In re Claussen 14 P.3d 586. 595 (Or. 2000) (lawyer who 
misrepresented client's withdrawal of assets as in the ordinary course of business after legal 
research gave lawyer a basis for so opining did not assist a client's fraud); In re Fink, 764 
A.2d 1208. 1209. 1211 (Vt. 2000) (lawyer who incorrectly advised client that she could sign 
her ex-husband's name on a car title following a divorce did not knowingly assist client 
fraud). 
52. The term "passively assisting." as used in this context. denotes a form of assistance 
that does not directly assist or further a client's crime or fraud. but may do so indirectly. 
53. However. even passive assistance. such as withholding information trom a court or 
the government. may violate Model Rule 1.2. See. e.g.. People v. Casey. 948 P.2d 1014 
(Colo. 1997) (forty-five day suspension for lawyer who tailed to inform court that client 
facing trespassing charge was using someone else's identity); In re Price. 429 N.E.2d 961 
(Ind. 1982) (lawyer withheld information from government to assist client in obtaining 
Medicaid benefits illegally). But see Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm .. Op. 97-02 
(1997) (lawyer's failure to give law-enforcement authorities telephone number of client 
accused of crime does not amount to assisting client in committing crime). 
54. In this Part. I talk specifically about whether or not the client's actions constitute 
crimes as opposed to fraud. It is certainly the case that many of the client's actions would 
likely be construed as fraud both in the manner of entry and the method of obtaining 
employment. However, I do not think that calling the action a fraud as opposed to a crime 
changes the analysis meaningfully. 
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A. Hypothetical One: Client Enters with Proper Immigration Documentation 
and Is Not Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers 
On one end of the spectrum, a client enters with a lawful visa, but does not 
obtain proper work authorization. The employer hires the employee without 
asking for papers and thereafter fails to pay the client for work performed. In 
this instance, the client has not committed a crime; he entered lawfully, and 
working without papers itself is not a criminal act. 55 Further, since the 
employer did not ask about the client's immigration status it is unlikely that the 
client's actions would be construed as fraudulent. 56 In the absence of actual 
criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer's representation cannot be construed 
as assisting in a crime or fraud. 
B. Hypothetical Two: Client Enters Without Proper Documentation and Is Not 
Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers 
Moving along the spectrum, suppose the client enters the country by 
evading inspection, the employer hires the client without asking for papers and 
thereafter fails to pay the client for work performed. In this example, the client 
55. The employer, on the other hand. could be liable for not complying with the 
employment-authorization verification mandates set forth in the 1986 Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA). See 8 U.s.c. § 1324(a)(I)(B) (2000) (cstablishing what is now 
commonly known as the 1-9 requirements). Also. in the absence of immigration reform at the 
national level. states have passed an unprecedented number of bills related to immigration. 
See Press Release. Nan Conference of State Legislatures. Federal Gridlock on Immigration 
Reform Leads States to Action (Nov. 29. 2007). available at http://www.ncsl.org! 
programs/press/2007/prlI2807.htm CAs of November 16. 2007. roughly 1562 pieces of 
legislation related to immigrants and immigration had been introduced among the 50 state 
legislatures. Of these bills. 244 became law in 46 states .... State legislators have introduced 
roughly two and a half times more bills in 2007 than in 2006. Thc number of enactments 
from 2006 (84) has more than tripled to 246 in 2007."). 
:Y1any of these bills create employer sanctions. See. e.g.. H.B. 2779. 48th Leg .. 1 st Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (prohibiting employers from knowingly or intentionally hiring 
undocumented workers and rcquiring all employers to use the Basic Pilot Program to 
determine employees' legal status); H.B. 729. 105th Gen. Assem .. Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007) 
(providing for administrative procedures against employers who knowingly hire illegal 
immigrants. including the temporary suspension of the employer's business license): S.B. 
70. 2007 Leg .. Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007) (making it unlawful for any employer to knowingly 
cmploy an unauthorized worker and requiring employers to verify a prospective employee's 
legal status or authorization to work. The law also creates penalties for employing 
unauthorized workers. including fines. jail sentences and revocation of business licenses). 
56. There is an argument that by holding oneself out for work. the individual is 
implicitly representing that she is authorized to work and if not so authorized is committing a 
fraudulent act. However. given the reality that many undocumented workers are in the 
workforce despite employers' knowledge of their status. and given the fact that federal law 
places the burden on the employer to verify employment authorization. holding oneself out 
for work does not necessarily mean that the employee is implicitly represcnting that she is 
lawfully authorized to work. 
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did commit a crime of entry without inspection, 57 which courts have found to 
be a noncontinuing crime, complete upon entry. 58 If the client thereafter seeks 
assistance in the wage-and-hour case, does 1.2(d) prohibit a lawyer from 
counseling or representing the client? There is no ongoing crime or fraud; the 
crime was completed upon entry and there is no crime or fraud related to the 
employment because the employer did not ask for papers from the employee. 59 
Thus. 1.2(d) would not prohibit a lawyer from counseling or representing a 
client in this situation. 
C. Hypothetical Three: Client Enters Lawfitlly but Uses a False Social Security 
Number to Obtain Employment 
As the crime becomes more closely connected to the employment, the 
1.2(d) analysis is a bit less clear. Assume the client enters lawfully, but uses a 
fraudulent Social Security number to obtain employment and the employer 
thereafter fails to pay him for hours worked. Does a lawyer's representation of 
the client in a wage-and-hour claim in this context assist him in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct?6o 
It is a crime to use a false Social Security number to obtain benefits6l but 
the crime is completed when the false representation is made. 62 Thus, 
57. 8 U.s.c. § 1325 (2000). 
58. United States v. Rincon-Jimenez. 595 F.2d 1192. 1194 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that 
a violation of 8 U.s.C. § 1325 is consummated at the time of entering the United States and 
is not considered a continuing oITense). 
59. While employers in the past may not have asked for documents. given the 
increasing criminalization of an employer's failure to ask for and document the immigration 
status of clients. as well as stepped-up enforcement. this practice may be waning. There have 
been a number of states that have passed statutes requiring an employer to obtain 
immigration information on each employee. See 8 U.s.c. § 1325 (2000). 
60. This example also has the potential to raise Rule II issues for the lawyer 
representing the employee. Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
[b]y presenting to the court a pleading. written motion. or other paper-whether by signing. 
filing. submitting. or later advocating it-an attomey or unrepresented party certitles that to 
the best of the person's knowledge. information. and belie( formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances: ... (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or. if specifically so identified. will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery. 
FED. R. CIV. P. II(b). As part of the filing of a legal action. the lawyer may be required to 
provide a social security number on court papers such as case-designation sheets. If the 
lawyer provides the false social security number that the client is using. he or she could be 
su~iected to sanctions under Rule II for asserting factual contentions that are not truthful. 
61. 42 U.S.c. §§ 408(a)(7)(A)-(8) (Supp. V 2006). A person can be fined or 
imprisoned for not more than five year or both for such otTense. 
62. See United States v. Payne. 978 F.2d 1177. 1180 (lOth Cir. 1992) (finding that 
using a false social security number for tax evasion purposes. with intent to deceive. was not 
a continuing offense): United States v. Joseph. 765 F. Supp 326. 330 (E.D. La. 1991) 
(finding that use of a false social security number on a credit application for a bank loan. 
with intent to deceive. was not a continuing offense). 
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representation of the client to obtain wages he is due does not directly assist 
him in that completed crime. There are arguments however that the 
representation indirectly assists the client to remain unlawfully in the United 
States by providing financial assistance. And, while unlawful presence in the 
United States is not currently a crime,63 it may amount to fraud. Is this type of 
indirect assistance what Rule 1.2(d) was designed to prohibit? 
Analyzing the nexus between the lawyer's actions and the client's criminal 
or fraudulent activity helps to explore this question. 64 While the lawyer in this 
example has not directly caused the client to remain in the United States, there 
still exists a potential causal link between the representation and the presence. 
How close does the connection between litigation for past due wages and the 
client's unlawful presence in the United States have to be to bar the provision 
of advice and representation to clients in this context? If the rule were 
interpreted to prohibit anyone who committed a crime from seeking legal 
services on an unrelated civil matter, the interpretation would run contrary to 
deeply rooted concepts of access to justice. 65 Further, the connection between 
the lawyer's actions and the client's crime in this context seems too remote to 
bar representation in light of the uncertainty of both the outcome and the 
consequence of a recovery. There is no guarantee that the lawyer will be 
successful in her attempt to recover wages for the client and no necessary link 
between the recovery of money and the client's continued unlawful presence. 66 
So, while there is some factual causal proximity 67 between the lawyer's 
conduct and the client's crime or fraud in this example, the link appears too 
uncertain and tenuous to construe 1.2(d) as prohibiting a lawyer's advice and 
representation. 68 
63. See H.R. 4437. 109th Congo *§ 201. 203 (2005) (proposing to make unlawful 
presenee in the United States an "aggravated felony"). 
64. Geoffrey C. Hazard . .If.. How Far :'vfay a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in 
Legally Wrongful Conduct.? 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669. 671-72 (1981) (explaining that there 
needs to be a nexus between the assistance and the actual crime or fraud for 1.2(d) to bar 
attorney representation). 
65. See inFa notes 70-78 and accompanying text. 
66. If the 1.2(d) analysis depended upon whether the money recovered in litigation 
would directly support the client to remain in the United States. lawyers would have to 
inquire. prior to accepting a case. how money recovered in litigation would be used. Such an 
interpretation of Rule 1.2(d) seems implausible. 
67. Hazard. supra note 64. at 672 (referring to the lack of a nexus between the 
lawyer's conduct and the client's criminal or fraudulent acts as a lack of "causal proximity"). 
68. The analysis otJered above in hypothetical three would be similar even if the client 
was engaged in an ongoing crime. For example, assume a client enters the country after 
having been previously deported. The client obtains employment. without presenting 
documents. and thereafter seeks legal assistance to recover wages for work performed. 
Similar to the hypothetical above. the lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any 
proposed course of conduct with a client. As such. the lawyer would be able to advise the 
client that entry and presence in the United States after a deportation order is a crime. The 
question then is whether the lawyer's representation in wage-and-hour litigation assists in the 
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D. Hypothetical Four: Client Enters Lawfitlly but Uses and Still Possesses 
False Immigration Documents to Obtain Employment 
On the far end of the continuum would be the situation in which the client 
is committing an ongoing crime that is related to the employment situation. 
Suppose the client enters lawfully but thereafter uses false immigration 
documents to obtain employment and still possesses the documents, which is a 
continuing crime. 69 The client seeks the lawyer's advice and representation to 
recover damages and pursue reinstatement for a discriminatory termination. In 
this hypothetical, there are several steps the lawyer might take to comply with 
Rule 1.2(d). First since it could be considered an ongoing crime to possess 
false immigration documents. the ethically prudent lawyer should advise the 
client that possession of such documents is illegal and recommend that the 
client no longer retain possession of them. 70 The lawyer could then explain to 
the client that the ethical rules would not permit her to bring a claim seeking 
reinstatement based on the false immigration documents. 71 If the client had 
since obtained lawful immigration status, then the lawyer could proceed with 
the representation, including a claim for reinstatement. If not, then she could 
clicnt's criminal conduct. As described above. the analysis would depend upon how close a 
connection exists between the crime of entry and presence in the United States and the 
recovery of wages. While arguments exist on both sides. it is likely that the link between the 
lawyer's representation and the client's ongoing crime would be too tenuous to prohibit 
representation under Rule 1.2( d). 
69. 18 U.s.c. ~ 1546(a) (2000): see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
70. Rule 1.2( d) states that "a lawyer may discuss the legal consequenccs of any 
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counselor assist a client to make a good 
faith effort to detenmine the validity, scope. meaning or application of the law." MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007). Thus it is entirely permissible for the lawyer to 
explain to the client the illegal nature of some conduct and to counsel that the conduct cease. 
For a thoughtful discussion of when counseling can cross the line into assistance. see Pepper, 
supra note 29. However. lawyers cannot counselor assist in the obstruction of justice. Model 
Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: "(b) commit a criminal act 
that ret1ects adversely on the la\\yer's honesty. trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud. deceit or misrepresentation; (d) 
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2007): see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Klaas, 742 
N.E.2d 612, 614 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for one year with six months 
for telling a fonmer client to "clean up his acC based on lawyer's knowledge that the FBI 
was going to initiate a drug raid). 
71. In practical tenms, afterthe Supreme Court's decision in Hoflman, it would be hard 
to argue for reinstatement on the merits, unless the client had lawful immigration papers. To 
date. courts have approved only those requests for reinstatements that are conditioned upon 
an undocumented worker's obtaining proper work authorization within a specified period of 
time. See. e.g.. Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 902-03 (1984) (approving the 
NLRB's order that conditioned reinstatement of the injured workers upon proof of "legal 
readmittance to the United States"): NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group. Inc .. 134 
F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1997) (approving order to reinstate workers if "they present within a 
reasonable time, INS Fonm 1-9 and the appropriate supporting documents"). 
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proceed with only the claim for damages based on the discriminatory firing on 
the grounds that representation in a claim for damages would not further the 
crime of possession of false immigration documents. 
In addition to the application of 1.2(d) to these hypotheticals, construing 
the rules of professional responsibility so as to deny lawyers the ability to 
represent undocumented workers could conflict with established legal and 
public policy principles. Our legal system is premised on the notion that the law 
should be knowable and that law is, by nature, public information. 72 One of the 
lawyer's roles is to provide clients access" to the law so long as providing access 
is done within the bounds of the law. 7.) In fact, the preamble to the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct talks about the lawyer'S obligation to assure 
access to the legal system. 74 If Rule 1.2( d) were interpreted so broadly as to 
prohibit a lawyer from representing an undocumented worker in employment-
related civil litigation, undocumented workers might be legally entitled to relief 
but unable to access the legal system. 
While the legal system does recognize the integral relationship between 
rights and remedies,75 having a substantive right without the ability to enforce 
is not unprecedented. 76 Immunity from suit standing limitations, narrower 
standards for private enforcement of civil rights. and legislation prohibiting 
access to federal courts are all examples where remedies have been restricted 
by the courts or Congress. 77 However. each of these limitations. whether 
72. Pepper. supra note 29. at 1547. 
73. Id. at 1547-48. 
74. As a public citizen. a lawyer should seek improvement of the law. access to the legal 
system. the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession. . In addition. a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and 
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a 
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their 
authority .... [A]II lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic 
influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (2007). 
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *23. * 109) ("[I]t is a general and indisputable rule. that where 
there is a legal right. there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law. whenever that right 
is invaded .... [E]very right. when withheld. must have a remedy. and every injury its proper 
redress. '"). 
76. Donald H. Zeigler. Rights Require Remedies: A :Yew Approach to the Enforcement 
of Rights in the Federal Courts. 38 HASTINGS LJ. 665. 666 (1987) (explaining that courts 
have erected procedural barriers to obtaining remedies in various contexts. but. at the same 
time. have supported the underlying substance of the right): see also David Rudovsky. 
Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies. 2005 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1199. 1202 (identifying an ongoing debate among constitutional scholars about 
whether rights and remedies are best understood as separate legal concepts or as being 
"inextricably intertwined""). 
77. Rudovsky. supra note 76. at 1200 ("Over the past three decades. the Supreme 
Court (and in recent years. the Congress) has restricted civil rights remedies through a series 
of complex and controversial measures, including expanded immunities from suit, narrower 
standards for standing and for private enforcement of civil rights legislation. exceptions to 
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created by the courts or Congress, has independent rationales underlying it that 
do not relate to the attorney-client relationship.78 Rule 1.2(d), on the other 
hand, is a rule of professional responsibility designed to keep the provision of 
legal services within proper bounds. 79 As such, the examples from other areas 
of law are not determinative of the rights without a remedy argument in this 
context. 
It could be argued that because an undocumented worker intentionally 
ignores legal obligations, other remedies afforded by the legal system should be 
foreclosed to that individual. Like with the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, 
wrongdoers should not be able to avail themselves of legal protections when 
they have otherwise disregarded the law. On the other hand, however, the legal 
system is full of rights and protections, particularly procedural protections, that 
apply regardless of whether the underlying litigant broke the law. For example, 
prisoners are entitled to challenge the conditions of their confinements as well 
as access the courts for general civil matters, such as divorce,80 and criminal 
defendants are entitled to a whole host of procedural protections designed to 
preserve their rights. 81 Thus, a concern about clean hands would be addressed 
better by congressional action that defines or limits the substantive rights of 
undocumented immigrants rather than through rules of professional 
responsibility. 
the exclusionary rule, limitations on remedies in criminal cases and federal habeas corpus. 
and direct federal court door-closing legislation."). 
78. For example. standing limitations are designed to promote separation of powers. 
serve judicial efficiency. improve judicial decision making. and serve the value of fairness. 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 61-62 (3d ed. 2006). 
Sovereign immunity doctrine is designed to create efficiency by limiting litigation. preserve 
the unhampered exercise of governmental discretion. and further separation of powers by 
limiting judicial review. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. FEDERAL JURISDICTION 611-12 (4th ed. 
2003). 
79. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-6 (stating that Rule 1.2(d) is "part of an 
important constellation of rules directed at keeping the scope of legal services provided to 
clients within proper bounds"). 
80. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817. 821-22 (1977) (finding that prisoners have a 
constitutional right of access to the courts): White v. Kautzky. 494 F.3d 677. 679-80 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that "meaningful access" to the courts includes the ability to bring 
actions "seeking new trials. release from confinement. or vindication of fundamental civil 
rights" (quoting Bounds. 430 U.S. at 827»: Walbert v. Walbert. 567 N.W.2d 829.832 (N.D. 
1997) (finding that denial of an incarcerated person's request to appear at a divorce hearing 
by telephone deprived him of his due process right to have reasonable access to the courts). 
81. For example. the Fourth Amendment contains an exclusionary rule. Weeks v. 
United States. 232 U.S. 383 (1914): Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). an 
expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). and a requirement of 
probable cause, United States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (search warrant): Henry v. 
United States. 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (arrest warrant). The Fifth Amendment contains a 
privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(interrogation): Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (trial). The Sixth 
Amendment preserves the right to counsel in certain criminal cases. Gideon v. Wainwright. 
372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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In sum, while lawyers representing undocumented workers in employment-
related civil litigation should be mindful of 1.2( d) prohibitions, it is unlikely 
that the rule would bar a lawyer's representation of such clients. A lawyer may 
have a sense of uneasiness representing an undocumented worker, but the rules 
of professional responsibility do not define a lawyer's role as that of a police 
officer. 82 While lawyers are prohibited from assisting a client in criminal or 
fraudulent action, lawyers are not barred from representing an undocumented 
worker in employment-related civil litigation for which the worker is entitled to 
relief because the immigration-related crimes or fraudulent actions are most 
sensibly understood as not sufficiently related to the underlying legal claim. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF IMMIGRATION STATUS TO THE UNDERLYING 
LITIGATION 
The question of whether to protect or disclose immigration status is a 
difficult one. The legal analysis of a lawyer's ethical obligation regarding 
disclosure of a client's immigration status initially depends upon whether the 
information is relevant to the pending litigation. This Part examines the 
development of the law on the relevance of immigration status in the context of 
employment-related civil litigation. Specifically, it will explain the state of the 
law prior to the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(lRCA), the import of IRCA's passage, the impact of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, and the development of law 
post-Hoffman. 
, 
The question of relevance arises in two different contexts in these cases: 
first in the discovery stage and second at trial as evidence is being introduced. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), "[p ]arties may obtain 
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's 
claim or defense." 83 "Relevant:' in the discovery stage, is defined very 
broadly84 and includes information that may not be admissible at trial but that 
82. Part of the uneasiness stems from the fact that the ethical issues raised in this 
Article are but a symptom of the larger underlying problem-namely. what the United States 
will do about the millions of undocumented workers who contribute to our economy on a 
daily basis. In the absence of meaningful immigration reform. the ethical issues raised in this 
Article are timely and crucial. but they do not address the larger. unresolved. vexing problem 
of meaningful immigration reform. 
83. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)( I): see also Manning v. Gen. Motors. 247 F.R.D. 646. 651 
(D. Kan. 2007) ("Relevancy is broadly construed. and a request for discovery should be 
considered relevant if there is 'any possibility' that the information sought may be relevant 
to the claim or defense of any party." (citing Owens v. Spring/United Mgmt. Co .. 221 F.R.D 
649.652 (D. Kan. 2004»): Jackson v. AFSCME Local 196.246 F.R.D 410, 412 (D. Conn. 
2007) ("Information that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence is considered relevant for the purposes of discovery."). 
84. The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts. the names of 
witnesses. or any other matters that may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his 
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might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 85 Once at trial, the question 
of what is relevant is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which defines 
"relevant evidence" as evidence that tends to make a fact at issue in trial more 
or less probable than it would have been in the absence of the evidence. 86 The 
standard of relevance is more stringent at the trial stage, and the information 
allowed into evidence at trial will necessarily be more narrow than that allowed 
to be explored in the discovery stage. 87 
Lawyers representing undocumented immigrants in employment-related 
civil litigation should be ~repared to address issues of relevance in both the 
pretrial and trial stages. 8 The distinction is critical to understanding the 
lawyer's ethical obligations. If the information is determined relevant to the 
litigation, then it will be discoverable by, or disclosed to, the other side unless it 
is privileged. 89 If it is not relevant to the litigation, then the information will be 
case. See Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co .. 139 F.2d 469. 472 (2d Cir. 1943): Mahler v. Pa. R. 
Co .. 8 Fed. R. Servo 33.351 (E.D.N.Y. 1945). 
85. The rule reads. "Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence:' 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(I). Subsection (b) was intended to create a broad scope of examination 
and allows not only for the discovery of evidence for use at trial but also inquiry into matters 
that are themselves inadmissible as evidenee but that might lead to the discovery of such 
evidence. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 annot. 
86. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
87. Dominion Exploration & Prod .. Inc. V. Waters. 972 So. 2d 350.361 (4th Cir. 2007) 
eNot only may diseovery be had on any relevant matter involved in a pending action. but it 
may be had of any matter even if inadmissible at trial. which is reasonably ealculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence.""): Lee V. State. 141 P.3d 342.347 (Alaska 2006) 
("[D]iscovery rules are to be broadly construed and 'relevance for purposes of discovery is 
broader than for purposes of trial. ... (quoting Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage. 718 P.2d 
456.461 (Alaska 1986))): Catrone V. Miles. 160 P.3d 1204. 1212 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) 
C'The requirement of relevancy at the discovery stage is more loosely construed than that 
required at trial. .. · (quoting Brown V. Superior Court. 670 P.2d 725.730 (Ariz. 1983))). 
88. In many instances. questions of relevance will be raised at the pretrial and trial 
stage through motions for protective orders or motions to compel the production of evidence. 
See. e.g.. Rivera V. NIBCO. Inc .. No. CIV-F-99-6443. 2006 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 16967. at *21-
22 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31. 2006) (analyzing whether immigration status is relevant to the 
underlying case through a motion for a protective order): Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms. 
Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. 501-02 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (deciding whether immigration status is 
relevant to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act by ruling on Plaintiffs motion for a protective order): 
Cortez V. Medina's Landscaping. No. 00 C 6320. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831. at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 30. 2002) (raising the question of relevance of immigration status through a motion 
to compel discovery): De La Rosa V. N. Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237. 238-39 (C.D. III. 
2002) (raising the question of relevanee of immigration status through a motion to compel 
discovery): Zeng Liu V. Donna Karan Int'1. Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191. 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (using a motion to compel discovery to ascertain the relevance of immigration status). 
89. For a detailed discussion of the lavvyer's ethical obligations if immigration status is 
relevant to the underlying proceedings. see inFa Part IV. 
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kept confidential90 and cannot be disclosed unless the lawyer is permitted or 
mandated to do so pursuant to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 91 
The law regarding the interplay between immigration status and 
employment-related civil claims has evolved over time. Prior to 1986 and the 
passage of the [RCA, laws governing employment remedies and those relating 
to the control of immigration were largely separate. 92 Instead of regulating 
undocumented labor, federal immigration laws focused on the admission, 
classification, and naturalization of noncitizens. 93 In fact, seeking employment 
in the United States as an undocumented worker was not il\egal,94 and most 
courts interpreting the rights of undocumented workers found that they were 
still entitl ed to statutory protections in the workplace.95 
In 1986, Congress passed the IRCA, which established an extensive 
employment-verification system, 96 designed to deny employment to 
90. The term "relevant:' as used in this Part. is limited to the definition under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) relating to discovery and Federal Rule of Evidence 401 
concerning relevant evidence at trial. While the term "relevant"" sounds similar to the term 
"relating to" used in Model Rule 1.6(a) to define "confidentiality of information:' the terms 
have ditTerent meanings. For a detailed explanation of the difference between these terms 
and the relationship between the two. see infi-a notes 169-73 and accompanying text. 
91. For a detailed discussion of the lawyer's ethical obligations if immigration status is 
not relevant to the underlying proceedings. see infra Part IV. 
92. See Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 892-94 (1984) (finding that the 
immigration laws "as presently written" expressed only a "peripheral concern" with the 
employment of undocumented workers) (quoting De Canas v. Bica. 424 U.S. 351. 360 
(1976»): see also Linda S. Bosniak. E,clusion and ,ifembership: The Dual Identity of the 
L'ndocumented Worker C'nder Cnited States Law. 1988 WIS. L REV. 955. 979 (stating that 
prior to employer sanctions. immigration laws were focused on immigrants' entry and border 
crossing): 110 & Chang. supra note 10. at 478-79 (explaining that prior to passage of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). immigration laws were focused on the terms and 
conditions under which immigrants would be classified and admitted into the country). 
93. Cf Ho & Chang. supra note 10. at 479 n.16 (noting. however. that there were other 
immigration laws that were designed to regulate the labor market in discrete ways. such as 
the Chinese Exclusion Act. which was designed to protect domestic workers from having to 
compete with the Chinese labor market. and the Immigration Act of 1924. which contained 
preferences within the quota system for those with job skills in specific sectors of the 
economy). 
94. Del Rey Tortilleria. Inc. v. NLRB. 976 F.2d 1115. 1124 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy. 
1.. dissenting) C'Once an alien has crossed the border. however. employment is not an 
additional offense (in fact. it is no crime at all):'). 
95. See Ho & Chang. supra note 10. at 479 (referring to cases supporting protection 
under Title VII. the National Labor Relations Act. the Fair Labor Standards Act. the Farm 
Labor Contractor Registration Act. and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act): Michael J. Wishnie. Prohibiting the Employment of Cnauthori::ed 
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails. 2007 U, CHI. LEGAL F. 193.211 (""Before IRCA. courts 
and executive-branch agencies generally enforced labor and employment laws without 
regard for the immigration status of the employee:"). 
96. 8 U.S.c. §§ 1324(a)(l )(A)-(B) (2000). At the same time. Congress created new 
provisions barring employers from discriminating against applicants or cmployees because 
of their national origin or citizenship status. Jd. § I 324b(a)(l ). Despite these new provisions 
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immigrants who were not lawfully present in the United States or who were not 
lawfully authorized to work in the United States. 97 The statute also made it a 
crime for an unauthorized immigrant to subvert the employer-verification 
system by tendering fraudulent documents 98 and made it unlawful for 
employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers. 99 Under lRCA, in order 
to enforce these provisions, employers must complete forms verifying the 
immigration status of employees. 100 
Despite prohibitions on the employment of undocumented workers and 
corresponding sanctions, lRCA's legislative history illustrates Congress's 
intent not to diminish the protections afforded undocumented workers under 
existing labor and employment statutes. 101 To do otherwise might adversely 
designed to address undocumented workcrs. the legislative history clearly illustrates that 
passage of this bill was in no way intended to diminish the already existing labor law 
protections afforded to such workers. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(II). at 8-9 (1986), reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757. 5758 (""[T]he committee does not intend that any provision of 
this Act would limit the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies such as the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor. the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. the National Labor 
Relations Board. or Labor arbitrators. in conformity with existing law. to remedy unfair 
practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such 
agencies or for engaging in activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise would be 
counter-productive of our intent to limit the hiring of undocumented employees and the 
depressing effect on working conditions caused by their employment."). 
97. 8 U.s.c. § 1324a(h)(3) (2000) (defining "unauthorized alien"" for the purpose of 
the statute). 
98. ld. § 1324c(a)(2). 
99. Id. § 1324a(f)(l) (making employers who violate IRCA subject to criminal 
prosecution). Despite the new provision making it criminal for employers to hire 
undocumented workers. only a small percentage of arrests made in 2007 involved criminal 
charges against those who hired such workers. See Spencer S. Hsu. Immigrant Crackdown 
Falls Short; Despite Tough Rhetoric, Few Employers of Illegal Workers Face Criminal 
Charges. WASH. POST. Dec. 25. 2007. at A3 (citing a 2007 report by the Department of 
Homeland Security that found that while arrest rates had gone up to nearly four times the 
previous year's level. only 2 percent of the arrests involved charges against individuals who 
had hired undocumented workers-""[f]ewer than 100 owners. supervisors or hiring officials 
were arrested in fiscal 2007. compared with nearly 4.900 arrests that involved illegal 
workers. providers of fake documents and others, the figures show""). 
100. 8 U.S.c. § 1 324a(b )( I) (2000) (requiring the completion of 1-9 forms designed to 
verify immigration status); see also Michael 1. Wishnie. Emerging Issues for Undocumented 
Workers. 6 U. PA. 1. LAB. & EMP. L. 497. 500 (2004) (""In 1986. Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (lRCA). which deputized private employers in the 
public effort to control 'illegal immigration. "'). 
1 0 I. It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the 
bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law. or to limit 
the powers of federal or state labor relations boards. labor standards agencies. or labor 
arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for 
exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing 
law. 
H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1). at 58 (1986). reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649. 5662. 
Addendum 5 -026 
380 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:355 
affect the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents. 102 Courts 
generally followed this intent and continued to extend workplace protections to 
undocumented workers. I03 Because undocumented workers were generally 
protected under labor and employment statutes, the immigration status of the 
worker was not relevant. 
This jurisprudence remained largely consistent until 2002, when the 
Supreme Court decided Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRE. I04 The 
issue before the Court was whether the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) could award back-pay to an undocumented worker harmed by the 
employer's unfair labor practice. 105 In a 5-4 decision, the Court decided that, 
by passing [RCA, Congress intended to bar certain legal remedies to 
undocumented workers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) if the 
remedy could be construed as encouraging one to evade existing immigration 
laws. 106 Specifically, the Court held that undocumented immigrant workers are 
not entitled to claim back-pa6- under the NLRA in light of federal immigration 
policies set forth in IRCA. I 7. The Court found that the NLRB did not have 
discretion to provide a remedy that conflicted with another federal policy, 
namely the immigration policy of deterring illegal immigration. 108 
This decision marked another step in the evolving jurisprudence 
surrounding the rights of undocumented workers. Prior to 2002, the only 
Supreme Court case involving undocumented workers and labor and 
employment statutes was the pre-IRCA decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRE. I09 
[n Sure-Tan, the Court found that undocumented workers were "employees" as 
defined under the NLRA but concluded that workers who "voluntarily" left the 
102. Id 
lO3. Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 884 (1983) (holding that undocumented 
workers were considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act); Rios v. Enter. 
Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union 638. 860 F.2d 1168. 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting 
undocumented workers remedies under Title VII prior to the passage of the IRCA): In re 
Reyes. 814 F.2d 168. 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that both undocumented and documented 
workers are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Local 512. Warchouse & Ot1ice 
Workers' Union v. NLRB. 795 F.2d 705. 716 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that undocumented 
workers are entitled to the protections afforded under the NLRI\); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters 
Local 986. 791 F.2d 1391. 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding an arbitrator's award of back-
pay and reinstatement to undocumented workers prior to passage of IRCA): Donovan v. 
Burgett Greenhouses. Inc .. 759 F.2d 1483. 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1985) (allowing for the 
enforcement of the FLSA on behalf of undocumented workers): see also Ho & Chang. supra 
note 10. at 484-85. 
104. Hot1n1an Plastic Compounds. Inc. v. NLRB. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
105. Id. at 146-47. 
106. Id. at 149-50. 
107. Id at 151-52. 
108. Id at 149. 
109. Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 894-96 (1984) (finding that the NLRA 
was violated when undocumented workers were reported to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) as retaliation for having voted for a union). 
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country were not eligible for an award of back-pay because they were not 
available to work, as required by the statute. I 10 Unlike the decision in Hoffman, 
the Court found that protecting undocumented workers under the NLRA would 
assist in the enforcement of immigration laws. III However, the majority in 
Hoffinan did not rely upon Sure-Tan in reaching its conclusion and instead 
relied upon the changed "legal landscape"I 12 that came about as a result of the 
passage of IRCA. 113 The Court focused its analysis of [RCA on the provisions 
that prohibit employers from knowingly hiring or employing unauthorized 
workers, 114 with a particular emphasis on the criminal fraud by employees who 
use fraudulent documents. I IS 
Since 2002, lower courts have been analyzing the scope and impact of 
Hoffman as applied to other types of employment law claims. Some courts have 
been asked to address the question of relevance directly, often in the pretrial 
stage, 116 while other courts have been asked to address whether undocumented 
110. Id. at 892-93. 903. After Sure-Tan. the circuits split on the question of eligibility 
for back-pay under the NLRA tor undocumented workers who were in the U.S. after 
discharge from employment. Compare HofTman Plastic Compounds. Inc. v. NLRR 237 
F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (allowing an award of back-pay to an undocumented 
worker in the U.S.). and NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group. Inc .. 134 F.3d 50. 57 
(2d Cir. 1997) (allowing an award of back-pay to an undocumented worker where employer 
was aware of worker's status). and EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel. 881 F.2d 1504. 1517 (9th Cir. 
1989) (reasoning that the District Court did not err in finding that plaintiffs in a Title VII 
case were entitled to an award of back-pay). and Rios v. Enter. Ass'n Steamfitters Local 
Union 638. 860 F.2d 1168. 1173 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that plaintiffs in a Title VII case. 
who have remained in the country. arc eligible for back-pay as of thc time of the violation). 
and Local 512. Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB. 795 F.2d 705. 719 (9th Cir. 
1986) (finding that undocumented workers who are in thc U.S. remain eligible for back-pay). 
and Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986. 791 F.2d 1391. 1393 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that an 
arbitrator's decision granting reinstatement and back-pay to undocumented workers was not 
reviewable because it was not in manifest disregard of the law). with Del Rey Tortilleria Inc. 
v. NLRB. 976 F.2d IllS. IllS (7th Cir. 1992) (finding undocumented workers who remain 
in the country are ineligible for back-pay). 
I I 1. Sure-Tan. 467 U.S. at 893-94 ('"If an employer realizes that there will be no 
advantage under the NLRA in preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers. any 
incentive to hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened. In turn. if the demand for 
undocumented aliens declines. there may then be fewer incentives for aliens themselves to 
enter in violation of the federal immigration laws."). 
112. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147. 
113. Id. at 147-48. 
114. Id. at 148. 
115. Id.: see Wishnie. supra note 100. at 506-07 (asserting that the majority's focus 
was on the use of fraudulent documents by workers. as evidenced by "its repeated invocation 
of the fraudulent document provisions of immigration law. but also in its attempt to align its 
holding with prior decisions denying reinstatement or back-pay ·to employees found guilty 
of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment' and who 'had committed 
serious criminal acts'" (citing Hoffman. 535 U.S. at 148». 
116. See, e.g .. Rivera v. NIBCO. Inc., No. CIV-F-99-6443. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16967 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006): Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms. Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. SOl 
(W.O. Mich. 2005): Garcia-Andrade v. Madra's Cafc Corp .. No. 04-71024. 2005 U.S. Dist. 
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workers are entitled to certain legal reliefl17 or even have standing to bring 
lawsuits. 118 In those cases where courts are deciding the relevance of 
immigration status to the underlying litigation, courts have consistently 
analyzed three factors: the type of relief requested by the plaintiff; 119 the nature 
of the underlying substantive claims; 120 and how prejudicial the court views 
the disclosure when compared to the probative value, if any.121 Courts have 
LEXIS 22122 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3. 2005): Colindres v. Quiettlex Mfg .. No. H-01-4319. 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27982 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19.2004): Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 
C 6320. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30. 2002): Flores v. Amigon. 233 F. 
Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002): De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237 (C.D. 
Ill. 2002): Zeng Lui v. Donna Karan Int'l. Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002): Pontes 
v. New Eng. Power Co .. No. 03-00160A. 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 340 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
Aug. 17. 2004): Cabrera v. Ekema. 695 N.W.2d 78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005): Llerena v. 302 
W. 12th St. Condo .. No. 102490/03.2004 WL 2793176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 7.2004): Asgar-
Ali v. Hilton Hotels Corp .. 798 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. CL 2004). 
117. See inFa notes 130-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether or not 
undocumented workers are entitled to various substantive rights. 
118. See, e.g.. Martinez v. Mecca Farms. Inc .. 213 F.R.D. 60 l. 604-05 (S.D. Fla. 2002) 
(finding that undocumented farm workers are not precluded from having standing to sue 
under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act). 
119. See, e.g.. Rivera v. NIBCO. Inc .. 384 F.3d 822. 825-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding 
that immigration status is relevant to back-pay and front-pay damages under Hoffman): 
Flores v. Limehouse. No. 2:04-1295-CWH. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30433. at *6-7 (D.S.C. 
May II. 2006) (finding that IRCA does not prohibit undocumented aliens from bringing a 
claim under RICO): Trejo v. Broadway Plaza Hotel. No. 04 Civ. 4005. 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17133. at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16.2005) (concluding that immigration status is not 
relevant because not seeking back-pay): De La Rosa. 210 F.R.D. at 239 (finding that 
immigration status is not relevant to back-pay because back-pay would only the period 
between termination and reinstatement): Pontes v. New Eng. Power Co .. 18 Mass. L. Rep. 
183. 2004 WL 2075458. at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 19. 2004) (finding that immigration 
status is not relevant to a claim for impaired earning capacity based upon a work injury 
because the analysis does not implicate what the plaintiff previously did or what job the 
plaintiff intends to do in the future). 
120. See, e.g., Galaviz-Zamora. 230 F.R.D. at 502 (finding that immigration status is 
not relevant to damages for unpaid wages. nor to standing. class certification. or credibility): 
Corte:::. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831. at *2 (finding that immigration status does not bar 
recovery of unpaid wages): Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (determining that immigration 
status does not preclude a claim for unpaid wages and overtime under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act): Lill. 207 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93 (denying defendant's request to discover 
plaintiffs immigration status in a claim for back-pay): Llerena. 2004 WL 2793176, at *1-2 
(finding that immigration status is not relevant to a case involving tort and state labor law 
violations). 
12l. See, e.g.. Galavi:::-Zamora. 230 F.R.D. a1502 (finding that the prejudicial impact 
of disclosure far outweighs its probative value): Ponce v. Tim's Time. Inc .. No. 03 C 6123. 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20263 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14.2005) (finding that even though there was 
evidence that plaintiff made false statements to hide immigration status that may have been 
relevant for impeaching or attacking credibility. the potential prejudice to plaintiff 
outweighed the possible probative value): Garcia-Andrade. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22122. at 
*6 (finding plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights bar defendants from requiring documentation 
of plaintiffs' immigration statuses): Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65 (finding that the 
potential for prejudice by allowing the disclosure of immigration status far outweighs its 
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overwhelmingly decided to prohibit the disclosure of immigration status in the 
context of employment-related civil litigation, often citing the highly 
prejudicial impact of the disclosure compared to its relatively small probative 
value. 122 
In those cases where courts address the rights of undocumented workers to 
pursue certain civil remedies, there are many other variables. However, in 
separating the cases by subject matter, some underlying trends can be 
identified. Cases that involve claims for unpaid wages typically find that 
undocumented workers are entitled to recover an award for work performed. 123 
For cases involving the availability of damages under the FLSA or the NLRA, 
courts typically find that status is not relevant to liability, though it may be 
relevant to the damages portion of the case. 124 Cases involving claims for lost 
wages due to an injury, on the other hand, make a few distinctions. Many cases 
find that an undocumented worker is entitled to lost wages but find that 
immigration status is relevant to the amount of wages that can be recovered. 125 
Other courts, relying on the argument that there is no federal preemption, find 
that undocumented workers can recover lost wages they would have earned. 126 
minimal probative value): Liu. 207 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93 (stating that the risk of injury to the 
plaintiff of the disclosure outwcighs thc need for disclosure): Pontes. 2004 WL 2075458. at 
*3. 
122. See. e.g.. Rivcra v. NIBCO. Inc .. 364 F.3d 1057. 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(concluding that immigration status does not have to be disclosed because of the substantial 
and particularized harm of the discovery-namely. the chilling ctTeet that disclosure can 
have on the ability to enforce rights): EEOC v. City of Joliet. 239 F.R.D. 490. 492-93 (N.D. 
III. 2006) (eoncluding that the potential damages that could result from disclosure of 
immigration status. namely the chill on plaintiffs' enforcement of their Title VII rights. far 
outweigh any minimal legitimate probative value): EEOC v. First Wircless Group, Inc .. 225 
F.R.D. 404. 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (prohibiting the disclosure of immigration status based on 
a finding that the unacceptable burden on the public interest that would result from deterring 
plaintiffs from seeking relief outweighs the potential relevance). 
123. See, e.g.. Chell en v. John Pickle Co .. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006): 
Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc .. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005): Martinez v. Mecca 
Farms. Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601 (S.D. Fla. 2002): Gomez v. Falco. 792 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. Div. 
2004). 
124. See. e.g.. Renteria v. Italia Foods. Inc .. No. 02 C 495. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14698. at * 19-20 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21. 2003) (finding plaintiffs not entitled to back-pay under 
FLSA for retaliatory discharge because this would contravene the policies embodied in 
IRCA. but they are entitled to compensatory damages): In re Tuv Taam Corp .. 340 N.L.R.B. 
756. 759-60 (2003) (granting back-pay conditionally and leaving for the compliance stage a 
determination of whether any of the discriminatees were lawfully entitled to be present and 
employed in the United States). 
125. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found .. Inc .. 315 F. Supp. 2d 504. 506-08 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004): Echeverria v. Lindner. No. 018666/2002. 2005 WL 1083704. at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 2. 2005): Celi v. 42d St. Dev. Project. Inc .. No. 37491101, 2004 WL 2812902. at *3. 
2004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9. 2004): Cano v. Mallory Mgmt.. 760 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 
2003). 
126. See, e.g.. Balbuena v. !DR Realty LLC. 845 N.E.2d 1246. 1259-60 (N.Y.2006): 
Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp .. 802 N.Y.S.2d 56. 66 (App. Div. 2005): Tyson 
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Several other cases distinguish. between U.S. and home country earnings if the 
plaintiff is undocumented. 127 Various courts have addressed the impact of 
undocumented status on Title VII claims post-Hoffman. A couple of courts 
have questioned the applicability of Hoffinan to the Title VII context 
altogether,128 while others found that while Hoffman may limit the back-pa~ 
remedy, it does not foreclose other remedies available under Title VII. 12 
Another case found that once an undocumented worker obtains legal status she 
may be eligible for all remedies except back-pay for the period of time she was 
undocumented. 130 Worker compensation cases consistently find that 
undocumented workers are eligible for benefits because there is no federal 
preemption. 131 A couple of cases limit the type of worker compensation 
Foods. Inc. v. Guzman. 116 S.W.3d 233. 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). But see Veliz v. Rental 
Servo Corp. USA. Inc .. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317. 1335-36 (D. Fla. 2003) (finding that 
undocumented status precludes an award of lost U.S. wages). 
127. Hernandez-Cortez V. Hernandez. No. 01-1241-lTM. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19780. at * 19 (D. Kan. Nov. 4. 2003) (finding that an undocumented alien can only recover 
money based on country of origin wages): Rosa V. Partners in Progress. Inc .. 868 A.2d 994. 
1000 (N.H. 2005) (holding that if defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff was 
undocumented then the undocumented worker can recover U.S. wages. but if the defendant 
did not know or had no reason to know then the undocumented worker can only recover 
damages based upon country of origin wages); JaIlO\\ V. Kew Gardens Hills Apts. Owners. 
803 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 2005): Sanango V. 200 E. 16th St. Hous. Corp .. 788 N.Y.S.2d 
314.321 (App. Div. 2004). overruled by Balbuena. 812 N.Y.S.2d 416. 
128. Rivera V. NIBCO. Inc .. 364 F.3d 1057. 1066-70 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that 
Hoffman may not apply in the Title VII context because of the differences between Title VII 
and the NLRA): De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237. 239 (C.D. Ill. 2002) 
(noting that Hoffman was not dispositive in addressing the question of whether 
undocumented workers are entitled to back-pay under Title VII). 
129. Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv .. 281 F. Supp. 2d 895. 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) 
(suggesting that Hoffman precludes undocumented workers from receiving back-pay under 
Title VII. but does not foreclose other remedies available to plaintiffs): see also Nancy 
Montwieler. EEOC: EEOC Limits Undocumented Workers' Relief Based on Recent Supreme 
Court Decision. 126 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA). at A2 (July L 2002) (,,[T]he Hoffman decision 
in no way calls into question the settled principle that undocumented workers are covered by 
the federal employment discrimination statutes .... "). But see Morejon V. Terry Hinge & 
Hardware. No. B 162878. 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10394. at *23-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Nov. 4. 2003) (finding plaintiff barred from bringing discrimination claim because of 
unclean hands doctrine for use of false documents): Crespo V. Evergo Corp .. 841 A.2d 471. 
476-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (barring undocumented worker from economic and 
noneconomic damages in state anti-discrimination action because of status). 
130. Escobar. 281 F. Supp. 2d at 897. 
131. See, e.g .. Safeharbor Employer Servo I. Inc. v. Velazquez. 860 So. 2d 984. 986 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding plaintiff is not barred from workers' compensation 
because of undocumented status as there is no federal preemption): Earth First Grading V. 
Gutierrez. 606 S.E.2d 332. 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (finding plaintiff entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits as federal law does not preempt award): Cont'! PET Techs. V. 
Palacias. 604 S.E.2d 627. 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (finding plaintiff entitled to workers' 
compensation because no federal preemption); Wet Walls. Inc. V. Ledezma 598 S.E.2d 60. 
63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (finding plaintiff entitled to workers' compensation because no 
federal preemption): Correa v. Waymouth Farms. Inc .. 664 N.W.2d 324. 329-30 (Minn. 
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benefits that an undocumented worker is entitled to receive. 132 The holdings of 
these cases in tum determine whether or not status is relevant to the underlying 
action. 
The current jurisprudential framework provides no clear answer to the 
question of whether immigration status is relevant to the underlying 
proceeding. However. the trends outlined above provide some guidance as to 
the factors often considered. 
III. BALANC]"IG CONFlDENTlALITY AND DISCLOSURE OBLIGATlONS 
Once a determination is made that representation is permissible, lawyers 
will have to grapple with the decision of whether to protect or disclose 
immigration status. This analysis hinges upon a determination as to whether 
immigration status is relevant to the underlying civil action. If immigration 
status is relevant to the underlying litigation, the information will be 
discoverable unless the client is entitled to claim a privilege. If, on the other 
hand, immigration status is not relevant to the underlying litigation, the 
information will remain confidential 133 unless the lawyer is mandated or 
chooses to disclose it. This Part will explore the balancing of these obligations 
when immigration status is relevant and irrelevant to the underlying claims. 
A. Immigration Status Determined Relevant to Underlying Litigation 
If immigration status is determined to be relevant to the underlying 
litigation, then the information generally will be discoverable in the pretrial 
stage pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b) 134 and admissible at 
2003) (finding IRCA does not preempt undocumented workers from receiving state workers' 
compensation benefits). 
132. See, e.g.. De Jesus Uribe v. Aviles. No. B166839. 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
9698. at *12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26. 2(04) (finding undocumented workers may not be 
eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits but that plaintiff was entitled to workers' 
compensation regardless of his immigration status): Cherokee Indus .. Inc. v. Alvarez. 84 
P.3d 798. 801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (finding that status alone does not deprive an alien 
from all worker compensation benefits. but claimant may not be eligible for vocational 
rehabilitation or medical treatment by a specific doctor). 
133. It is important to note that infonnation not relating to the representation is not 
considered confidential. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). However. the 
tenns "relevant" to the litigation and "relating" to the representation are distinct. with 
"relating to the representation" being broader. Because of this. infonnation can be related to 
the representation and thus confidential. but not relevant to the underlying litigation. For a 
detailed explanation of the difference. see infi'a notes 169-73 and accompanying text. 
134. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(I) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense-including the 
existence. description. nature. custody. condition. and location of any documents or other 
tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable 
matter .... "). 
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the trial stage pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401. 135 One way in which 
immigration status could be protected from discovery and precluded from 
admission into evidence is through a claim of privilege. 136 In this context, the 
most likely claim of privilege would be a client's claim of privilege against 
self-incrimination. 137 
The privilege against self-incrimination is found in the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and can be claimed in criminal and civil 
proceedings, whether formal or informal, including administrative, judicial, 
investigatory; or adjudicatory proceedings. 138 The privilege is invoked by an 
individual 1-,9 in instances where providing a response might be 
incriminatory. 140 Generally, the privilege may be used whenever information, 
sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be discoverable, provides even a clue 
that might point a government investigator toward evidence of criminal 
conduct. 141 In fact, courts have recognized a claim of privilege based solely on 
an assertion that the evidence would provide a "link in the chain" of 
. 147 prosecutIOn. -
Individuals can invoke the privilege in response to a question presented on 
the witness stand,143 but may also invoke the privilege at many stages in civil 
135. FED. R. EVlD. 401 (defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"). Of course at trial 
there can bc many different things that bar the admission of evidence. but it must. at a 
minimum. be relevant to the proceedings in order to be admissible. 
136. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter. Fear of DiscovelY: Immigrant Workers and the 
Fifth Amendment. 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27. 59 (2008). 
137. The privilege against self-incrimination derives from the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution. U.S. CaNsT. amend. V. 
138. Kastigar v. United States. 406 U.S. 441. 444 (1972): see also United States v. 
U.S. Coin & Currency. 401 U.S. 715. 718 (1971) (civil forfeiture proceedings): In re Gault, 
387 U.S. I. 49 (1967) (delinquency proceedings); Bigby v. U.S. Immigration & 
Naturalization Sen .. 21 F.3d 1059.1060-61 (11th Cir. 1994) (dcportation proceedings); 
Gonzales v. McEuen. 435 F. Supp. 460. 470 (CD. Cal. 1977) (school disciplinary 
proceedings ). 
139. But. as in the criminal context. the privilege can only be asserted by individuals. 
not by corporations. Fisher v. United States. 425 U.S. 391. 424-26 (1976): Hale v. Henkel. 
201 U.S. 43. 69-70(1906). 
140. Heidt. supra note 19. at 1065. 
141. Id.: see also Martin I. Kaminsky. Preventing L'nfair L'se of the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical AnaZvsis. 39 BROOK. L. REV. 121. 
122 (1972): Marjorie S. White. Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fijih Amendment. 48 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 158. 160 (1981). 
142. Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479. 486 (1951). The privilege may be used 
even if the invokers realize that they \\ould not likely be prosecuted for the conduct they 
would be forced to reveal. United States v. Johnson. 488 F.2d 1206. 1209 ( 1st Cir. 1973): 
United States v. Miranti. 253 F.2d 135.139 (2d Cir. 1958). 
143. Capitol Prod. Corp. v. Hernon. 457 F.2d 541. 542 (8th Cir. 1972). 
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cases, including responses to discovery requests. 144 The privilege must be 
invoked in response to a specific question or request for discovery and allows 
individuals to refuse to: submit answers to allegations in the comBlaint; 145 
respond to interrogatories; 146 respond to requests for admissions; I 7 answer 
questions at depositions; 148 or respond to requests to produce documents. 149 
Both the employer and employee in an employment-related civil case 
brought by an undocumented worker might have reason to claim the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. For the employee, since it is unlawful to enter the 
country without inspection, to present false documents upon entry, or to use 
false documents to obtain employment, information sought through discovery 
or questions asked at trial could lead to criminal liability. Under IRCA, 
employers can be criminally liable for knowingly hiring undocumented 
workers. ISO An employee could engage in discovery regarding the employer's 
general practice of employee verification and the specifics of other employee 
immigrant workers, the answers to which could lead to criminalliability.I5I 
144. See. e.g.. SEC v. Thomas. 116 F.R.D. 230. 231-34 (D. Utah 1987): United States 
v. Second Nat"! Bank of Nashua N.H .. 48 F.R.D. 268.271 (D.N.H. 1969). 
145. De Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320. 322 (D. Mass. 1967). 
146. Gordon v. FDIC. 427 F.2d 578.580 (D.C. Cir. 1970): Backos v. United States. 82 
F.R.D. 743. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1979): United States v. 47 Bottles. More or Less. Each 
Containing 30 Capsules of Jenasol R.J. Formula '60: 26 F.R.D. 4. 5-6 (D.N.J. 1960): Paul 
Harrigan & Sons. Inc. Y. Enter. Animal Oil Co .. 14 F.R.D. 333. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
147. Gordon. 427 F.2d at 580-81: FDIC v. Logsdon. 18 F.R.D. 57. 58 (W.O. Ky. 
1955): United States v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 151. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): Mayo v. Ford, 184 
A.2d 38 (D.C. 1962): Simkins v. Simkins. 219 So. 2d 724. 725-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). 
148. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys .. 608 F.2d 1084, 1084-87 (5th Cir. 1979). reh 'g 
denied. 611 F.2d 1026(5th Cif. 1980): In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig .. 609 F.2d 867. 
869-73 (7th Cif. 1979): In re Master Key Litig .. 507 F.2d 292. 292-94 (9th Cif. 1974): Justice 
v. Laudermilch, 78 F.R.D. 201. 202-03 (M.D. Pa. 1978): In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig .. 347 F. 
Supp. 1347. 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1972): Alioto v. Holtzman. 320 F. Supp. 256. 257 (E.D. Wis. 
1970): Duffy v. Currier. 291 F. Supp. 810. 812. 814 (D. Minn. 1968): De Antonio Y. 
Solomon. 41 F.R.D. 447. 449 (D. Ma~s. 1966): Lowe's of Roanoke. Inc. v. Jefferson 
Standard Life Ins. Co .. 219 F. Supp. 181. 183-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1963): Nat'l Discount Corp. v. 
Holzbaugh. 13 F.R.D. 236. 237 (E.D. Mich. 1952). 
149. Henry v. Sneiders. 490 F.2d 315. 316-17(9th Cif. 1974). cert. denied. 419 U.S. 
832 (1974): In re Turner. 309 F.2d 69. 70(2d Cif. 1962): De Antonio v. Solomon. 42 F.R.D. 
320.321,323 (D. Mass. 1967). 
150. 8 U.s.c. § I 324a(a)(l )(A) (Supp. V 2006) (making it illegal to knowingly hire an 
illegal alien): see also id. § 1324a(a)(2) (stating an employer is criminally liable for 
continuing employment of an illegal alien). IRCA includes an extensive employee 
verification system designed to deny employment to undocumented workers. Id. § 
1324a(b)( I). As part of the verification process. employers are required to complete forms 
for each employee. Id. § 1324a(b)( I). 
151. Eric Schnapper. Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers. 39 TRIAL 46. 54 
(2003) (explaining that if the employer asserted a defense under Hoffinan Plastic 
Compounds. an employee "would be entitled to engage in discovery regarding the 
employer's prior knowledge of his or her immigration status. Proof of an employer's general 
practices and knowledge regarding other immigrant workers would also be relevant 
evidence"). 
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What is the consequence of claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination?152 For many years, there was no consequence, as 
the Supreme Court found it impermissible to burden the asserter of the 
privilege in the civil context. 153 However, this changed in 1976 with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Baxter v. Palmigiano, in which the Court 
permitted a negative inference to be drawn from an individual's refusal to 
testify. 154 Currently, courts have discretion to dismiss the action in its 
entirety, 155 but this discretion is not unlimited and dismissal is not 
automatic. 156 The court has to balance any prejudice to other civil litigants 
against the potential harm to the party claiming the privilege if compelled to 
choose between a civil action and protecting against prosecution. The balance 
must be weighed to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege and should be 
upheld unless defendants have substantial need for particular information and 
there is no other less burdensome and effective means of obtaining it. 157 In 
addition to dismissing the entire action, courts can dismiss certain claims, 
Issues also might be raised under Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the 
employer claims. as a defense. that the employee is undocumented. Under Rule I I. the 
lawyer for the employer can only raise this defense if the assertion is based upon 
"knowledge. information. and belicf." FED. R. CIV. P. II(b). There are instances where this 
assertion could be in direct conf1ict to the employer's representation on the 1-9 form that .. to 
the best of his/her knowledge" the plaintilT was not an undocumented alien. See Schnapper. 
supra. at 54. 
152. This discussion proceeds upon the assumption that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege was not effectively resisted. In order to resist the assertion of the privilege, the 
challenger must show that the response would not incriminate or the crime for which the 
invoker's response incriminates is barred by the attachment of jeopardy. the running of the 
statute of limitations. or past grants of immunity. See Heidt. supra note 19. at 1071-80 
(detailing each of the ways in which an opponent can resist the invocation of the privilege). 
153. See. e.g.. Lefkowitz v. Turley. 414 U.S. 70. 71-74. 83 (1973) (canceling of 
government contracts): Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation. 392 U.S. 
280. 282. 284-85 (1968) (government employment): Spevack v. Klein. 385 U.S. 51 L 514 
(1967) (attorney discipline): Garrity v. New Jersey. 385 U.S. 493. 494-98 (1967) (police 
employment). 
154. 425 U.S. 308. 316 (1976): see also Hasbro. Inc. v. Serafino. 958 F. Supp. 19.24-
25 (D. Mass. 1997) (adverse inferences may be drawn from defendant's assertion of Fifth 
Amendment privilege where there is other probative evidence in civil RICO suit): United 
States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Fam .. 683 F. Supp. 141 L 1444 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(adverse inference may be drawn from assertion of privilege in civil cases). But see Avirgan 
v. Hull. 932 F.2d 1572. 1580 (11th Cif. 1991). cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1048 (1992) 
(invocation of privilege does not give rise to inference sufficient to avoid summary 
jUdgment). 
155. See Hiley v. United States. 807 F.2d 623. 628 (7th Cif. 1986): Mount Vernon 
Say. & Loan Ass'n y. Partridge Assoc .. 679 F. Supp. 522. 529 (D. Md. 1987): Stop & Shop 
Co. y. Interstatc Cigar Co .. 110 F.R.D. 105. 108 (D. Mass. 1986). 
156. Wansong v. Wansong. 478 N.E.2d 1270. 1272 (Mass. 1985). 
157. SEC v. Graystone Nash. Inc .. 25 F.3d 187. 192 (3d Cif. 1994): United States v. 
Parcels of Land. 903 F.2d 36. 44-45 (I st Cif. 1990): Black Panther Party y. Smith, 661 F.2d 
1243. 1266 (D.C. Cif. 1981): Wehling v. CBS. 608 F.2d 1084. 1088 (5th Cif. 1980). 
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postpone or stay proceedings until the criminal statute of limitations runs, or 
preclude the use of certain evidence, 
Given this discretion, it is difficult to predict the precise consequence of an 
undocumented worker claiming the privilege,158 However, lawyers should 
advise clients that pleading the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination might result in the dismissal of the action, or that certain claims 
or evidence might be barred in the process of litigation, Ultimately, once 
informed of the consequences, this is a decision for the client to make,159 
One other possible privilege that could be raised in this scenario is the 
attorney-client privilege, 160 The privilege is applicable only: in a fonnal legal 
proceeding; in response to an attempt to compel testimony in the discovery or 
trial stage; and if what is being compelled is testimony about infonnation 
passing between lawyer and client. 161 The privilege will only protect otherwise 
relevant infonnation from discovery when the opposin9 party asks the client 
what she told her la\\'Yer about her immigration status, 16_ or the opposing party 
158. Clients might be concerned that if they claim their Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination the employer will make assumptions about their status and report 
them to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). While this risk does 
exist. employers also face the risk of incriminating themselves if they knew, or should have 
known, that the employee lacked proper work authorization, See Schnapper. supra note 151. 
at 54. 
159. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) states, "a lawyer shall abide by a 
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, 
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued:' MODEL RULES 
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). Objectives are defined as those decisions that directly 
affect the ultimate resolution of the case or the substantive rights of the client. See 
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 30-31 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES]' The claim of a client's privilege against self-incrimination 
afforded by the Fifth Amendment could impact the ultimate resolution of the case and affect 
the client's substantive rights. 
160. Dean Wigmore's classic statement of the privilege. as reformulated in a modern 
legal ethics text. contains eight elements: I) where legal advice is sought: 2) from a 
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such; 3) the communications relating to that 
purpose: 4) made in confidence: 5) by the client 6) are at the client's instance permanently 
protected: 7) from disclosure by himself or the lawyer: 8) except if the privilege is waived. 
See GEOFFREY HAZARD. SUSAN KONIAK & ROGER CRAMTON. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
LAWYERING 206 (3d ed. 1999). Compare Restatement section 68. which permits invocation 
of the privilege where: "I. a communication: 2. [is] made between privileged persons: 3. in 
confidence: 4. for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client." 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000). 
161. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24. at 9-28. 
162. As stated by Professors H.azard and Hodes. "[n]eilher the traditional nor the 
modern formulation of the privilege directly protects against compelled disclosure the 
substance of the underlying confidential communication: only the content of the 
communication between client and lawyer is protected. Thus a client may be compelled to 
testify about the underlying facts of an occurrence or transaction (unless able to refuse under 
the Fifth Amendment. for example). but not whether those facts were related to the client's 
lawyer." ld. at 9-26. This distinction between the communication and the facts underlying 
the communication has long been established in the law. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
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asks the lawyer directly. 163 In most instances. lawyers for the opposing party 
will simply ask the client directly where they are from. whether or not they are 
documented. and how they entered the United States. Thus. the attorney-client 
privilege is unlikely to be invoked in this context to protect against disclosure. 
If it were detennined to be applicable, there is one exception that bears 
mention, the crime/fraud exception. Under this exception, the attorney-client 
privilege does not protect communications in furtherance of a crime or 
fraud. 164 In ascertaining the applicability of the exception, a distinction is made 
between communications made in the course or furtherance of fraud, which are 
not protected, and communications about a fraud after its completion, which 
are protected. 165 In the context of an undocumented worker who seeks a lawyer 
to help on an employment-related civil claim. the exception would be 
inapplicable in most instances because the client would be seeking legal advice 
after the completion of the crime or fraud. 166 
In sum, if immigration status is relevant to the underlying proceedings, the 
information will likely be discoverable and admissible at trial unless the client 
claims a privilege. The most likely applicable privilege would be the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, while the attorney-client 
privilege might be applicable in very limited instances. Clients should be 
advised of the consequences of claiming a privilege and lawyers should then 
proceed based upon their informed decision. If, on the other hand, immigration 
status is not relevant to the underlying proceeding. the lawyer's ethical 
obligations are much different. 
B. Immigration Status Determined Not Relevant to Underlying Litigation 
If immigration status is not relevant to the underlying proceedings, there 
can be a tension between the protection afforded confidential information and 
specific instances where a lawyer may be mandated to disclose otherwise 
confidential information under the rules. The initial question is whether the 
immigration status of an undocumented worker seeking employment-related 
449 U.S. 383. 386. 395 (1981). 
163. A la'wyer must assert the attorney-client privilege whenever it is not frivolous to 
do so. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'! Responsibility. Formal Op. 94-385 
(1994). Once a court rules that the privilege does not apply and subsequently orders 
disclosure. a lawyer is relieved of her ethical duty to claim the privilege. Once the ethical 
constraint is lifted. disclosure becomes mandatory under Rule 1.6(b)(6). HAZARD & HODES. 
supra note 24. at 9-33. 
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000). 
165. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-41 to 9-42. 
166. For a more detailed discussion of whether or not a lawyer is assisting the client in 
a crime or fraud by representing them in an employment-related civil case as well as whether 
any of these offenses constitute "continuing crimes,"' see supra Part II. 
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civil assistance is confidential. 167 If the information is confidential, a lavvyer 
must keep it confidential unless disclosure is mandated or permitted. There are 
two rules that involve the lawyer's obli~ation to disclose information if the 
client is engaged in a crime or fraud. 1 8 Rule 3.3(b) addresses a lavvyer's 
obligation to disclose facts to the tribunal, while Rule 4.1 (b) addresses a 
lawyer's obligation to disclose facts to a third party. This Part will initially 
discuss the confidentiality provisions under Rule 1.6, then explain the 
parameters of Rules 3.3(b) and 4.1(b) respectively, and, finally, examine how 
lawyers balance confidentiality mandates with potential disclosure obligations 
when representing an undocumented worker in employment-related litigation. 
Pursuant to Rule 1.6, all information "relating to the representation," 
whether it comes from the client or another source, is confidential. 169 Even 
information not itself protected, but that may lead to discove7c of protected 
information by a third person, is included in the definition. 1 0 Rule 1.6(a) 
creates a presumption of confidentiality that operates without the necessity of a 
client request and includes information in the public domain. 171 
167. See inFa notes 176-78 and accompanying text. 
168. Rules 4.I(b) and 3.3(b) each involve a balancing of various interests. Rule 4.I(b) 
involves the balance between two important values in the law of lawyering: maintaining 
confidentiality of client information and ensuring that lawyers represent client interests only 
within the bounds of the law and do not become participants in wrongdoing. MODEL RULES 
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.I(b) (2007). Rule 3.3(b) is a balance between duties to the client 
and duties to the tribunal. Based on the language and interpretation of Rule 3.3(b). where 
there is a danger that the tribunal will be misled, a lawyer may be required to forsake his 
client's immediate and narrow interests in favor of the interest of the administration of 
justice. Id. R. 3.3(b). 
169. Id. R. 1.6 cm!. 3. 
170. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 4. 
171. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-60. For a critique of the inclusion of 
information in the public domain under the definition of contldentiality. see Allan W. Vestal. 
Former Client Censorship a/Academic Scholarship. 43 SYRACUSF L. REV. 1247. 1247-48 
(1992) (describing a former client who threatened to report the author to the disciplinary 
authorities for publishing an article that contained public information about a case). For 
cases involving the disclosure of infonnation generally known. see. for example. In re 
Anonymous. 654 N.E.2d 1128. 1129 (Ind. 1995) (finding that lawyer violated Rule 1.6 by 
disclosing information relating to representation of client. even though information "was 
readily available from public sources and not confidential in nature"): Lawyer Disciplinary 
Bd. v. McGraw. 461 S.E.2d 850.851 (W. Va. 1995) ("The ethical duty of contidentiality is 
not nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record or by the fact that 
someone else is privy to it."): State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof! Conduct. Op. 
2000-1 I (2000) ("[T]he lawyer is required to maintain the confidentiality of information 
relating to representation even if the information is a matter of public record."). But cf In re 
Sellers. 669 So. 2d 1204. 1206 (La. 1996) (tinding that lawyer violated Rule 4.1 by failing to 
disclose existence of collateral mortgage to third party because "mortgage was filed in the 
public record. disclosure of its existence could not be a contldential communication. and was 
not prohibited by Rule 1.6"): In re Detention of Williams. 22 P.3d 283. 286 (Wash. Ct. App. 
200 I) (stating that the fact that client gave social security records to lawyer did not render 
such documents "confidential" under Rule 1.6 and therefore "undiscoverable"). To contrast 
the public domain inclusion. see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 
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While this appears to be straightforward, the tenn "relating to the 
representation:' as used in 1.6(a), raises interesting questions because this 
analysis assumes that immigration status is not "relevant" to the litigation. 
Thus, in order to fully understand the lawyer's confidentiality obligations, the 
distinction between "relating to the representation" and "relevant to the 
litigation" needs to be explored. 
In this context, the two tenns are quite distinct and, based upon both the 
plain meaning of the terms as well as how they are applied in this context, 
"relating to the representation" should be construed as much broader than 
"relevant to the litigation." In terms of the plain meaning, the representation of 
a client entails all of the work that a lawyer does on behalf of a client to achieve 
their identified goals, whereas litigation refers only to the scope of the action 
that was filed in court. Thus, issues relating to the representation will inevitably 
be broader than issues relating only to the litigation. 
The import of this distinction becomes clear when applied to lawyers 
representing undocumented workers. In order to be effective in representing 
immigrant clients in employment-related litigation, lawyers need to know the 
workers' status 172 since status impacts the array of remedies available to the 
client. Once the lawyer knows a client's status, she can, if the client desires, 
craft the case in a way that will make immigration status not relevant. 173 For 
example, if the worker has a claim under the NLRA for wrongful discharge, 
she can pursue all relief except back-pay and reinstatement. In this context, the 
information must be considered related to the representation, for without it, the 
lawyer can not effectively represent the client. However, once anned with the 
information, the lawyer can make strategic decisions about ways to pursue the 
litigation so that status is not relevant to the legal claims presented. Thus, 
pursuant to Rule 1.6(a), as applied in this context, the tenn "relating to the 
representation" is broader than "relevant to the litigation." 
Assuming that status, and the related questions, are confidential, does Rule 
1.6 pennit a lawyer to disclose this infonnation? Pursuant to Rule 1.6, in order 
for lawyers to be permitted to disclose confidential client information, lawyers 
either need express or implied authorization to do so, unless one of the 
exceptions to the confidentiality rule applies. Both informed consent and 
implied authorization are part of the very definition of confidentiality under 
1.6(a).174 The rule penn its disclosure of client information when "impliedly 
59 (2000). under which infonnation that is generally known is not confidential. 
172. For these purposes. the tenn "status" includes the tact of lawful immigration 
documentation as well as the manner of entry and of obtaining employment. Because 
infonnation about lawful immigration documentation. manner of entry and of obtaining 
employment all impact the legal relief a client may be entitled to. such infonnation should be 
considered related to the proceedings. 
173. See Schnapper. supra note 151. at 54 (explaining that plaintiffs should be able to 
avoid discovery requests about immigration status by limiting the relief requested). 
174. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24. at 9-6 to 9-7. 
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authorized, , . to carry out the representation:' I 75 Comments to the rule state 
that impliedly authorized disclosures depend upon the circumstances of the 
particular case, but may include the admission of a fact that cannot properly be 
denied, a disclosure that facilitates the satisfactory resolution of a matter, or the 
disclosure of information to other lawyers in the firm. I 76 
However, implied authorization does not include information that 
adversely affects the material interests of the client,l77 privileged information 
or information that would prejudice the client. 178 Given the grave risks that 
accompany disclosure of status, entry or employment information, and the 
potential privilege involved, attorneys representing undocumented workers in 
employment-related litigation are highly unlikely to be impliedly authorized to 
disclose this information. 
Pursuant to Rule 1.6(a), ""lawyer[s] shall not reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent." 179 
Informed consent is defined in the rules as an "agreement by a person to a 
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate 
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably 
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." I 80 While there may 
be some instances in which a client makes a strategic decision to disclose, I 8 I 
the more common scenario will likely be a desire to keep the information 
confi dential. 
In the absence of implied authorization or infonned consent to disclose, 
Rule 1.6 mandates that the information be kept confidential unless one of six 
express exceptions applies. 182 In interpreting Rule 1.6 and its exceptions, the 
175. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). 
176. Jd. R. 1.6 cmt. 5: see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LA WYERS § 61 (2000) (pennitting disclosures that advance the interests of clients). 
177. ABA Comm. on Prof! Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001). 
178. ABA Comm. on Prof! Ethics and Grievances, Fonnal Op. 98-411 (1998). 
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). 
180. fd. R. 1.0( e). This definition was added to the tenninology section of the rules in 
2002 upon the recommendation of the Ethics 2000 Commission and replaced the prior term 
which was "consent after consultation." HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 2A-6 to 2A-7. 
ABA's House of Delegates accepted this recommendation. not as a substantive change. but 
as a way to adopt a more frequently used and easily understood term. See ABA Report to the 
House of Delegates. No. 40 l (Aug. 200 I). Model Rule 1.6. Reporter's Explanation of 
Changes. 
181. See inFa Part V for a discussion of those instances in which clients might want to 
strategically disclose and the corresponding obligations of the lawyer in that context. 
182. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably bel ieves necessary: (I) to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily hann: (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services: (3) 
to prevent. mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a 
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the cJ ient has used the lawyer's services: (4) to secure 
Addendum 5 ·040 
394 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:355 
rules provide that disclosures are to be limited in order to avoid divulging 
information that ought to remain confidential. 183 And, the exceptions to the 
I . I . b d . d' I 184 ru e simp y permit, ut 0 not reqUire, ISC osure. 
In the absence of a court order, 185 none of the six exceptions permits the 
disclosure of immigration status and related client actions. There is no potential 
for death or substantial bodily hann; I 86 the issues do not involve the lawyer's 
compliance with the rules of professional conduct; 187 and there is no dispute 
between the lawyer and the client related to the representation. 188 Adopted by 
the ABA House of Delegates in 2003, the remaining two exceptions involve 
legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules: (5) to establish a claim or 
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to 
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct 
in which the client was involved. or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning 
the lawyer's representation ofthe client: or (6) to comply with other law or a court order. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6tb) (2007). Rule 1.6(b )(2) and (b )(3) were added in 
2003 and are not yet in effect in many states. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-7 to 9-S. 
IS3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmL 14 (2007) (explaining the lawyer 
may disclose information only .. to the extent"' the lawyer "reasonably believes necessary" to 
carry out the purpose of the exception). 
184. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15. However, some states have adopted versions of Rule 1.6 that 
use the term "shall" as opposed to "may" when addressing the exception to the general rule 
of confidentiality. See, e.g.. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2007) ('"A lawyer 
shall reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client 
from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm."): WIS. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS R. 1.6 (2007) C'A lawyer shall reveal information relating 
to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the 
tinancial interest or property of another."): N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (8) 
(2007) ("To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is 
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. a lawyer should reveal such 
infonnation to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary."): PA. PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6(b) (2007) ("A lawyer shall reveal such infonnation if necessary to comply with the 
duties stated in Rule 3.3."). 
IS5. If a court orders disclosure and all of the lawyer's challenges to that order have 
failed. then an otherwise permissive disclosure option becomes mandatory. See HAZARD & 
HODES. supra note 24, at 9-109. 
IS6. Rule 1.6(b) states. "A lawyer may reveal infonnation relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (I) to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm .... " MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(I) (2007). 
IS7. Rule 1.6(b) statcs. "A lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (4) to 
secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules ... :. Id. R. 1.6(b)(4). 
ISS. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reao-;onably believes necessary: ... (5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of 
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client. to establish a defense to a 
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved. or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 
representation ofthe client . 
Id. R. 1.6(b)(5). 
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disclosure to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud resulting in 
substantial injury to the financial interests of a third party,189 or to mitigate 
damages that flow from such crime or fraud. 190 These exceptions appear 
inapplicable to the undocumented-worker dilemma, because there is no 
substantial injury to the financial interests of a third party. 191 Additionally, in 
order for this exception to apply, the la\\yer has to be involved in the client's 
crime or fraud. 192 It is unlikely that mere representation of an undocumented 
worker in a civil-employment matter would rise to the level of involvement 
contemplated by this exception. 
Thus, pursuant to the Model Rules, assuming that immigration status 
constitutes confidential infonnation under Rule 1.6 and that no exceptions 
apply, the lawyer must not disclose this information unless another rule 
mandates disclosure. Rules 3.3(b) and 4.1 (b) both have mandatory disclosure 
provisions. Rule 3.3(b) states, '"A lawyer who represents a client in an 
adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is 
engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the 
189. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (2) to prevent the client from committing a 
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial i'1jury to the financial interests 
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's 
services. 
Id. R. 1.6(b )(2). Scholars have noted that the scope of the rule is narrowed by two 
limitations: it must be the client's crime or fraud that threatens another with financial ruin 
and it only applies if the client has used or is using the lav,yer's services in furtherance of the 
scheme. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-8. 
190. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (3) to prevent. mitigate or rectif}.· substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or 
has resulted from the cI ien!" s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the 
client has used the lawyer's services. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2007). For a description of the history 
leading to the 2003 adoption of (b )(2) and (b )(3). see HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-
89 to 9-97. 
191. Arguably. the government is losing some tax dollars if undocumented workers 
fail to pay taxes. but this incorrectly assumes that all undocumented workers fail to pay 
taxes. and. even if some portion of workers do not. it would be hard to argue that this 
shortfall is bringing the government to the brink of financial ruin. See Karen Brooks. The 
Give-and-Take of /!legal Immigration Study: Their Taxes Lijt State. But Services Drain 
Counties. DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 8. 2006. at I A (citing to a report that found that. 
while illegal immigrants cost Texas $1.16 billion in services. they pay $1.58 billion in taxes 
and fees every year for a profit of $420 million): Shikha Dalmia. Immigrants Contribute 
!vlore to the Economy Than They Take--(Illegal Immigrants Pay). L.A. Bus. L May 22. 
2006. at 51 (stating that eight million of the approximately twelve million illegal aliens in the 
United States file personal income taxes): Eduardo Porter. Here IIIegal(v. Working Hard and 
Paying Taxes. N.Y. TIMES, June 19.2006. at AI (explaining that many of the undocumented 
workers in the United States who get regular pay checks pay taxes). 
192. Both Rule 1.6(b)(2) and Rule 1.6(b)(3) require lawyer involvemcnt. Thus. if a 
lawyer simply discovers a client's planned or ongoing fraud. she is not permitted to disclose 
information despite a desire to do so. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-91. 
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proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal.,,193 Rule 3.3(b) places upon lawyers an obligation to 
disclose certain criminal or fraudulent conduct. 194 While this requirement 
creates a tension between a lawyer's duty to her client and her duty to the 
tribunal, it is the duty to the tribunal and the administration of justice that is 
favored in the balance. 195 The obligation to disclose this information applies 
even if the information would otherwise be protected by Rule 1.6. 196 Despite 
the rule's broad reach, there are some limits to the rule's initial application. 
First, the rule governs only the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client 
in adjudicative, and ancillary, proceedings. 197 Furthermore, the lawyer must 
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007). In 1983. when the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct were first promulgated, there were four specific duties of 
candor to the tribunal set out in Rule 3.3(a). RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI. 
LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILlTY 643 (2005). 
The second duty required a lawyer to disclose information when silence would be 
tantamount to assisting a client's crime or fraud. Jd. Based upon the recommendations of the 
Ethics 2000 Commission. Rule 3.3 was revised. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 29-5. 
The duty to disclose information when silence would amount to assisting a client's crime or 
fraud was eliminated and a more general duty was imposed under Rule 3.3(b). Jd. 
For an explanation of the specific reasons for the changes made by the Ethics 2000 
Commission, sec Margaret Colgatc Love. The Revised ABA .Hodel Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000. 15 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETIIICS 441. 465-66 
(2002), which explains: 
The Commission deleted paragraph (a)(2) of the present rule, and addressed the lawyer's 
duty to disclose crime or fraud in connection with an adjudicative proceeding more generally 
in a new paragraph (b) .... The new paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer who knows that 
any person. including the lawyer's client. intends to engage. is engaging or has engaged in 
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding, shall take reasonable remedial 
measures. including. if necessary. disclosure to the tribunal. A new comment identifies the 
type of conduct sought to be reached under the rule: 'bribing. intimidating or otherwise 
unlawfully communicating with a witness. juror. court official. or other participant in the 
proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to 
disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so.' New commentary 
describes remedial measures short of disclosure. including remonstrating with the client, 
consulting with the client about the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal. and withdrawal 
from the representation. 
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007): see I-IAZARD & HODES. 
supra note 24. at 29-6 ("Lawyers are not all-purpose ·truth police': the duties of candor are 
therefore imposed only where the lawyer can be said to have contributed [even if 
unwittingly] to the court's being led astray:'). 
195. According to Professors Hazard and Hodes. "In these situations. the conception of 
lawyer as 'officer of the court' is given its maximum force." HAZARD & HODES. supra note 
24. at 29-4. 
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2007) ("The duties stated in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding. and apply even if 
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."). 
197. Jd. R. 3.3 cmt. I ("This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing 
a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. ... It also applies when the lawyer is representing a 
client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority. 
such as a deposition."). 
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have knowledge of the criminal or fraudulent conduct, and the information 
must be related to the proceeding. 198 
Rule 4.1(b) states that "[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer 
shall not knowingly: ... fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless 
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.,·199 A companion to Rule 4.1(a), which 
prohibits a lawyer from lying, Rule 4.1 (b) requires a lawyer to correct material 
misstatements or deliberate omissions of others under certain circumstances.200 
Designed to address a lawyer's silence in the face ofa client's ongoing crime or 
fraud, Rule 4.1 (a) places an affirmative obligation upon the lawyer to disclose 
information where the disclosure is necessary to avoid misleading a third 
party.201 There are some specific substantive limits on Rule 4.1' s application. 
First, the disclosure obligations do not apply unless the misstatement or 
omission is material to the proceeding. 202 Second, the disclosure must be 
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act. 203 Finally, the rule 
applies only if disclosure is permitted under Rule 1.6 and is not allowed where 
doing so would violate confidentiality obligations under Rule 1.6.204 
198. Id R. 3.3 cmt. 12. 
199. ld R. 4.1. For a description of the changes made to Rule 4.1 by the Ethics 2000 
Commission. see Love. supra note 193. at 466. which states: 
"The Commission made no change in the text of Rule 4. I (,Truthfulness in Statements to 
Others') but clarified the duty imposed by paragraph (b) (a lawyer may not knowingly 'fail to 
disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client unkss disclosure would be prohibited by Rule 1.6'). This duty is 
id.;ntitied in commentary as a 'specific application' of the general duty set forth in Rule 
1.2(d), ... and it is most frequently invoked where a c1ienl's wrong-doing involves a lie or 
misrepresentation to a third party. The commentary explains the remedial measures the 
lawyer may be required to take to avoid assisting client crim.; or fraud, subject to the 
lawyer's duty of confidentiality to the client under Rule 1.6. 
200. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 37-3. 
201. In some jurisdictions. Rule 4.I(b) may have broader application as some 
jurisdictions have defined fraud and misrepresentation to include "mere nonfeasance:' a 
"failure to disclose material facts even absent prior creation of the misapprehension:' Jd at 
37-12. 
202. Jd at 37-8. 
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.I(b) (2007). For examples of cases in 
which lawyers have either directly participated in a client's crime or fraud or advised the 
client to commit a crime or fraud, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. For 
examples of cases in which lawyers are merely aware that the client has committed or is 
committing a crime or fraud. see supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
204. MODEL RULES OF PROF'] CONDUCT R. 4.1 (b) (2007). Rule 4.I(b) does not require 
disclosure of conildential infonnation even to avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud. See 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility. Fonnal Op. 93-375 (1993) (opining that a 
lawyer representing a client in a bank examination is under no duty to disclose weaknesses 
in client's case or otherwise reveal confidential infonnation to third parties. unless the 
lawyer becomes a party to the fraud). 
This final limitation on Rule 4.1 is not without detractors. Professors Hazard and Hodes 
argue that Rule 4.I(b) does not comport with the other model rules that address fraud and 
misrepresentation. including Rules 1.2( d). 1.6(b). and 3.3(a). in that Rule 4.1 (b) appears to 
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In analyzing the disclosure obligations under both Rule 3.3(b) and Rule 
4.I(b), the applicable limitations can be grouped into three distinct categories: 
the relationship between the criminal or fraudulent act and the pending case; 
the relationship between the lawyer's actions and the client's alleged crime or 
fraud; and the relationship between the mandatory-disclosure rules and the 
confidentiality rules. 
The categorization of these limitations gives rise to a series of questions 
regarding the applicability of disclosure obligations under both rules. First, do 
the alleged criminal or fraudulent acts have the requisite connection to the 
pending action? Pursuant to Rule 3.3(b), only information "related to the 
proceedings" must be disclosed to the tribunal. 205 The use of the term "related 
to" under Rule 3.3(b) is very different from the use of the term "related to" 
under Rule 1.6(a).206 The comments to Rule 3.3(b) help to define "related to 
the proceedings" by specifically identifying "criminal or fraudulent conduct 
that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.',207 The comments 
further define the term by identifYing the following conduct that would be 
implicated by Rule 3.3(b): "bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully 
communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participants in the 
proceeding; unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence; 
or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do 
give automatic preference to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6 and neglects the 
complexity of the relationship between the confidentiality and justice obligations. HAZARD & 
HODES. supra note 24. at 37-3 to 37-4. The authors argue for a saving interpretation of the 
rules: 
Silence assists client fraud in situations to which Rule 4.I(b) applies: the lawyer must 
therefore speak up to avoid providing the assistance that is forbidden by Rule 1.2( d). 
According to Rule 4. I(b). the lawyer may not speak ({prevented from doing so by Rule 1.6: 
however. Rule 1.6 does not prevent her from speaking. because she is required by law-Rule 
J.2(d)-to speak. 
Id. at 37-14. Thus. the action would fall under the "other law" exception to Rule 1.6(b)(6) 
and disclosure would be permitted. Id. at 37-15. The authors believe that a lawyer can 
"maintain total confidentiality only when he has not yet drafted any offending papers and has 
not advaneed his client's scheme by his silence." Id. In this situation ... the lawyer has 
knowledge only of a possible future fraud and may not warn the potential victim under any 
version of Rule 1.6:' Id. 
Several jurisdictions have amended Rule 4.1 (b) to require disclosure of information 
even if it is protected by Rule 1.6. See, e.g. THE MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. 4.1 (2002): N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2006). See generally ANNOTATED 
MODEL RULES. supra note 159. at 415: Morgan Cloud. Privileges Lost? Privileges 
Retained? 69 TENN. L. REV. 65. 92 (2001) (asserting that many dilemmas created by 
"contradictory and far from self-explanatory commands" of Rules 1.2, 1.6. 1.8. 1.16. 3.3. 
and 4.1 could be "resolved by permitting disclosures to prevent or rectify harms suffered by 
third parties because of crimes or frauds committed by the lawyers' clients"). 
205. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007). 
206. For an analysis of the term "relating to" under Rule 1.6(a). see supra notes 169-
73 and accompanying text. 
207. MODEL RULES OF ?ROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2007). 
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SO:,208 Rule 3.3(b) is concerned with the rules of the game and the mechanics 
of trial, as opposed to the substance of the underlying c1aims. 209 When applied 
to the undocumented-worker context, criminal or fraudulent acts that the 
undocumented worker may have engaged in involving his or her entry or 
employment in the United States do not "relate to the proceedings" nor 
undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process as proscribed by Rule 
3.3(b). Thus, the lawyer representing the undocumented worker would not have 
an obligation to disclose to the tribunal. 
Pursuant to Rule 4.1 (b), only "material facts" have to be disclosed to third 
parties. 2 I 0 Given that the application of these rules arises in instances where 
immigration status has been determined not to be relevant to the underlying 
proceedings, it is extremely likely that the disclosure provisions of 4.1 (b) do 
not apply. On the other hand, the term "material" arguably could be construed 
more broadly than "relevant:' If this were the case, then the lawyer would have 
to proceed to analyze the additional limitations imposed by Rules 3.3(b) and 
4.I(b). 
Second, are the lawyer's actions sufficiently related to the client's alleged 
crime or fraud? Rule 4.1 (b) states that a lawyer shall disclose otherwise 
confidential information when "necessary to avoid assisting" a crime or 
fraud. 21 I Thus, the question raised under Rule 4.1 (b) is whether representing an 
undocumented immigrant in employment litigation is "assisting" the client in a 
crime or fraud. As analyzed in Part II, it is unlikely that mere representation of 
an undocumented worker in an employment-related civil matter would amount 
to assisting in the commission or furtherance of a crime. 212 
Finally, each rule references its interrelation with Rule 1.6, meaning that a 
lawyer must also interpret the application of confidentiality rules. Rule 3.3(c) 
expressly states that the disclosure of information is required even if the 
information would otherwise be protected by Rule 1.6,2 I 3 while Rule 4.1 (b) 
208. Id. 
209. Rule 3.3(b) deals with other frauds outside of the area of evidentiary frauds. such as 
bribes. intimidation or unlawful communications with a witness. juror. court official or other 
participant in the proceeding. unlawfully [sic I destruction or concealment of documents or 
other evidence or failure to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do 
so. 
ROTUNDA & DZlENKOWSKI. supra note 193. at 664. 
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (b) (2007): see also HAZARD & HODES. 
supra note 24. at 37-8 C[Rjepresentations that do not go to the heart of the matter may be 
considered to be 'not material. '''). For an argument that lawyers should not be required to 
correct immaterial falsehoods that have no bearing on the issues before the court, even if 
made in the courtroom setting. see W. William Hodes. Two Cheers for Lying (About 
Immaterial Matters). PROF. LAWYER. May 1994. at 4. 
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (b) (2007). 
212. See supra Part II. 
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2007). 
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states that the lawyer may resist disclosure of material information if it is 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.214 
In order to understand the contours of a lawyer's ethical obligations, it is 
helpful to apply these rules to the same hypotheticals employed in Part I. 
I. Hypothetical One: Client Enters with Proper Immigration 
Documentation and Is Not Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers 
In the first hypothetical, assume a client enters with a lawful visa, but does 
not obtain proper work authorization. The employer hires the employee without 
asking for work-authorization papers and thereafter fails to pay the client for 
work performed. Does a lawyer who represents this client in a wage-and-hour 
claim have an obligation to disclose any information to the tribunal under Rule 
3.3(b) or to a third party under Rule 4.I(b)? In this instance, the client has not 
committed a crime; he entered I aw fu II? , and working without valid work-
authorization papers is not itself a crime. 15 Further, since the employer did not 
ask about the client's immigration status, it is unlikely that the client's actions 
would be construed as fraudulent. 216 Under these facts, there is no obligation to 
disclose under Rule 3.3(b), because the client has not engaged, is not currently 
engaging, and does not intend to engage in criminal or fraudulent activity. 
There is also no obligation to disclose under Rule 4.1 (b), because the obligation 
to disclose exists only when such disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting in a 
criminal or fraudulent act of the client. If the client has not engaged in a crime 
or fraud, then there is no obligation to disclose. 
2. Hypothetical Two: Client Enters Without Proper Documentation and Is Not 
Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers 
In the second hypothetical, the client enters the country by evading 
inspection. The employer hires the client without asking for papers and then 
fails to pay the client for work performed. The lawyer agrees to represent the 
client in a wage-and-hour case. In this situation does the lawyer have an 
obligation to disclose the client's crime or fraud to third parties under Rule 
4.I(b) or to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b)? 
In this example, the client did commit the crime of entry without 
214. Id. R. 4.I(b). 
215. The employer could be liable. both civilly and criminally. for not obtaining an 1-9 
form and not ensuring that the employee was lawfully permitted to work. See, e.g.. 8 U.S.c. 
§ I 324a(e)(4)(A) (2000) (subjecting to civil fines employers who hire. recruit or refer for a 
fee. or employ aliens knowing the aliens are unauthorized aliens): id. § I 324a(t)(l) 
(subjecting to criminal penalties employers who hire. recruit or refer for a fee. or employ 
aliens knowing the aliens are unauthorized aliens). 
216. For a response to the argument that holding oneself out for work is an implicit 
representation of proper authorization to work and thus constitutes fraud. see supra note 56. 
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inspection,217 which courts have found to be a noncontinuing crime, complete 
upon entry.218 However, the employee did not commit a crime or engage in 
fraud related to the employment because the employer did not ask for papers 
from the employee.219 Since the client has committed a crime, the next inquiry 
is whether the crime is a "material fact" or "related to the proceedings." Since 
both documented and undocumented workers are entitled to compensation for 
hours worked but not compensated,220 information related to the client's entry 
into the country would not be relevant to the wage-and-hour claims. 221 If status 
is not relevant to the claim, the mode of entry or the method of obtaining a job 
are unlikely to be considered "material facts" as required by Rule 4.1(b). 
Further, the unlawful mode of entry into the country, in and of itself, does not 
relate to the proceedings nor undermine the adjudicative process as required by 
Rule 3.3(b). Thus, disclosure to a third party or to the tribunal would not be 
mandated. 
3. Hypothetical Three: Client Enters Lawfidly but Uses a False Social 
Security Number to Obtain Employment 
In the third hypothetical, the client enters lawfully, but uses a fraudulent 
Social Security number to obtain employment and the employer thereafter fails 
to pay him for hours worked. The analysis in this hypothetical is very similar to 
hypothetical two. In this case, if the lawyer represents this client in a wage-and-
hour claim, does the lawyer have any disclosure obligations to third parties 
under Rule 4.1 (b) or to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b)? As described above, the 
217. See 8 U.s.c. § 1325(a) (2000). 
218. United States v. Rincon-Jimenez. 595 F.2d 1192. 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(finding that a violation of 8 U.s.c. § 1325 is consummated at the time of entering the 
United States and is not considered a continuing offense). 
219. The employer. on the other hand. may face criminal or civil liability. See supra 
note 151 and accompanying text. 
220. See, e.g.. Gabu Than Chellen v. John Pickle Co .. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247. 1276-78 
(N.D. Okla. 2006): Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc .. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295. 320-25 (D.N.1. 
2005): Martinez v. Mecca Farms. Inc .. 213 F.R.D. 601. 604-05 (S.D. Fla. 2002): Gomez v. 
Falco. 792 N.Y.S.2d 769.769 (App. Diy. 2004). 
221. Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms. Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. 500-02 (W.O. Mich. 
2005) (finding that immigration status is not relevant to damages for unpaid wages. nor to 
standing. class certification. or credibility): Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping. No. 00 C 6320. 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1883 L at * 1-*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30. 2002) (denying a motion to 
compel discovery concerning the plaintiffs citizenship status in a case where unpaid wages 
for work. but not back-pay. is at issue): Flores v. Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (LD.N.Y. 
2002) (determining that immigration status is undiscoverable in a claim for unpaid wages 
and overtime for time worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act): Zeng Liu v. Donna 
Karan Inn Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191. 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying discovery of 
plaintiffs immigration status on the grounds that it is not relevant to a claim for unpaid 
wages for time worked): Llerena v. 302 W. 12th St. Condo .. 799 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 
2004) (refusing to compel evidence relating to immigration status in a case involving tort 
and state labor law remedies for unpaid wages for time worked). 
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client in this case has committed a completed crime. It is a crime to use a false 
Social Security number to obtain benefits,222 and the crime is completed when 
the false representation is made.223 
The crime and/or fraud of using a false Social Security number to obtain 
work is more closely related to the employment, but the ethical rules require 
that it be a "material fact" or "related to the proceedings" in order for there to 
be any disclosure obligations. Again, courts have found that both documented 
and undocumented workers are entitled to compensation for hours worked.224 
Thus, status is unlikely to be considered a material fact, and even if it were 
found to be a "material fact" pursuant to Rule 4.1 (b), there would still need to 
be a connection between the lawyer's assistance on the case and the client's 
crime or fraud for third-party disclosure to be required. 
The question then becomes: Does the la\\')'er's representation in the wage-
and-hour case assist the client in the commission or furtherance of using a false 
Social Security number? On the one hand, it could be argued that a suit for 
wages assists in obtaining the benefits of the false representation. However, the 
nexus between the use of fraudulent papers and legal assistance to recover 
wages is quite tenuous, since the crime or fraud of using the false Social 
Security number is completed when the number is used to obtain employment. 
Further, the law currently permits undocumented workers, even if they use 
false papers to obtain employment, to recover wages for completed work. Thus, 
even if the lawyer's representation in this context is indirectly being used to 
recover money that could not have been earned absent the crime or fraud, 
lawyers still must balance this against their duties of loyalty, confidentiality, 
and zealous service. 225 Thus, so long as the representation is within the bounds 
of the law, it seems problematic to interpret the rules such that la\\'j'ers would 
be required to consider the ways in which their representation might indirectly 
encourage behavior that is offensive or illegal. 
Finally, regardless of the analysis above, Rule 4.1 prohibits a lawyer from 
disclosing material information to third parties if the information is otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6. As explained previously, none of the express exceptions 
to Rule 1.6 are likely to apply in this context. 226 Thus, disclosure to a third 
party under Rule 4.1 would be prohibited. 
Similarly, disclosure to a tribunal, in most instances, would not be required 
under Rule 3.3(b). In and of itself, the use of a fraudulent Social Security 
222. 42 U.s.c. §§ 408(a)(7)-(8) (2000). A person can be fined. or imprisoned for not 
more than five years. or both. for such offense. Jd. § 408(a). 
223. United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177. 1180 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that falsely 
representing a Social Security number is not a continuing offense): United States v. Joseph, 
765 F. Supp. 326. 330 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding that the crime of using a false Social Security 
number with the intent to deceive is completed when the false representation is made). 
224. See cases cited supra note 220. 
225. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24 at 2-6 to 2-7. 
226. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text. 
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number to obtain a job may subject the client to criminal and civil liability, but 
it does not relate to the proceedings nor undermine the integrity of the 
adjudicative process as those terms are defined in Rule 3.3(b). If the client 
decides to take steps related to the proceedings that would undermine the 
adjudicative process, such as lying under oath or presenting false documents, 
then the lawyer would have to follow the disclosure obligations set forth in 
Rule 3 .3(b). 
4. Hypothetical Four: Clients Enters Lawfully but Uses and Still Possesses 
False Immigration Documents to Obtain Employment 
In the final hypothetical, the client is committing an ongoing crime that is 
related to the employment situation. The client enters lawfully, but thereafter 
uses false immigration documents to obtain employment and still possesses the 
documents. The employee seeks the lawyer's assistance for a discriminatory 
termination. The lawyer agrees to represent the client after advising the client 
that possession of false immigration documents is unlawful and explaining to 
the client that she will not seek reinstatement or back-pay in the c1aim.227 Does 
the lawyer have an obligation to disclose the information about false work 
papers to a third party under Rule 4.1 (b) or to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b)? 
Possession of false immigration documents to obtain work is likely to be 
considered a continuing crime. 228 Since these are cases in which immigration 
status has been determined not to be relevant to the underlying proceedings, the 
lawyer would be barred from disclosing it to third parties under Rule 4.I(b) 
because it is not a "material" fact. 229 Even if it were determined that status was 
related or material to the proceeding, Rule 4.1 still requires there to be a 
relationship between the crime or fraud and the lawyer's actions. Specifically, 
the lawyer shall disclose confidential information only when necessary to avoid 
assisting in the commission or furtherance of the client's crime or fraud. So 
long as the lawyer advises the client that possession of such documents is 
illegal, does not seek reinstatement or back-pay, and seeks only compensatory 
damages, it is difficult to construe the lawyer's representation of the client in a 
claim for discriminatory termination as furthering the client's use of false 
papers to obtain employment. Further, disclosure under Rule 4.l(b) to third 
parties would be barred because the related information is confidential under 
Rule 1.6 and no exceptions apply. 
227. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text: see also 18 U.s.c. § 1546(a) 
(Supp. V 2006). 
229. If status is relevant. as it may be in some discriminatory-termination cases. or in 
some aspects of a discriminatory-termination case (e.g .. damages). then status could be 
required to be disclosed in discovery and at trial unless the employee asserts a privilege. See 
supra Part "l.A. 
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Pursuant to Rule 3 .3(b), is the use of false immigration documents to 
obtain work "related to the proceedings"? As discussed above in hypothetical 
three, the use of false immigration documents to obtain work might subject the 
client to criminal and civil liability, but it does not, by itself, relate to the 
proceedings nor undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process as those 
terms are defined in Rule 3.3(b). If the client decided to make false statements 
under oath or present false evidence, and the lawyer was unable to dissuade the 
client, the lawyer would be required to comply with the disclosure requirements 
set forth in 3 .3(b). 
Thus, Rule 4.1 (b) does not appear to mandate disclosure to third parties in 
any instance because of the Rule 1.6 limitations. Disclosure to a tribunal under 
Rule 3.3(b) would only be mandated if status were determined to be "related to 
the proceedings:' Given the meaning of "related to the proceedings" and the 
fact that these issues will arise only where status is found not relevant to the 
underlying claim, a mandated disclosure to the tribunal pursuant to Rule 3.3(b) 
would seem to occur only if the client took some subsequent action in the 
context of the proceedings that affected the integrity of the adjudicative 
process, such as lying on the stand or presenting false evidence. However, if 
counseled appropriately, disclosure to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b) should not 
be necessary. 
Though the hypotheticals above focus on the ethical obligations of lawyers 
representin~ employees, the ethical rules also impact lawyers representing 
employers. 30 For a lawyer representing an employer, ethical issues are most 
likely to arise when the lawyer inquires about the employee's immigration 
status, either during discovery or at trial. In order to assess the ethical 
limitation, the lawyer first needs to assess whether immigration status is 
relevant to the underlying litigation. If the question of relevance has not been 
decided by a court, or if a court has decided that status is relevant, inquiry into 
the opposing party's immigration status would likely be permissible and 
ethical. If, however, immigration status is not relevant to the underlying 
litigation, several ethical rules might limit inquiry by the employer's attorney. 
The first limitation stems from Rule 4.4(a) which states that "a lawyer shall 
not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, 
or burden a third person.,,23! Where immigration status is not relevant, the 
question is whether the employer has a "substantial purpose" to inquire. Given 
the information's lack of substantive consequence to the litigation, the inquiry 
230. In addition to ethical limitations. the employer may take action that raises the 
specter of potential criminal liability. For example. if the employer signed an 1-9 form 
verifying that the employee was documented. but either knew. or had reason to know. that 
the employee lacked lawful status. the employer might subject himself to criminal liability 
for knowingly hiring an undocumented worker. See 8 U.s.c. § 1324a(a) (2000) (SUbjecting 
employers who violate IRCA to criminal prosecution). 
231. MODEL RULES OF ?ROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2007). 
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likely lacks "substantial purpose" and instead is likely being used to gain unfair 
advantage in the litigation. Further, Rule 8.4(d) states that it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice:,232 The comments help define the parameters of this 
rule and state that "[a] lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, 
knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, 
sex, religion, national ongm, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.,,233 When immigration status is not considered 
relevant, intentional inquiry into such information may refiect bias or prejudice 
based upon national origin. And, if the inquiry deters the employee from 
proceeding with her claims, it could be construed as prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
A second, but somewhat related, limitation can be found in Rule 3.4(d), 
which states that a lawyer shall not, "in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous 
discovery request:,234 Again, if a court has determined that immigration status 
is not relevant to the underlying litigation, inquiry by the employer's attorney 
as to the employee's immigration status could be viewed as a frivolous 
discovery request under Rule 3.4(d). 
A third limitation involves the use of threats of criminal prosecution as a 
way to gain advantage in a civil action. This could happen expressly if the 
employer threatens to report the worker to police or immigration officials. It 
could also arise implicitly through questions about immigration status in the 
civil case. Under the old Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer 
could not "present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal 
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.',235 While this 
prohibition does not expressly exist in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct,236 there are, nonetheless, limitations on the use of such a threat to 
232. fd. R. 8.4(d). 
233. Id. R. 8.4 cmt. 3. Further, while there is no explicit language in the rules 
themselves about harassment. the preamble to the Model Rules states that "[a]lmvyer should 
use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others:' 
Id. pmbl. 5. 
234. Id. R. 3.4(d). 
235. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSlBtLITY DR 7-105(A) (1980). Some states have 
retained the old Model Code approach. See, e.g.. CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(7) 
(1986): D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (1990): ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. 1.2(e) (1990): ME. BAR RULES R. 3.6(c) (1986): TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 4.04(b)( I) ( 1989). 
236. See HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24, at 40-8 (explaining that the omission was 
deliberate because its inclusion was viewed as redundant): CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS 718 (1986) (explaining that the drafters of the Model Rules deliberately 
omitted DR 7- I05(A)"s language based upon the belief that "extortionate. fraudulent. or 
otherwise abusive threats were covered by other, more general prohibitions in the Model 
Rules and thus that there was no need to outlaw such threats specifically"). 
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advance a civil claim. 237 Based upon a Fonnal Opinion of the ABA Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, a threat to bring criminal charges to 
advance a civil claim 
would violate the Model Rules if the criminal wrongdoing were unrelated to 
the client's civil claim, if the lawyer did not believe both the civil claim and 
the potential criminal charges to be well-founded, or if the threat constituted 
an attemp,t to exert or suggest improper influence over the criminal 
process. 2,,8 
In this context, since it has already been determined that immigration status 
is not relevant to the underlying litigation, immigration status may not be 
sufficiently related to the claim to insulate the lawyer from improper ethical 
conduct.239 Further, in the absence of a relationship between the threat and the 
underlying claim, the actions of the employer's lawyer might be construed as 
extortion, which is a disciplinary offense under Rule 8.4. 240 The Model Penal 
Code defines extortion as obtaining the property of another through threats, 
including threats to accuse another of a criminal offense.24I However, if the 
employer has an honest belief that the charges are well founded, the actions 
would not constitute extortion. 242 Thus, what the employer knew, or didn't 
know, might impact the analysis. In most instances, the employer would be 
inquiring about immigration status to gain an advantage in the litigation and 
thus would know, or bel ieve, that the employee lacked legal status. If this were 
the case, the employer's actions would not likely rise to the level of extortion. 
However, if the employer threatens criminal prosecution, without any 
237. For an exploration of when threatening eriminal action may be an ethics violation. 
see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994) (examining 
whether a lawyer can use the threat of filing a disciplinal)' complaint or report against 
opposing counsel to obtain advantage in a civil case): ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'! 
Responsibility. Formal Op. 92-363 (1992) (examining when a threat to bring criminal 
charges for the purposc of advancing a civil claim would violate the ethics rules). 
238. ABA Comm, on Ethics and Prof'! Responsibility. Formal Op, 92-363 (1992). 
239. For a discussion of the purpose behind the relatedness requirement. see id. C'A 
relatedness requirement avoids exposure to the charge of compounding .... It also tends to 
ensure that negotiations will be focused on the true value of the civil claim, which 
presumably includes any criminal liability arising from the same facts or transaction. and 
discourages exploitation of extraneous matters that have nothing to do with evaluating that 
claim,"). 
240. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2007) Cit is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: ... (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty. 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects: (c) engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud. deceit or misrepresentation,"). 
241. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(2) (2001). 
242. While the lawyer's actions might not rise to the level of extortion. if the lawyer 
uses even a well-founded threat of criminal charges merely to harass a third person. the 
lawyer's actions could violate Rule 4.4(a). which states. "[i]n representing a client a lawyer 
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass. delay. or 
burden a third person:' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2007): see also ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'! Responsibility. Formal Op. 92-363 (1992). 
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actual intent to proceed with such a claim, the lawyer's actions could violate 
Rule 4.1, which imposes upon lawyers a duty to be truthful when dealing with 
others. 243 And, even if the lawyer's actions do not amount to extortion because 
they are based upon an honest belief that the charges are well founded, if his 
purpose in making the threat is merely to harass a third person, his actions 
could constitute a violation of Rule 4.4(a).244 
In sum, disclosure obligations pursuant to the Model Rules will vary 
depending upon whether immigration status is relevant to the underlying 
proceedings. If status is relevant, the information will be disclosed during the 
course of the litigation unless a privilege applies. Undocumented workers may 
opt to claim their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as 
opposed to risking disclosure of their status.245 If status is not relevant to their 
underlying claim, disclosure to a third party pursuant to Rule 4.I(b) is 
prohibited since the information is confidential under Rule 1.6. Disclosure to a 
tribunal pursuant to Rule 3.3(b) is limited to those instances in which status is 
determined to be "related to the proceedings." Given that status is not relevant 
to the proceedings, if the client does not utilize that information in a way that 
undermines the integrity ofthe adjudicative process, then the lawyer will not be 
obligated to disclose the information to a tribunal. Finally, the ethical rules also 
may limit an employer's ability to inquire about an employee's immigration 
status. If the inquiry lacks "substantial purpose" or is merely a "frivolous" 
discovery request, the lawyer's actions may be impermissible. Further, a 
lawyer's actions may be ethically improper if the inquiry amounts to an implied 
threat of criminal prosecution and the criminal allegations are not related to the 
civil case. Thus, lawyers for both the employer and employee should be 
mindful of ethical I imitations as they undertake representation in this context. 
IV. STRATEGIC DEC1SIO;'\l TO DISCLOSE 
In the absence of permissive or mandatory disclosure pursuant to the 
ethical rules, lawyers might consider whether disclosure of immigration status 
would be strategically beneficial to the case. In such instances, what can and 
should lawyers do? To address this question, this Part will first examine the 
overall decision-making paradigm set forth in the Model Rules and then ask 
whether the disclosure of immigration status, pursuant to the rules, is a lawyer 
243. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2007) ("In the eourse of representing a 
elient a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person .... .o). 
244. Jd. R. 4.4(a) ("[A] lawyer shall not us[e] means that have no substantial purpose 
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person .... .o); see also ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992) C'A lawyer who uses even a 
well-founded threat of criminal charges merely to harass a third person violates Rule 4.4 . .o). 
245. For a description of the potential consequences to the plaintiff of elaiming the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, see supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text. 
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or client decision. After analyzing this paradigm, this Part will examine how 
strategic disclosure decisions are affected by confidentiality rules. Finally, this 
Part will address the lawyer's counseling and communication obligations. 
In most instances, disclosure of immigration status exposes the client to 
grave risks without any comparable benefit in return. 246 However, there may 
be some limited instances in which disclosure could work to a client's 
advantage. This advantage could play out in relation to the judge as well as the 
opposing party. For example, disclosing status up front might give your 
individual client more credibility before the judge: if the client is telling the 
truth about status, he or she is probably telling the truth about the issues in the 
pending litigation. Such disclosure would also serve to educate the judge and 
others about undocumented workers and their pi ight. In terms of the opposing 
party, if the client discloses early in the litigation, it shows that he or she is not 
afraid of the disclosure and thus takes away much of the opposing party's 
leverage in negotiations. 247 In terms of a trial strategy, a client's immigration 
status could be used as part of a theory of the case or a storytelling device to 
explain that even though this person is very vulnerable, he or she is seeking a 
legal remedy because the harm done was so great. Finally, for lawyers working 
closely with the immigrant day laborer community, disclosure could be used as 
an organizing tool to show that some individuals stepped forward, pursued 
relief even though they were afraid, and ultimately succeeded in court. 
Assuming the lawyer believes that disclosure of immigration status might 
be beneficial to the client's case, who gets to make the ultimate decision about 
disclosure? Rule 1.2(a) states that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall 
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.,,248 As 
246. See supra notes 9-1 I and accompanying text (describing some of the potential 
dangers that could accompany disclosure of immigration status). 
247. Some clients determine that money is more important to them than a deportation 
order because they are willing to go back and forth across the border. In such instances. what 
might be better for individual clients might not be better for the larger client community. 
While the possibility of differing interests of individual clients and the larger community 
raise interesting questions about the scope and nature of a lawyer's advice. such inquiry is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
248. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). For a discussion of the 
historical development of ethical limitations on the allocation of decision-making authority. 
see Judith L. Maute. Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 17 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1049. 1053-57 (1984). For a description of the 
specific changes made to Rule 1.2(a) in 2002. see Love. supra note 193. explaining: 
The Commission was concerned that the current formulation sends conflicting signals: on the 
one hand it might be read to require consultation with the client before the lawyer takes any 
action: and on the other it suggests that the lawyer is not obliged to abide by the client's 
decisions with respect to the ·means.· a, opposed to the ·objectives.· of the representation. 
After considering and rejecting a number of alternative formulations. the Commission 
decided to add a new sentence to clarify that '[a]lawycr may take such action on behalf of 
the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.' and to leave the 
resolution of disagreements with clients about means to be worked out within a framework 
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defined, the objectives of the representation are those decisions that directly 
affect the ultimate resolution of the case or the substantive rights of the 
client. 249 Means of the representation, on the other hand, refer to those 
decisions that are procedural or tactical in nature. 250 The rule is designed to 
allocate primary responsibility for decision making in these two categories, 
with clients making those decisions that relate to "objectives" and lawyers 
making those decisions that relate to "means," after consultation with the 
client. 251 Despite the attempt to distinguish between "objectives" 252 and 
"means;,253 the rule does not always provide a lawyer clear guidance on which 
defined by the law of agency, the right of the client to discharge the lawyer, and the right of 
the lawyer to withdraw from the representation ifthe lawyer has a fundamental disagreement 
with the cI ient To emphasize the lawyer's obligation to consult a cross reference to Rule 1.4 
('Communication') was added to the text 
Id at 447. 
249. See, e.g., Blanton v. Womancare Inc .. 696 P.2d 645.650-51 (Cal. 1985) (finding 
that decisions that would impair substantive rights differ from procedural decisions "both in 
the degree to which they atTect the client's interest. and in the degree to which they involve 
matters of judgment which extend beyond technical competence"): Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. 
on Prof! Ethics. Informal Op. 97-37 (1997) (holding that the decision about whether to join 
a third party in civil action is an issue relating to the objectives of representation and is 
therefore a matter for the client to decide). One scholar has described the attorney-client 
relationship as similar to a joint venture in which each venturer presumptively takes on 
certain tasks. but without a sharp dividing line between their responsibilities. Maute. supra 
note 248. at 1066-69. 
250. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES. supra note 159. at 30-31. 
251. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-13. For examples of cases distinguishing 
between "objectives" and "means," see United States v. Beebe. 180 U.S. 343, 352 (1901) 
(finding that decision whether to settle belongs to client rather than Ia\\)'er): Hawkeye-Sec. 
Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co .. 260 F.2d 361. 363 (10th Cir. 1958) (finding that decision 
whether to appeal belongs to client rather than lawyer). Failure to respect this allocation of 
decision-making responsibility constitutes a breach of professional responsibility on the part 
of the lawyer. See. e.g.. Silver v. State Bar. 528 P.2d 1157, 1161-62 (Cal. 1974) (lawyer 
disciplined for dismissing appeal without client's consent and with a view to his own gain): 
In re Stem. 406 A.2d 970. 972 (N.1. 1979) (lawyer disciplined for settling matter Over 
client's objection); In re Paauwe, 654 P.2d 1117. 1120 (Or. 1982) (la\\)'er disciplined for 
appealing case without client consent). 
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). This rule is subject to a few 
limitations. such as the limitation that the objeetives must be lawful. HAZARD & HODES. 
supra note 24. at 5-14. If however. proper specific objectives are identified by the client and 
explained to the lawyer. a lawyer's failure to pursue them will constitute a violation of Rule 
l.2(a). See, e.g.. People v. McCatTrey. 925 P.2d 269. 271 (Colo. 1996) (finding that lawyer's 
delay in filing suit until statute of limitations lapsed violated Rule 1.2(a)): In re Hagedorn. 
725 N.E.2d 397. 399-400 (Ind. 2000) (holding that lawyer hired to assist clients in adopting 
a child failed to take steps to effectuate adoption. thereby violating Rules 1.1. 1.2(a), 1.3. and 
1.4). 
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.2(a) (2007) ("A lawyer may take such 
action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation."). 
Thus. there may be circumstances in which the lawyer could make a decision that a 
particular means or o~iective would be approved by the client. in the absence of an explicit 
discussion. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-13 to 5-14. The choice of means is still 
subject to mandatory "consultation" with the client as provided for in Rule 1.4. See MODEL 
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decisions concern the objectives and which concern the means of the 
representation. 254 As such, Rule 1.2(a) has been subject to criticism,255 and 
various scholars have proposed alternative models of decision making.256 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007). 
254. See Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised .Hodel of Attorney-Client Relationship: The 
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315. 324 (1987) ("'[T]hat which is often thought to 
be an end might really be a means: that which is assumed to be just a means could be an end 
to a particular client. "). This distinction \vill be difficult to adhere to where procedure begins 
to blend into substance. For example, some tactical decisions are so crucial to the litigation 
that they impact the objectives of the representation and clients will want to make the 
decision. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, at 5-14 to 5-14.1 r-lD]isagreement is especially 
likely where the lines between an 'objective' and 'means' to achieving that objective are 
most indistinct. In order to resolve certain commonly arising allocation questions of this sort 
Rule 1.2(a) specifies important dccisions that are to remain under the exclusive control of the 
client."). Given this blurring of the express delineation, Professors Hazard and Hodes have 
suggested that "[tJhe more a decision marks a critical turning point in the representation, 
whether for tacticaL strategic, economic, or even political and moral reasons. the more the 
lawyer should defer to the client." Id. at 5-17. 
255. See, e.g.. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLiENT-
CENTERED ApPROACH 266-67 (1991) (criticizing courts and professional standards that 
allocate decisions regarding the "ends" of the representation to clients and those concerning 
the "means" to lawyers); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 
154 (1974) (suggesting a participatory model of client counseling in which clients are active 
decision makers in addressing their problems and share control and decision-making 
responsibility with the lawyer): Arnold I. SiegeL Abandoning the Agency .\Iodel of the 
Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Sew Approach for Deciding Authority Disputes. 69 NEB. L. 
REV. 473 (1990): Mark Spiegel. Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent 
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41. 43 (1979) (arguing that the distinction 
which purportedly gives the lawyer control over procedural and tactical decisions and clients 
control over the subject matter of the litigation is inappropriate). 
256. BINDER ET AL .. supra note 255, at 268 (proposing that lawyers should defer to 
clients "whenever a lawyer using 'such skilL prudence, and diligence as other members of 
the profession commonly possess and exercise,' would or should know that a pending 
decision is likely to have a substantial legal or nonlegal impact on a client"(quoting W. 
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 185-93 (1984))). In terms of the technical or 
means-based decisions. Binder. Bergman and Price state that such issues are "generally for 
[the lawyer] alone to decide, even though they may have a substantial impact." unless that 
impact is "beyond that normal(v associated with the exercise of lmtyering skills and crafts." 
Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Finally, the authors explain that "[i]n counseling clients, 
lawyers should provide clients with a reasonable opportunity to identity and evaluate those 
alternatives and consequences that similarly situated clients usually find pivotal or 
pertinent." Id. at 275. ROSENTHAL supra note 255, at 154 (suggesting a participatory model 
of client counseling in which clients are active decision makers in addressing their problems 
and share control and decision-making responsibility with the lawyer): SiegeL supra note 
255, at 515-27 (proposing the development of an informed consent doctrine that would 
account for the interests of the client, lawyer. and the public). 
Additionally, various authors have written about decision making between the lawyer 
and client in specific contexts. See. e.g .. Thomas F. Geraghty & Will Rhee, Learning from 
Tragedy: Representing Children in Discretionary Transfer Hearings, 33 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 595 (1988) (discussing decision making in the context of representing children): Ann 
Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An 
Empirical Study of Lawyers' Xorms, 9 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 1101. 1131-47 (1996) 
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So where does the disclosure of immigration status fall on the spectrum 
between objectives and means? Whether and when to disclose immigration 
status does not necessarily fall squarely into either definition, but could be 
categorized as either. 257 Assuming that one's client is an undocumented worker 
who is seeking relief in which immigration status is not relevant, disclosure of 
immigration status should not impact the ultimate resolution of the legal case 
and might be construed as a procedural or tactical decision. In those cases in 
which immigration status is relevant, disclosure could directly affect the 
ultimate resolution of the case or the substantive rights of the client. 258 
Regardless of whether status is relevant or not, disclosure may have many 
collateral consequences. For example, the client may be at risk of criminal 
prosecution, deportation, or being barred from reentry into the United States.259 
In terms of the litigation, while disclosure may not ultimately determine the 
merits of the litigation, it could, in certain contexts, result in dismissal of the 
(examining lawyer-client decision making in the context of poverty law and civil rights 
practices); Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood. The Allocation of Decision making Between 
Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client 
Decisionmaking. 47 U. KAN. L. REV. I (1998) (exploring the attorney-client decision-making 
paradigm in the context of criminal defense); Tracy N. Zlock. The :Vative American Tribe as 
a Client: An Ethical Analysis. 10 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 159 (1996) (addressing the problem 
of allocation of decision-making authority when representing Native American tribes). 
257. What it: for example. there is a disagreement between the lawyer and the client 
regarding who gets to make this decision? Rule 1.2 does not specify an exact procedure for 
resolving such a disagreement. The lack of specificity is due in part to the "varied nature of 
the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in 
question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons:' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cm!. 2 (2007). If. after consultation with the client. there is no mutually 
agreeable solution. the lawyer could characterize the disagreement as fundamental and seek 
permission to withdraw from the representation. Id. R. 1.16(b)( 4). The client could also 
discharge the lawyer if unsatisfied with the service being provided. Id. R. 1.16(a)(3). 
258. Of course there are other ethical rules that would impact whether or not a laVl-'Yer 
can disclose or must disclose in this situation. For a detailed discussion of ethical limitations 
when immigration status is relevant to the case. see supra Part 1I1.A. 
259. See Rivera v. NIBCO. Inc .. 364 F.3d 1057. \064 (9th Cir. 2004). cert. denied. 
544 U.S. 905 (2005) C'While documented workers face the possibility of retaliatory 
discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil rights. undocumented workers confront the 
harsher reality that. in addition to possible discharge. their employer will likely report them 
to the INS and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution:'). 
For a description of potential criminal liability. see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying 
text. Finally. a client who is found to have been in the United States unlawfully for a year or 
more and who thereafter seeks re-admission into the United States will be barred from 
admission for ten years. 8 U.s.c. § I I 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(JI) (2000). 
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action. 260 And, if the immigrant fears disclosure, the decision to disclose by the 
lawyer might force the client to voluntarily dismiss the action. Given the 
potential impact upon the client and the potential impact on the resolution of 
the case, the decision to disclose should be made by the client after consultation 
with the lawyer. 261 
This analysis assumes that the strategic decision to disclose is simply a 
matter of who gets to decide. However, given that the information to be 
disclosed is confidential information,262 the lawyer must grapple with the 
interplay between the rules that govern who gets to decide and the 
confidentiality rules. The rule of confidentiality is one ofthe fundamental rules 
of professional conduct for lawyers.263 This rule requires lawyers to keep all 
information "relating to the representation" confidentiaL unless the information 
falls within a small number of closely defined circumstances. 264 A strategic 
decision to disclose immigration status does not fall within the exceptions to 
the confidentiality rule 26) and should not trump a client's expectation of 
confidentiality. Thus, in order to disclose for strategic purposes, the lawyer 
must have the client's consent, either express or implied. 
In trying to obtain client consent, lawyers should be guided by Rule 1.4, 
which delineates communication obligations. 266 Rule 1.4(a) specifically 
260. A general practice of pcrnlilting such discovery might deter litigation by documented 
workers concerned that their immigration status could later change. or that litigation might 
lead to revelation of immigration problems of relatives or friends. The specter of deportation 
arouses considerable fear among some immigrant groups: the chilling effect of discovery 
orders could deter legal action simply because the potential plaintiffs did not fully understand 
the relationship between their immigration status and civil litigation. 
Schnapper. supra note 151. at 54. 
261. Such a position is not \vithout support. There are a series of cascs in which courts 
have decided. in the context of an ongoing professional relationship. that the client's 
judgment should prevail even in matters of tactics. procedure. or drafting of documents. See. 
e.g.. State v. Ali. 407 S.E.2d 183. 189 (N.C. 1991) ("[W]hen counsel and a fully informed 
criminal defendant client reach an absolute impasse as to such tactical decisions. the client's 
wishes must control: this rule is in accord with the principal-agent nature of the attorney-
client relationship."): Olson v. Fraase. 421 N.W.2d 820. 829-30 (N.D. 1988) (explaining that 
the lawyer had a duty to follow client's reasonable instructions to prepare documents to 
create joint tenancy. despite honest belief that instructions were not in client's best interest): 
Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc .. 694 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1985): Olfe v. Gordon. 286 
N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1980) (detennining that a lawyer may not ignore client's wish to obtain 
certain type of collateral); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof! Responsibility. 
Infonnal Op. 97-48 (1997) (finding that a lawyer who thinks client is mistaken in wanting to 
take particular legal action is obligated to either follO\\ client's instructions or withdraw 
from representation). 
262. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. 
263. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-6 ("As a matter of professional ethics and 
discipline. lawyers are obligated-with only a few narrowly drawn exceptions-to preserve 
their clients' confidences inviolate."). 
264. See supra notes 176-78. 181-99 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra notes 181-99 and accompanying text. 
266. MODEL RULES OF PROF'l CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007). 
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identifies those decisions that clients need to be consulted on267 and creates an 
affirmative duty to discuss with clients decisions that require their informed 
consent268 as well as a duty to reasonably consult about the means by which 
their objectives are to be accomplished. 269 "Reasonably" implies that the 
lawyer's obligation to consult will vary depending upon the circumstances. 270 
The lawyer will have to weigh the importance of the action and the feasibility 
of consulting with the client prior to acting. 271 
Assuming that the disclosure can happen only if the client agrees to waive 
the confidentiality mandate, what is the attorney obligated to communicate to 
the client to assist in the decision-making process? According to the Model 
Rules, the client "should have sufficient information to participate intelligently 
in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by 
which they are to be pursued.,,272 In order to participate intelligently in 
decision making, the rules contemplate that clients' decisions are "based upon 
an understandin~ of the risks and benefits that may result from disclosure and 
nondisclosure.,,_73 In particular, when a lawyer is aware of facts that may 
jeopardize the client's objectives in seeking representation, the lawyer must 
267. As originally promulgated. Rule 1.4(a) simply stated that "[a] lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information." ROTUNDA & DZiENKOWSKI. supra note 193. at 117. In 2002. the 
Rule was amended to identify tive specific requirements. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. 1.4(a) (2007). Section (b) is designed to make operational the obligations implicit in Rule 
1.2, which requires that the lawyer consult with clients about the means utilized to achieve 
clients' objectives. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 7-7. 
268. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (2007). 
269. Id. R. 1.4(a) states. "A la\vyer shall ... reasonably consult with the client about 
the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished .... " 
270. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, at 7-5 (finding that the duty of the la\\yer to 
communicate with the client under Rule 1.4 is qualified by the concept of reasonableness). 
Thus. whether or not a lawyer has a duty to consult requires a context-sensitive analysis 
ba<;ed on objective factors. 
271. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 3 (2007). If the lawyer is 
impliedly authorized to act in certain situations. the obligation to consult is alleviated. 
COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT. REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES (2001) (explaining changes to Model Rule 1.2). 
272. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (2007). 
273. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES. supra note 159. at 93; see. e.g.. Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Snyder. 793 A.2d SIS (Md. 2002) (finding that in failing to explain implications 
of OWl case adequately to client and incorrectly advising her that she need not appear in 
court for initial appearance which resulted in her arrest. attorney committed misconduct). 
Accordingly. a Im\yer must explain the legal effect of entering an agreement or executing a 
legal document. See, e.g.. In re Morse. 470 S.E.2d 232 (Ga. 1996) (disciplining attorney for 
asking client to sign agreement settling worker's compensation claim without explaining its 
legal effect); In re Ragland. 697 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1998) (finding attorney violated 
professional conduct rules in failing to explain impact of settlement and indemnity 
agreement); see also In re Flack. 33 P.3d 1281 (Kan. 2001) (finding that by failing to meet 
individually with clients to explain estate plans. and relying on nonlawyer staff to explain 
plans to clients. attorney violated Rule 1.4(b )). 
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apprise the client of those facts and their legal implications in order for the 
client to make an informed decision about alternatives.274 In order to be 
effective. the lawyer should provide advice regarding the risks and benefits of a 
certain action in language appropriate to the client's level of sophistication.275 
A lawyer who is relying upon client consent to justifY an action and has not 
actual\y received that consent. or has not communicated sufficiently with the 
client. may be subject to discipline. 276 
In the context of waiving the confidentiality mandate and disclosing the 
client's immigration status. the lawyer needs to explain the risks and benefits of 
disclosing the information in a way that can be understood by the client. Given 
the potential ramifications. it may be advisable to explain not only the legal 
consequences related to the ongoing litigation, but also some of the nonlegal 
consequences that could accompany disclosure. Once this information has been 
274. See, e.g.. In re Sullivan. 727 A.2d 832 (Del. 1999) (finding improper the aets of a 
lawyer who failed to tile a brief which resulted in dismissal of appeal and. more than a year 
later. sent a letter to client informing her there were "no claims pending" in her ca~e): In re 
Cable. 715 N.E.2d 396 (Ind. 1999) (finding that in failing to inform client that he was too 
busy to handle appeal. lawyer neglected to explain matter to the extent reasonably necessary 
to allow client to make informed decisions about representation): Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Cassidy. 766 A.2d 632 (Md. 2001) (finding misconduct by a lawyer who was 
hired to draft and record deed but failed to tell client he had been suspended, which was vital 
information because the law requires certifieation by a lawyer to record deed): In re Howe. 
626 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 2001) (tinding that attorney's eonduct in failing to explain to client 
he was not following through with his commitment to reduce award to judgment resulted in 
client's inability to make informed decision to secure alternate counsel to complete matter 
before interest rate was locked and constituted misconduct). 
275. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are rea'mnably 
adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal 
matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved. and whether the client or 
other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally. 
such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or 
other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should 
be assumed to have given informed consent. 
MODEL RULES OF ?ROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 cmt. 6 (2007): see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS * 62 (2000) ("When the question concerns the lawyer's duty 
to the client. the clienfs consent is effective only if given on the basis of information and 
consultation reasonably appropriate in the circumstances. "). 
276. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24. at 9-65 C[I]f a lawyer who is relying on 
client consent to justify disclosure of elient information has not actually received consent. or 
has not communicated sufficiently with the client. the lawyer may be subjected to 
discipline."): see also, e.g., In re Winkel. 577 N.W.2d 9, II (Wis. 1998) (finding that failure 
to inform clients about risk of criminal prosecution if clients surrendered business assets to 
bank and la,v firm without arranging to pay subcontractor bills amounted to failure to 
explain matter to clients to extent reasonably necessary to permit them to make informed 
decision): ABA Comm. on Prof] Ethics and Grievances. Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) 
(explaining that for lawyer and client to agree to retainer provision calling for binding 
arbitration of disputes regarding fees and malpractice claims. lawyer must fully apprise 
client of advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, including informing client that 
arbitration normally results in client's waiver of significant rights. such as right to jury trial. 
broad discovery. and appeal). 
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provided to a client, the client can then make an informed decision about 
whether waiving confidentiality and disclosing immigration status is in his or 
her best interest. 
In sum, if a lawyer believes disclosure would be beneficial to a client's 
case, the lawyer should utilize the decision-making paradigm set forth in Rule 
1.2. The lawyer must also be mindful that immigration status is considered 
confidential information and that the confidentiality mandates of Rule 1.6 
apply. Thus, in the absence of exceptions permitting disclosure, the lawyer 
generally must counsel the client and obtain the client's informed consent in 
order to disclose an undocumented worker's status. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A legislative solution to the ongoing immigration debates may be reached 
in the near future. However, until that time, undocumented workers will 
continue to work, and some will inevitably confront legal issues related to their 
labor and employment. In light of these realities, courts will continue to define 
the scope of rights and remedies for undocumented workers post-Hoffman. 
Lawyers confronting these issues will continue to wrestle with issues related to 
the representation of undocumented workers and the disclosure of immigration 
status in the course of representation. 
This Article concludes that Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits a lawyer from 
assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, generally does not bar an 
attorney from counseling or re~resenting an undocumented worker in 
employment-related civil litigation. 77 What lawyers do with information about 
immigration status in the course of litigation depends in part upon the relevance 
of status to the underlying litigation and the client's choices surrounding 
disclosure. If immigration status is not relevant to the underlying proceedings, 
lawyers will not be obligated to disclose status. In those instances where 
immigration status is relevant to the underlying proceedings, lawyers should 
counsel their clients on the use of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as a way to protect this information. Finally, strategic decisions 
regarding disclosure of immigration status are decisions to be made by the 
client after being counseled on the risks and benefits of disclosure. In light of 
the potential harmful consequences of an unwitting disclosure, lawyers should 
undertake representation of undocumented workers in labor and employment 
litigation mindful of the ethical issues that will inevitably arise. 
277. See supra Part II. 
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Table 1: Criminal Immigration Convictions 
the Tran sactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), this number is up 1% over the previous 
month . 
The comparisons of the number of defendants convicted for immigration-related offenses are based 
on case- by-case Information obtained by TRAC under the Freedom of Information Act f rom the 
Executive Office for United States Attorneys. (See Table 1) 
When mont hly 20 10 convictions of th is type are compared with those of the sa me peri od in t he 
previous year, the number of convictions was up (22 .1 percent) . Convictions over the past year are 
still much higher than they were five years ago. Overall, the data show that convictions of this type 
are up 124.7 percent from levels reported in 2005. 
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Figure 1: Monthly trends in immigration convictions 
The increase from the levels five years ago in immigration convictions for these matters is shown 
more clearly in Figure 1. The vertical bars in Figure 1 represent the number of immigration 
convictions of this type recorded on a month - to-month baSis. Where a prosecution was initially filed 
in U.S. Magistrate Court and then transferred to the U.S. District Court, the magistrate fil ing date was 
used since th is provides an earlier indicator of actual trends. The su peri mposed line on the bars plots 
the six-month moving average so that natural fluctuations are smoothed out. The one and five-year 
rates of change in Table 1 and in the sections that follow are all based upon this six "month moving 
average . To v iew trends year-by-year rather than month-by-month , see TRAC's annual report series 
for a broader picture . 
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now ranking . The Southern 
California (San Diego) was 
a year ago. 
to the top 10 list were South 
, now ranked f and Western District 
(Grand Rapids) at 6th In the same 
ranked and 13 th one 
ttl and 24th five years ago. 
district which showed the 
in immigration convictions 
year ago- 718.2 percent-
Southern District of California (San Diego). 
was the same district that had the largest 
8900 %-when compared with five 
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.. 
.. 
District Court recording the largest in immigration convictions- 92.9 
District of Texas (Fort Worth). But over the past five years, Colorado showed 
77.8 percent. 
there are about 680 federal District Court judges working in the United States. The 
with the number of new immigration crime cases in convictions 
December 2010 are shown in Table 3 . 
.. Philip Ray 
~J1artinez the 
Western District of 
ranked 
with 11 convicted in 
convictions. Judge 
ivJartinez appeared 
ten 
April 9, 2011 
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:TBAC 
The latest availab le data from the 
Justice Depart ment show that 
during December 2010 the 
government reported 11421 new 
prosecutions. According to the 
case- by -case information analyzed 
by t he Transact ional Records 
,\ccess Clearinghouse (TRAC), t his 
number is down 8.4% over the 
previous month. 
Number Lat0st Month 
Percent Change from pmvious month 
Percent Cbang& 
Percent Change from 5 years "90 (lnc.uding Magistrate Court) 
Percent Change 
The compa risons of the number of defendants charged are based on case-by-case information 
obtained by TRAC under the Freedom of Information Act from the Executive Office for United States 
Atto rneys. (See Table 1) 
When monthly 2010 prosecutions of this type are compared with those of the same period in the 
previ ous year, t he number of filings was down (-6.3 percent). Prosecutions over the past year are stil l 
m uch higher than they were five years ago. Overail, the data show that prosecutions of th is type are 
up 31. 7 percen t from leve ls reported in 2005. 
The growth in these cases is part ly related to increases in the matters filed in U.S. Magistrate Courts . 
I f magistrate cases are excl uded and only Federal District Court cases are counted, the overall 
increase in prosecutions is 2.5 percent instead of 31. 7 percent. The evidence suggests t hat part of 
the diffe rence may be the result of improvements in the recording of the magistrate cases by t he 
Just ice Department . 
i .l 
1U 
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Figure 1: Monthly trends in prosecutions 
The increase from the levels five years ago in prosecutions for these matters is shown more clearly in 
Figure 1. The vertica l bars in Figure 1 represent the number of prosecutions of this type recorded on 
a montri- to -month basi s. Where a prosecution was initially filed in U.S. Magistrate Court and then 
tr'ansferTed to the U.S. District Court, the magistrate filing date was used since this provides an 
ear lier indicator of actual t rends. The superimposed line on the bars plots the six-month moving 
average so that natura l fluctuations are smoothed out. The one and five-year rates of change in Table 
1 and in the sections that follow are all based upon this six-month moving average. To view trends 
year-by- year rather than month-by-month, see TRAC's annual report series for a broader picture . 
Cases were classified by prosecutors into more specific types. 
The largest number of prosecutions of these matters in December 2010 was for "Immigrat ion" , 
accou nting for 48 percent of prosecutions. Prosecutions were also filed fo r "Drugs-Drug Trafficking " 
( 13%), " Withheld by Gov t from TRAC (FOIA challen" (8.2%), "Weapons-Operation Triggerlock Major" 
(4 .5%), "Other Crim ina l Prosecutions" (3.9%) , "ASSimilated Crimes" (3.7%), "Drugs-Organized Crime 
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See Figure 2. 
agency for prosecutions in December 2010 was DHS accounting for 55 percent 
referred. Other agencies with substantial numbers of referrals were: DEA (11% ), FBI 
See Figure 3. 
FBI 
types of prosecutions Figure 3: Prosecutions by mV'I"'"",,;n agency 
U.S. Magistrate Courts 
Lead Charges 
6476 defendants in cases for these matters were filed in U.S. Magistrate Courts. 
less serious misdemeanor cases, including what are called "petty offenses," In 
are sometimes filed in the magistrate courts before an indictment or information 
cases, the matter starts in the magistrate courts and later moves to the district 
subsequent proceedings take place. 
courts in December the most frequently cited lead charge was Title 8 U.s,( Section 
the "Entry of alien at improper time or place; etc.", This was the lead 32.8 
filings in December. 
prosecuted lead charges include: "08 USC 1326 - Reentry of deported alien" 
841 - Drug Abuse Prevention & Control-Prohibited acts An (6%). 
U.S. District Courts 
4945 defendants in new cases for these matters were charged in the U.S. District 
In addition during December there were an additional 2336 defendants whose cases moved 
the magistrate courts to the U.S. district courts after an indictment or information was filed. The 
which follow cover both sets of cases and therefore cover all matters filed in district court 
Lead Charges 
shows the top lead charges recorded in the prosecutions of matters filed in U.S, District Court 
2010. 
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alien" (Title 8 U.S.C Section 1326) was the most lead 
,",?,pncr\! of deported alien" (Title 8 U.s.C Section 1326) was ranked 1 a year ago, 
ranked 2 five years ago. 
In was the lead charge "Drug Abuse Prevention & Control-Prohibited 
Title 21 U.S.C Section 841. "Drug Abuse Prevention & Control-Prohibited acts A" 
Title 21 U.S.C Section 841 was ranked 2 a year ago, while it was ranked 1 five years 
was and conspiracy" under Title 21 U.S.C Section 846. 
under Title 21 U.S.C Section 846 was ranked 3 a year ago, while it was ranked 3 
ago. 
ten lead charges, the one showing the greatest increase in prosecutions-up 
mr)"'r'.,,; to one year ago was Title 21 U.S.C Section 952 that involves" of 
substances ". Compared to five years ago, the largest increase-106.8 percent-was 
for under" Reentry of deported alien" (Title 8 U.S.C Section 1326 ). 
the top ten lead charges, the one showing the sharpest decline in prosecutions 
year ago-down 12.4 percent-was Bank robbery and inCidental crimes 
113 ). to five years ago, the most Significant decline in 
for filings where the lead charge was" Bringing in and harboring certain aliens" 
1324 ). 
Judicial Districts 
2010 the Justice Department said the government brought 2845.9 prosecutions for 
in the United States. 
there is great variation in the per capita number of prosecutions that are filed in each 
federal judicial districts. 
the largest number of prosecutions per for these matters last month 
3. Districts must have at least 5 prosecutions to receive a ranking. 
.. The Southern District of 
California Diego)-with 
prosecutions as 
with 2845.9 
ten million 
in United States 
most active during 
2010. The Southern 
California Diego) 
ranked 4 a year ago, while 
ranked 5 for most 
five years ago. 
.. District of Washington, D.C. 
ranked 
It New Mexico is now 
. The District of New 
ranked 5 a year 
was ranked 4 for 
use five years ago. 
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the top 10 list were Eastern District of Missouri Louis), now ranked f and 
at 2 nd In the same order, these districts ranked and 43 10 one 
61 st five years ago. 
district which showed the greatest growth in the rate of prosecutions 
percent-was Southern District of Alabama (Mobile). to five years ago, 
118.9 percent-was Southern District of California 
District Court recording the largest drop in the rate of 
North Dakota. But over the past five years, Eastern District of 
6.4 percent. 
time, there are about 680 federal District Court judges working in the United States. The 
with the number of new crime cases of this type during December 2010 are 
4. 
Crane in the 
District of Texas 
with 
in cases. 
in the top ten ran kings one year 
P. Kazen in the Southern District of Texas 
Kazen appeared in the top ten 
March 2011 
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4) and five years ago 
ranked With 87 
one year and 
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